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ABSTRACT 
The survival of the lo~ster fishery is dependent on many 
factors, both inside and outside the fishing household. This 
thesis argues that an adequate explanation of the survival of 
this petty commodity form of production necessitates an 
understanding of the tension between extern~l structures such 
as state policies and the internal dyn:~mics of fishing 
households. It exlimines the impact of changing state 
policies, during the period of the mid-1960s to the 1980s, on 
the survival of lobster fishing households. Recent changes 
in the area Qf licensing and unemployment insurance programs, 
resulted in both new constraints and new opportunities for 
the survival of lobster fishing households in PEI. 
Many analyses of the survival of fishing production have 
focused on the influence of state policy on the activities 
and decisions of the fisher. However, fishers are embedded 
in fishing households. State policies impact on members of 
fishing households, other than the fisher, and the survival 
of the fishing unit is dependent on the ability of the 
household as a whole to respond to changes in state policy. 
Drawing on data from interviews with men and women in 
fishing households in Naufrage, located in northeastern 
P.E.I., this thesis demonstrates that household members have 
actively and creatively responded to changes in state policy 
in developing strategies to reproduce their production unit. 
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Initiatives on the part of women have been a key component in 
household survival strategies. They have creatively adapted 
to the constraints of external forces as well as lobbied for 
changes in state policy that, in turn, extended the survival 
options for fishing families. The success of survival 
strategies depends on the internal characteristics of the 
fishing household such as life-cycle and the intersection of 
gender relations and household dynamics. 
iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This thesis was written with the support and encouragement 
of many people which I would now like to acknowledge. Firstly 
I want to thank my supervisors, Barbara Neis and Peter Sinclair 
for their competent supervision, constant encouragement, and 
challenging criticisms. 
I want to express appreciation to Memorial University for 
the Fellowship which I received during my two years at 
Memorial. Thanks also to the Institute of Social and Economic 
Research for the grant to do my research. This financial 
assistance certainly made my studies much more rewarding. 
My decision to take up graduate studies was greatly aided 
by the enthusiastic and generous support of the members of 
Cooper Institute. A special thanks to Marie Burge, Irene 
Burge, Irene Doyle. Andrew Macdonald and Vince Murnaghan for 
their helpful comments on my thesis and for their constant 
encouragement. 
A special word of appreciation to my mother who has always 
believed in me and encouraged me to follow new paths. Thanks 
also for your patience in waiting for me to come home to Prince 
Edward Island. As well, I want to express gratitude to my 
family, especially Irene and Florence. Your friendship and 
support was most appreciated. 
My stay in Newfoundland was made more enjoyable, thanks to 
the friendship, solidarity, and humor of my housemates and 
iv 
graduate colleagues. I extend a special word of gratitude to 
Linda Cullum, Gary Kinsman, Jaya Chauhan, Anne Louise Brooks 
and Helen Murphy. 
I could not have done this research without the generous 
and cooperative assistance of many individuals in both the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the Prince Edward Island 
Department of Fisheries. I would like to especially thank 
Miles Matheson and Mike Aitken. 
My decision to do this research on the fishery was partly 
inspired by my association with the Maritime Fishermen's Union. 
I have been constantly impressed by their commitment to work 
for the survival of the inshore fishery in the Maritime region. 
I also want to express a special appreciation to the fishing 
men and women in Naufrage, who have generously shared with me 
not only their knowledge of fishing, but also their love for 
their work and their desire to preserve this way of life. 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii 
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . • • . . . • • • . • . • . . • • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . i v 
Table of Contents •••.......••.....•.........•.. •..... vi 
List of Tables and Figures •••••.••••••••••• < • • • • • • • • • viii 
CHAPTER 1. Introduction • • . • . • • • . • • • • • • • . • • • • • . • . • • . . • . . 1 
1.1. Description of Research Community .•... •••.••• 4 
1. 2 . Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
1. 3. Thesis Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
CHAPTER 2. Understanding Survival: Theoretical Framework. 13 
2. 1. Definition of Survival . • • • • • • . • . • • • . . • . • • • . . • • . . 13 
2.1.1. survival from the Perspective of 
Household . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
2.2. Lobster Fishing as Petty Commodity Production •..• 16 
2.3. Conceptualizing Survival in Petty Commodity 
Production Theories .•.•....•.•...••..•.••. . .•... 19 
2.4. Contradictory Role of the State .•••....••...•... 24 
2.5. Gender and Household Relations ....•....••.•..... 29 
2. 6. Conclusion . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
CHAPTER 3. State Policies and Changing Organization in 
the.PEI ~obster Fi~hery •••..••••.•••.....••••••... 36 
3 .1. H1stor1cal overv~ew • • • • • . . • • • • . . • • • . . • . • • • . . . . . . 36 
3.2. Changes in State Policy in the 1960s .•..••.••... 40 
3.2.1. New Goals for State Policy in the 
Fishery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 
3.2.2. Rationalizing the Lobster Fishery •••....•..• 45 
3.3. Introduction of Trap Limits and Licensing 
Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 
3 . 3. 1. Buy-back Program • . . . . . • . • . . . . • . . . . . • • . . . • • . • 57 
3.3.2. Bonafide Licensing Policy .•.•••••••••••.•••. 60 
3.4. Impact of Lobster Regulations on Fishers in 
Naufrage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 
3.4.1. Increase in Concentration of Fishers 
in Naufrage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 
3.5. Unemployment Insurance •...••••..••.....••..•••.. 70 
3.6. Conclusion ...................................... 76 
CHAPTER 4. survival strategies of Fishing Households ... 77 
4 . 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7 
4.2. Strategies in the Lobster Fishery •••••.••..••.•• 77 
4. 2. 1. Fishing Harder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 
4.3. Fishing Other Species: Making a Day's Pay ••••.•. 89 
4. 3 .1. Groundfishery • • • • • • • • . • . • • . . • • • • • • . • • • • • • . . . 91 
4 • 3 • 2 • Tuna Fishery • . • . . • • • . . . • • • • . • • . . . • . • • . . . • . . • 9 5 
4. 3. 3. Herring Fishery • • • • • . • • • • • . • • • • • . • . • • • . • • • • . 97 
4 . 3. 4. Irish Moss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 
4.3.5. Unpredictability of Secondary Species ••••••.• 102 
vi 
4.4. Other Household Incomes •••••••.•••.••.••••.••••• 103 
4.4.1. Options of Fisher-men in Generating Wage 
Income .....•.....•..........•..... ., " ........ 10 4 
4.4.2. Women's contribution: Non-paid labour 
and Wage Income .••...•.•.•.••.•..•.• o •••••• 105 
4. 5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 
CHAPTER 5. Women Fishing . • • . • • • . • • • . • • • • • • • • . • • • • . • • • • 115 
5.1. Introduction ••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••.•.•••• 115 
5.2. supports/Constraints for Women Fishing •••.••••• 117 
5.2.1. Nature of the Lobster Fishery •••.•••••••••• 117 
5.2.2. Changes in Unemplo~aent Insurance •••••••••. 118 
5.2.2.1. Eligibility for Wives of Fishers •..• 119 
5.2.2.2. Eligibility for Spouses of 
Self-employed Workers •••••••••••••.• 120 
5.2.3. Naufrage: Women Took the Initiative •••••..• 122 
5.2.4. Flexibility in combining Work and 
Child care .•.•••.....••.....••.•..••.•••..• 125 
5.2.5. Life-cycle •..•••..•••.•••.•••••.•••••••••••• 127 
5.2.6. Household and Community Attitudes 
Towards l'lomen Fishing • . . • • • • . • . . • . • • • . . • • • . 128 
5.2.6.1. Household Attitudes .••••••.••••••••• 129 
5.2.6.2. Community Attitudes .•••••.••.••.•..• 134 
5.3 Implications for SQrvival ••••••.•••..•.••••.•••. 138 
5.3.1. Gender Rslations ...•..•.••.•.••.••.•.•. 138 
5.4 Conclusion ........................................ 141 
CHAPTER 6. summary and conclusions •••.••••.•••••••.•.•. 143 
6.1. survival Strategies and Changing State 
Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 
6.1.1. Women's Contributions: Multiple 
Incomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7 
6.2. Future Survival and New State Initiatives ••••.• 149 
6.2.1. Unemployment Insurance •••••••••••••••••••.• 150 
6.2.2. Declining Prices and Changes in 
American Legislation •.•••••..••••••••• 152 
6.2.3. Carapace Size Increase for Canner 
Lobsters •........•.......... "" • • • • . • . . • 153 
6.3. Areas for Future Research •••.•.•.••.••••.•••••• 155 
6.3.1. Unionization •••••••.••••••..•••••.•.•. 156 
6.4. Conclusion •••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••.• 158 
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 
APPENDIX A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 
APPENDIX B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 
vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE 1. 
Number of Lobster Licences, Maritime Provinces, 
Prince Edward Island, 1950 to 1984 ••....•.•.•..•• 47 
TABLE 2. 
Lobster Landed Value, Selected Years, 1957 to 1965 •• 47 
TABLE 3. 
Net Income from All Sources Per Enterprise Operat.ur 
in Lobstar Fishery, 1961 •.••••••••.•••.••••.•••••• 49 
TABLE 4. 
Lobster Landings and Value, Prince Edward Island, 
1960 to 197 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . • . . . • . . . . . • . . 52 
TABLE 5. 
Number of Boats Fishing out of Naufrage, 1967 
to 1989 ................................•.......... 67 
TABLE 6. 
Lobster Landings, Naufrage and Prince Edward Island, 
197 a to 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 
TABLE 7. 
Amount of Unemployment Insurance Benefits Paid to 
Fishers on Prince Edward Island, 1978 to 1988 .•.•.. 72 
TABLE 8. 
Lobster Landings and Landed Value, Prince Edward 
Island 1978 to 1989 ••••••••••••••••••...••.•...••.• 81 
TABLE 9. 
Four-Year Average of Lobster Landings, Naufrage, 
District 7B, 7Bl. 1978 to 1989 • . • . . • • • . • • • • • • . . • • • • 81 
TABLE 10. 
Landed Value of Lobster, Naufrage. 1978 to 1989 .•.. 83 
TABLE 11. 
Distribution of Lobster Licences by Lobster District, 
Prince Edward Island • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • 83 
viii 
TABLE 12. 
Groundfish Lcmdings for Inshore Set Gear, Naufraqe, 
1980 to 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 
TABLE 13. 
Landed Value of Cod and Hake, Naufrage Harbour 
1980 to 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • • . . . . . . . . . . . 93 
TABLE 14. 
Number of Tuna landed in Naufrage 1974 to 1988 •.••. 97 
TABLE 15. 
Landings and Landed Value of Herring, District 87,88. 
1974 to 1988 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 101 
TABLE 16. 
Irish Moss Landings and Landed Value, Naufrage, 
1980 to 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 
ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
I!' lGURE ONE : 
Prince Edward Island Statistical Districts and 
Lobster Districts •••••••.••••• , • • • • • • • • • . • . • . 5 
FIGURE TWO: 
Prince Edward Island lobster landings, five-year 
averages, 1993 to 199e • • • • • • • . • • • • . . • . . . • . . • . • 79 
FIGURE THREE: 
Canadian Lobster Landings, five-year averages, 
18 9 3 to 19 0 8 . • . . . . • . . • . • . • • • • . . • . . • . • . . . . . . , • . B 0 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The lobster fishery is the b~ckbone of the inshore fishery on 
Prince Edward Island (PEl). It represents more than 70 per 
cent of the total landed value of the PEI fishery which in 
1989 :\mounted to $56 ;nillion. since the beginning of the 
commercialization of the lobster fishery .!. .., t-.he 1870s, lobster 
has been the main fishery in PEI. In 1989, there were 1,385 
bonafide1 inshore fishers on PEI and 1,309 of these had a 
lobster licence (Prince Edward Island, 19 89). For these 
inshore fishers, over 70 per cent of their fishing income 
comes from the lobster fishery. 
The lobster fishery on PEI has two seasons, spring which 
extends from May 1 to June 30, and fall, which extends from 
August 10 to October 10. PEI is presently divided into three 
lobster districts. Two districts, 7B(24) and 7Bl(26), have a 
spring harvestin~ season and district 8 (25) has a fall season. 
The area of my research is in district 7B 1 which extends along 
the north shore of PEI from East Point to Seacow Pond. The 
Bonafide is a fisher who is registered as a commercial fisher 1 
holds a limited fishery license, and, as well, meets one of the 
following conditions: 
l)holds a category A license; 
2}is able to show proof that 75 percent or more of hisjher 
income was derived from his previous year's fishing; or 
3) can show proof of sale of fish of a landed value in 
excess of $15,000 (Annual Report, P.E.I. Department of Fisheries, 
1988} . 
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majority of the fishers on PEI, approximately 1,050, fish in 
the spring season and the bulk of the lobster product is 
landed during the months of May and June. 
The objective of this thesis is to look at the impact of 
·:;tate policy in the PEI lobster fishery from the mid-1960s to 
the present . and to investigate the survival strategies that 
fishing households in one particular area of PEI have 
developed in responding to these chQnges. 
One of the key areas of changes in the lobster fishery 
during this 30-year period has been increased state 
legislation. The lobster fishery is the oldest regulated 
fishery in the Maritimes with the first regulation dating from 
1873. The discussion of changes in state policy focuses on 
two state policies. The first is licensing, which includes 
limited-entry and personal licensing policy, the buy-back 
program and trap limits. The second is the unemployment 
insurance program (UI). 
Traditionally, studies on the fishery, especially at the 
primary level, have focused on the people directly involved in 
fishing, which in most cases were the men in fishing families. 
However, lobster fishing enterprises are household units and 
changes in the development of the lobster fishery affect all 
members of the household. Likewise, responses to outside 
forces in the industry do not just involve the fisherman of 
the household. survival strategies depend on the ability of 
both men and women to adjust to the constraints of state 
2 
policy and creatively respond to the opportunities for 
support. Thus, in the analysis of the different factors 
influencing survival strategies of fishing households, I pay 
particular attention to the role of women. In examining 
fishing households the study draws on data from the port of 
Naufrage, located on the northeastern shore of PEI. 
A key element in the analysis is the concept of survival. 
Various writers have looked at survival in fishing communities 
from different perspectives. Any examination of inshore 
fishing households quickly reveals their vulnerability to the 
forces of nature, to the demands of capital and to changes in 
state policy. As in the case of all fixed gear inshore 
fisheries, lobster landings are extremely cyclical due to the 
vagaries of the weather and other factors that affect stock 
levels. Fishers' incomes are also very susceptible to the 
forces of capitalism. Clement (1986) states that their social 
relations give them independence with respect to the labour 
process but not independence from the banks or processors. 
They own the means of production but have no control over the 
market (p.75). 
The vulnerability of lobster fishers in Prince Edward 
Island to the forces of capital was particularly evident in 
the 1989 and 1990 lobster season, when the prices for lobster 
dropped to mid-1970 levels. Fishers are also captive to the 
opposite end of the capitalist market in that they have no 
control over the cost of inputs. 
3 
The heavy intervention of the state in the fishery has 
provided some buffer to market forces, but it has also made 
the lobster fishery very susceptible to changes in state 
policy. Along with disastrously low lobster prices in 1989 to 
1990, lobster fishers are also being threatened with more 
stringent requirements for income support programs such as 
unemployment insurance benefits. 
Though fishing households are affected by changes in 
capital structure and in the state, this thesis focuses 
primarily on the response of fishing households to changes in 
state policy. 
1.1 Description of Research Community 
The research is focused on the harbour of Naufrage, 
located on the north shore, about 30 kilometers from the 
eastern tip of PEI (figure 1). There were 84 boats fishing 
out of this harbour in 1989 and the main species is lobster. 
They are engaged in a day fishery leaving the harbour in the 
morning and returning at night. Traditionally, the fishers in 
this area have fished lobster, followed by groundfish and 
mackerel. In the 1960s Irish Moss became an important product 
and in the 1970s tuna appeared in Island waters and many 
fishers began participating in this fishery. Since the mid-
1980s, after lobster fishing, more fishers have been 
temporarily operating out of other ports to fish tuna, herring 
for roe, and to a lesser extent, groundfish. 
4 
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There is a fairly high concentration of fishers in this 
harbour due to migration of fishers from the south side of the 
Island in the 1960s and 1970s. This has resulted in two 
distinct groupings of fishers in the harbour. About half of 
the fishers come from communities immediately surrounding the 
harbour, within a 15-kilometre radius. The other half come 
from communities on the southeastern coast of the Island 
ranging from 15 to 40 kilometers distance. The first group 
have more ties to each other on a social and community level 
and their families have been fishing in this area for many 
generations. 
I chose this harbour for my research for the following 
reasons. Naufrage has particular characteristics that are 
helpful in analyzing the concept of survival. The communities 
surrounding this harbour are heavily dependent on the fishery 
for their survival, both in processing and harvesting. 
District 882 (figure 1), within which this harbour is located, 
has the largest number of lobster fishers of any statistical 
district in PEI (DFO statistics). The high concentration of 
fishers, combined with rising costs and limited increases in 
lobster landings, compared to other areas in PEI have created 
a situation where fishers have had to combine income from 
fishing and non-fishing activities to reproduce their fishing 
2As indicated earlier, PEI is divided into 3 lobster districts. 
However, for most fishery statistics, it is divided into 10 
statistical districts (See figure 3). 
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unit. These kinds of conditions make it a good location to 
examine household strategies for survival. 
In addition, there are many women in this harbour who 
work for wages outside the home and a growing number who fish 
with their husbands. I wanted to examine in some detail the 
role of women in fishing households. This harbour seemed like 
a good place to look at the contribution of women from 
different perspectives. 
Furthermore, I had previously worked in this community 
and knew a number of the fishing families, thus making it 
easier to find respondents for interviews. I had a certain 
level of credibility and trust with the people because of my 
previous work, which would enable me to get more accurate 
information about their fishing lives than if I came in as a 
stranger. 
While Naufrage harbour has some unique characteristics it 
also has many aspects that are similar to other lobster 
fishing areas, especially on the north shore of PEI. Thus, an 
analysis of the impact of changes on fishing households in 
Naufrage is helpful in understanding similar ~hanges in other 
areas in PEI. 
1.2 Methodology 
When I started this research project, I had two main 
objectives. One was to have a clearer understanding of the 
structure of the lobster fishery and the other was to gain 
7 
some insights into how lobster fishing families were affected 
by, and had responded to, changes in state policy since the 
1960s. 
Two main methodological approaches were used. one was to 
research available information, analyses and statistics on the 
lobster fishery , focusing particularly on changes in the 
harvesting sector since 1967. Sources for this data include: 
information from provincial and federal departments of 
fisheries; interviews with staff from both these departments; 
interviews with staff of the Maritime Fishermen's Union; 
reports on the PEI fishery by government resource people and 
private researchers. The second was to gather in some 
systematic and representative way information from members of 
fishing households in Naufrage. Fifteen fishing households 
were selected, and structured interviews were conducted with 
both the boat-owner and the spouse3 on a variety of topics 
about attitudes and practices concerning both their fishing 
activities outside the home and their relations within the 
fishing households. 4 
The participants for the interviews were selected from 
fishers fishing out of Naufrage harbour and residing in the 
communi ties adjacent to the harbour. The interviews were 
organized with the objective of collecting data from both a 
3It was not possible to interview spouses in two of the 
households. In one case the fisher was single and in the other the 
spouse was in a rehabilitation centre. 
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gender and a generational perspective. Fifteen fisni~g 
households were selected and where possible, both partners 
were interviewed. Participants were selected according to the 
number of years they had fished with their own outfit. They 
were divided into three different generational groups; those 
fishing 25 years or more, those fishing 15 to 25 years, and 
those with less than 15 years experience. The households were 
also selected so that in half of them women were fishing with 
their spouses and in the other half they were not. 
The reason for choosing fishers from three different 
generations was to get some information concerning changes in 
the lobster industry and to examine similarities and 
differences in the experiences of older and younger fishing 
families in terms of both supports and constraints for their 
survival. 
The criterion of women fishing was chosen because of my 
observation of women's increasing participation in fishing 
with their husbands. My original hypothesis was that this was 
part of a survival strategy that younger fishing households 
were engaging in. By getting involved in this work, women 
were entering an occupation that previously was open only to 
men. I wanted to determine if there were particular supports 
or constraints either in households or in the community that 
affected women's entry into this new occupation. It is true 
that the percentage of women who are fishing is higher in my 
sample of interviews than in the general population. Only 
9 
about 10 to 12 per cent of the fishing enterprises in Naufrage 
have women fishing with their spouses, whereas my sample has 
50 per cent. However, having a larger number of fishing women 
in my sample allowed me to get more in-depth information and 
a broader perspective as to why women went fishing and the 
prevailing attitudes towards women fishing. My previous 
knowledge and experience with fishing communities indicated 
that, as costs rose much faster than income, more women used 
this option as a way of increasing household income. An 
appendix contains more detail on the topics covered and some 
comments on the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology 
used. Since the interviews were confidential, any names in 
quotes from the interviews that appear in this thesis are 
fictitious. 
1.3. Thesis outline 
The following is an outline of how the remaining chapters 
are organized. Chapter two presents the theoretical framework 
that I use to explain survival of fishing households. It 
includes a review of literature that focuses on the following 
three theoretical areas. The first discusses different 
theoretical approaches to explaining the survival of petty 
commodity production. The second examines a theoretical 
approach to explaining the sometimes contradictory role of the 
state in the fishery. The third reviews some perspectives on 
the role of gender in household strategies. 
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Chapter three is divided into three sections. The first 
section is a brief overview of the development of the lobster 
fishery since its commercialization in the 1870s, which 
provides a context for understanding its present status as a 
seasonal fishery closely allied to the household. The second 
section discusses the impact of state intervention since the 
1960s, focusing particularly on licensing policies and 
unemployment insurance programs during the period 1965 to 
1990. Thirdly, the chapter outlines how the organization of 
the fishery and fishing practices in Naufrage harbour changed 
during this period. 
Chapter four draws on data from the interviews with 
fishing families and discusses the different strategies that 
inshore fishing households have used to survive as full-time 
fishers. These include increasing capital investment to fish 
lobster more intensively; exploiting other species to 
complement lobster income; generating income through wage 
labour of other members of the household, particularly women. 
All of these strategies are interrelated, and the income from 
one often facilitates the implementation of another. In some 
cases, the availability of women's wage labour provides the 
necessary financial security to implement strategies of 
increased capital investment. 
Chapter five focuses particularly on the issue of women 
fishing. Changes in state policy have opened up new survival 
options in the 1980s by extending eligibility for unemployment 
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insurance benefits to women fishing with their spouses. This 
chapter analyzes the supports and constraints for women moving 
into this area of work and discuss how, in turn, the changing 
role of \·!omen is affecting gender and social relations in the 
household and the community. 
In chapter six I discuss the implications for future 
survival by outlining the strengths and weaknesses of the 
survival strategies that households have employed. I also 
outline some questions and other areas of research that have 
been raised in this study but will need further exploration. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
UNDERSTANDING SURVIV.".L: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Definition of Survival 
The inshore fishery continues to hold an important place 
in the economic, political, social and cultural life of 
Prince Edward Island. Any investigation of this fishery 
reveals that the reasons for its survival are very complex. 
A number of different factors have contributed to its 
survival including: the role of the state, ecological 
factors, marketability of a high quality product like 
lobster, and the active desires of members of fishing 
families to find ways of creating and reproducing their 
social existence. 
A definition of survival for fishing households includes 
a wide range of possibilities, both in levels of production 
and in motives for cor.tinuing as a fishing unit. At a basic 
production level, survival means being able to maintain 
minima 1 means of production such as a boat and fishing gear.. 
However, the day to day reproduction of the fishing unit 
involves various combinations of fishing and non-fishing 
income, which depend on the support of many household 
members, not just the fisher/producer. But survival is not 
just defined in terms of the economic viability of a fishing 
production unit. It also includes the preservation ot other 
non-economic values such as living in a rural environment, 
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having a sense of independence in the work process, and 
bringing up children in a small community with connections to 
extended family. Thus, survival depends on the cooperation 
of various people in the household who might have very 
different motives for supporting the fish~.1g enterprise. 
This chapter develops a theoretical framework through which 
we can examine the impact of these factors on the survival of 
lobster fishing households. 
Firstly, the thesis examines survival from a historical 
perspective. It looks at the impact of state policy on 
inshore fishers and examines how these policies both 
influenced and l'v'ere influenced by the social relations in 
fishing households during the historical period from 1965 to 
the late 1980s. 
2.1.1 survival from the Perspective of Household 
The thesis also looks at survival from the perspective of 
the household as opposed to a community or regional 
perspective. There are a number of reasC'ns why it makes 
sense to examine the survival of inshore fishing from this 
perspective. Lobster is the main inshore fishery and the 
specific nature of this fishery has meant a close alliance 
between its development and the household. Recently, rural 
sociologists have been developing commodity specific analyses 
to explain the survival of some forms of production 
(Friedland, Barton and Thomas, 1981; Marchak,1983; sinclair, 
14 
1986). This analysis is based on the recognition of 
significant differences in the "natural imperatives of 
production, ways in which production is organized, structures 
of commodity markets and state policies influencing the 
conditions of production and marketing" (Koc 1989:2) • The 
way that lobster production is organized has facilitated its 
close connection with the household. 
In the case of lobster fishing, many decisions are made 
at the level of the household. At the processing level, the 
lobster fishery is a non-monopoly industry. Hence, fishers 
have some latitude in deciding where to sell their product. 
state policy has strengthened the role of households by 
dis~ipating corporate control, especially in the harvesting 
sector. Licensing policy prevents companies from owning 
lobster licences•, and individual fishers from operating more 
than one lobster enterprise. The individualization of 
household strategies is further highlighted by the absence of 
structures to collectively negotiate prices and the rela-
tively weak, non-commodified relations between households. 
Perhaps the most important reason for analyzing survival 
from the perspective of the household lies in the pluralistic 
work pattern of fishing households. As this thesis 
demonstrates, most lobster fishing enterprises cannot survive 
on fishing income alone. Thus to analyze the fishing 
1Lobster fishing licences were awarded to companies in 1971, 
but for offshore lobster only. 
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industry only from the perspective of activities and 
production decisions of male boat owners, provides an 
incomplete picture. Taking into consideration the activities 
and decisions of all the members of the fishing household 
allows for a more dynamic and comprehensive view of survival. 
Very little work is done at this level, especially in the PEI 
fishery, despite the fact that it is important for a more 
grounded application of often abstract theories of survival. 
In examining survival from this perspective I do not want 
to minimize the importance of survival strategies at other 
levels. If household strategies are to be effective in the 
long term, they must be linked to a political program that 
will develop strategies of survival at a community, regiona 1 
and national level, which will give the inshore fishery an 
important place in the whole fishing industry. 
2.2 Lobster Fishing as Petty Commodity Production 
Lobster fishing is an example of petty comrnodi ty 
production (PCP), also called domestic, independent and 
simple commodity production. It is a form of household 
production where the product is exchanged on commodity 
ma:.kets to realize the value of what is produced and to 
acquire both the means of production and personal consumption 
goods (Sinclair 1984:35). PCP embodies a unique combination 
of labour and capital. The fisher owns the means of 
production and, in the reproduction of the household, 
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combines his own labour with the paid and unpaid labour of 
other member~ of the household. 
There arP many debates around the survival of PCP as a 
form of production. The theorists can be broadly divided 
into three groups. The largest group {De Janvry 1980; Goss et 
al 1980; Hedley 1981) draw on classical writings of Lenin and 
Kautsky and perceive PCP as a limited, transitory form in the 
process of differentiation and proletarianization. The 
second yroup holds the position that PCP survives because its 
continuation is functional for capitalism {Mann and Dickinson 
1978). 'Place's or 'spaces' are continually created for this 
form of production as "effects of the law of value in 
capitalist competition, accumulation and concentration 
(including technical - .• ange)" (Bernstein 1988:263) . The 
smallest group argues that differentiation will occur in some 
cases and not in others {Friedmann 1982; Llambi 1988; 
Sinclair 1985,1988). It depends on a combination of 
circumstances that differ according to historical period and 
geographical area. However, as Sinclair states, a weakness 
of many sociological accounts is that very little account is 
taken of 11 specific ecological or cultural circumstances which 
condition how macro-structural forces will be perceived and 
what coping strategies people are likely to adopt" (1984:36-
37) • 
What is needed is a way of analyzing petty commodity 
production which takes into account the reciprocal relations 
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between the structures of the external environment and the 
internal dynamics of households, as well as the particular 
characteristics of the products being produced. L 1 a m b i 
(1988) outlines two approaches to understa:r.ding the 
emergence/destruction/recreation of a specific form of 
production. One approach is to look at the constraints and 
opportunities imposed on the unit of production by their 
economic and political environment. The other is to examine 
the internal dynamics of enterprises and their social agents' 
practices. Both these approaches can give us insights into 
how PCP survives, but to use either one or the other 
unilaterally, is to run the risk of determinism on the one 
hand or, on the other hand, to treat production units in 
isolation from their environment (359-360). 
In this thesis I am examining the impact of changes in 
state policy on the lobster fishery and how fishing 
households have responded to these changes. Fishing families 
in Naufrage cannot survive only on fishing in(ome. They are 
dependent on income generated from both fishing and non-
fishing sources and by other members of the household besides 
the fisher who is generally the male head of household. The 
ability to generate other income depends on many factoL·s 
which are influenced by larger economic and political 
structures but also by skills, needs and desires of household 
members. We need a theoretical framework that considers the 
role of the State in the fishing industry, the dynamics of 
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households, including gender and generational divisions, as 
well as the tension between Dbjectives of larger social 
structures such as the state and those of fishing families. 
The remainder of this che!pter develops this framework by 
drawing on theoretical concepts from three different areas. 
The first area is petty commodity production. In this 
section, I focus on those theorists who analyze the survival 
of petty commodity production by looking at the interaction 
of external and internal factors. Secondly, I discuss some 
theoretical perspectives concerning the often conflictive 
role of the state in the fishery. Thirdly, the thesis 
emphasizes the role cf women's work within the survival 
strategies of fishing households. The chapter reviews some 
theoretical positions that take into account the intersection 
of gender and household dynamics in their analysis of 
survival. 
2.3 Conceptualizing Survival in Petty Commodity Production 
Theories 
Most of the literature on petty commodity production 
deals with agriculture, but many of the concepts clarifying 
social relations in agriculture apply to fishing as well. 
Both are examples of primary production where the household 
is an integral part of primary production. Both are 
dependent on the market to sell their raw product. Various 
theorists have tried to deal with the tension between the 
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internal and external factors in petty commodity units. 
Friedmann ( 1978, 1980) proposes that the conditions of 
reproduction, decomposition or transformation of agrarian 
social relations are determined by the context of the social 
formation combined with the internal structure of the unit. 
The basic unit of petty commodity production, the household, 
has a 'dual character as enterprise and as family'. In her 
analysis of the survival of the family farm in advanced 
capitalism, Friedmann (1986) states that whether family farms 
take the path of reproduction or transformation depends on 
external and internal factors: the market for the product, 
the availability of capital, and the specific relations 
within the family. Friedmann has argued that the stability 
of the family farm is due to particular \","techanisms in 
internal relations in farm households such as 'generational 
cycle, balances between consumption and investment, and 
between effort and leisure' (Llambi 1988:361). These give it 
some advantages over capitalist units of production, which 
are more vulnerable to the direct press: ·res of the market. 
In her earlier works Friedmann (1978, 1980) places much 
emphasis on the 'demographic' cycle as the main mechanism in 
regulating the labour force. The family is treated as a 
monolithic unit and it is assumed that there is unity of 
purpose among all members of the family farm in its efforts 
to reproduce the production unit. In discussing balances 
between consumption and investment, there is 1 i ttle 
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consideration as to who, in the farm family, is making the 
sacrifices to ensure its reproduction. 
Llambi (1988) also uses a conceptual framework that 
includes outside and inside factors in theorizing the 
survival of the capitalized family farm. He proposes that 
11 market and political forces [as well as] culturally 
inherited patterns of behaviour generate the parameters which 
establish farmers' goals and the means they choose to attain 
them. They all exhibit a similar predisposition towards 
income maximization and risk miniruisation 11 (p.370). However, 
not all petty production units respond in the same way. He 
accounts for their differences by: 1) different access to 
natural and financial resources, 2) different degrees of 
knowledge of technical, mercantile and political conditions, 
3) different value patterns and attitudes, which in turn 
affect economic choices (p.370). 
A consideration of these categories gives insights into 
why fishing units are at different levels of stability from 
region to region or even within regions, although all are 
subject to the same state policies. However, Llambi 1 s 
analysis does not treat the responses of the production unit 
in a dialectical way. The practices and performance of 
production units vary in their response to outside forces 
because of the different internal characteristics of 
production units. Bv.t he does not consider that these 
household practices may in turn influence the market and 
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political forces. Llambi discusses the differences between 
households, but not those within households. 
household is treated like a monolithic unit. 
Again, the 
There is no 
mention of gender differences in petty production units. He 
discusses production units as if both men and women in these 
units have the same goals and interests. 
In her article on the nature of social relations in petty 
commodity production, Winnie Lem (1988) conceptualizes social 
relations in petty commodity production in a much more 
dynamic and active way. She is critical of Friedman's rigid, 
dichotomous conceptualization of non-commodified internal 
relations vs. commodified external relations in her analysis 
of petty commodity households. Lem maintains that it cannot 
adequately capture the "multifaceted quality of social 
relations that operate among petty commodity producers" 
(1988:505). 
She argues that social relations cannot be fully 
explained in structural terms, but are the result of 
conscious decisions made by members of producer households. 
(Social relations] are not only the product of 
abstract, developmental and structural logics of 
petty commodity production within a larger social 
formation, but they are also the outcome of human 
consciousness and human action. Producers 
consciously pursue various courses of action in their 
daily livelihood strategies to ensure the 
reproduction of their enterprises and their social 
world (Lem 1988:506). 
Lem' s analytical framework examines social relations in a 
dialectical way. They are influenced by outside structural 
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forces, but they in turn contribute to shaping the process 
through which these structures interact with the petty 
production unit. 
In her analysis of social relations of wine-growing 
households in Languedoc, Lem describes the household as 
composed of members with diverse and often conflicting 
interests. 'l'he continuation of the production unit depends 
on the labour of both men and women. The 'survival 
imperative' structures relations in the household between 
parents and children and particularly between husbands and 
wives. The continuity of the enterprise often requires the 
"subordination of the individual to the collective or family 
effort" (1988:517). One of the results of this is that women 
often assume a double burden of responsibility as their 
labour is necessary to maintain both the production unit and 
the household as a home. But another result is that the 
woman may withdraw her support for the production unit, which 
can have implications for its survival. 
I prefer Lem' s approach to explaining the process of 
changing social relations in the case of lobster fishing 
households in Naufrage. state policy has had significant 
influence in shaping the social relations in these fishing 
enterprises. But the response of the members of the 
household in turn affected the direction and development of 
state policy. 
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In many of the debates on the survival of petty commodity 
production, there is a strong emphasis on economic factors. 
However, my interviews with fishing households demonstrate 
that survival involves a mixture of economic and non-economic 
concerns, including preservation of certain values like 
independence, closeness to nature and preference of rural 
environment for raising children. 
Hedley ( 1988) maintains that many producer households 
reject a view of farming (fishing) which sees it narrowly as 
"a profit maximizing activity, or a practice in which the 
absence of such activity is constituted as problematic" 
(Hedley 1988:68). The farm (fishing) household is "a social 
product through which a way of life is created an.:l ilved ... a 
significant context within which people seek to impose their 
own direction on the production of their social existence" 
(p. 68). Non-economic concerns cannot be treated as 
'culturally curious' or 'impediments to progress'. Rather 
these concerns are a central part of the analysis of the 
rural world and they can be a strong motivation in the 
development of survival strategies. 
2.4. Contradictory Role of the State 
The intervention of the state has been a significant 
factor in the survival of lobster fishing households. 
However state policy has had a contradictory role, presenting 
both constraints and opportunities for survival of fishing 
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families. The contradictory dynamic expresses itself in 
various ways. Licensing policy, which was implemented to 
limit new entry and removP part-time fishers from the lobster 
fishery, was based on the logic that with fewer participants 
in the fishery, those who remained would have higher incomes 
and be less in need of state subsidies. With few employment 
alternatives, many marginal fishers, when faced with the 
possibility of losing their lobster license if they remained 
part-time, opted to become full-time fishers. Their decision 
to remain in the fishery was helped by other state 
initiatives such as the unemployment insurance program. 
Sinclair (1987, 1989) has developed a theory to explain 
the contradictory impact of state policies in the fishery. 
It is based on an understanding of the state as an 
institution whose parts are "loosely integrated and often 
work at cross-purposes." He argues that state policy should 
be treated as 11an active creation limited by the structural 
location and cultural vision of actorsrr (1989: 105). He 
refers to Theda Skocpol' s description of the state as "a 
structure with a logic and interests of .its own not 
necessarily equivalent to, or fused with the interests of the 
dominant class in society or the full set of member groups in 
the polity" (Sinclair 1989:105, Skocpol 1979:27). 
Sinclair's ( 1987) model for t}F"\ development of fishery 
policy includes the following points. The state interacts in 
a particular social and economic environment. Thus, 
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fisheries policies are formulated to cope with problems in 
that environment. The state is not an abstract entity; 
rather it expresses itself through people who occupy state 
positions and have particular interests and experiences and 
act out of a specific set of beliefs. The people/groups 
making the demands are not all equal in power or in ability 
to articulate their needs. The need for legitimation of the 
state and maintenance of order makes for avoidance of state 
policies that will be met with mass rejection. The 
availability of resources, especially in finances and 
information, is a central factor in many policy decisions 
(Sinclair 1987:62-3). 
According to this model of developtr.f'·ttt: of fisheries 
policy, contradictions in state policy can be explaineC by 
the following factors: the independence of state actors often 
resulting in expression of different interests; the 
fragmentation of the Canadian state where the two levels of 
government and different government departments often have 
competing agendas; and, the uneven levels of power and 
articulation of needs by the various groups involved. 
John McMullen (1987) also ascribes some of the confusion 
in the implementation of limited-entry licensing policy in 
the B.c. salmon fishery, to conflicts between department 
personnel. He maintains that in the 1970s there was 
considerable institutional instability in the Department of 
Fisheries. The state was "an arena of conflict, but its 
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personnel were weak participants in policy disputes." From 
1971 to 1978 the department of fisheries was only one of a 
number of disparate agencies in the conglomerate of the 
Department of the Environment and "suffered for attention, 
focus, consistency, and qualified personnel at senior levels" 
(McMullen 1987: 148-9). 
Sinclair's model provides some interesting insights into 
how to deal theoretically with contradictory state policies. 
These, in turn, have implications for survival strategies. 
However, this theory does not give us a way of understanding 
how responses from fishing households can impact on state 
policy. In my model for analyzing survival, I am arguing 
that the survival of inshore fishing is explained by the 
dialectical process between fishing households and external 
structures such as the state. It is based on the premise 
that fishing households are dynamic entities composed of 
various individuals who are actively involved in determining 
and carrying out the survival strategies of the enterprise. 
Consequently, state policies produce contradictory results, 
not only because of different interests among state actors 
and state institutions, but also because of different needs, 
desires and interests among the members of fishing households 
who are responding to, and influencing these policies. 
state actors develop fishery policy as though the only 
person to be affected by the policy is the fisher-man. For 
example, the goal of licensing policy was to reduce 
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participation in the fishery. The thrust of the policy was 
directed at the license-holder, in nearly all cases, the male 
head of household. However if a fisher has to leave the 
fishery, he is not the only one affected. Because of the 
lack of alternative employment possibilities in an area like 
Naufrage, leaving the fi.shery usually means leaving the area. 
If, for a variety of reasons, the fishing family doesn't want 
to do this, the woman in the household might decide to engage 
in wage labour to supplement fishing income and to enable her 
husband to continue fishing. Thus the r.esults of state 
policy are influenced by the actions of other members in the 
household. 
Taking the household seriously means that we can explain 
how state actors sometim$s have to adjust policy or expand 
state programs beyond their 0~iginal objectives in response 
to actions of household members operating out of a survival 
imperative. For example, in the 1980s, women used their 
constitutional rights to fight for access to unemployment 
insurance benefits for spouses of self-employed workers. 
This was not a collective decision, but individual women used 
the legal system to force changes in the unemployment 
insurance act which expanded the options of fishing women in 
develot .ng household survival strategies. This expansion of 
the unemployment insurance program is directly contrary to 
otate efforts to cut back on UI benefits to workers and 
fishers. 
28 
A model which takes seriously the complexity of fishing 
households as well as the complexity of state institutions 
means that in analyzing survival we have to examine the 
actions of fishing households as well as the those of the 
state. 
2.5. Gender and Household Relations 
An examination of fishing households involves a 
recognition that they are made up of men and women who have 
different roles and often have different reasons for wanting 
its continuance. Therefore gender dynamics is an important 
concept in developing an analysis of survival. 
A rich body of literature on the Atlantic inshore fishery 
has provided important insights into how this petty commodity 
form of production has survived under the domination of 
capitalist relations of production. However, much of the 
analysis has concentrated on the individual's relation to 
production, and where the household has been considered, 
survival was primarily determined by the activities and 
decisions of the male head of household. 
Marilyn Porter has critiqued the work of the 'Maritime 
Marxists'- Sacouman (1981), Veltmeyer (1979), and Clow 
(1984)- as well as the Newfoundland writers, Sinclair (1985) 
and Fairley {1985) for their gender-blind analysis of the 
fishery in Atlantic Canada. While their work does take 
greater account of the connections between the family and the 
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economy, it does not rucognize the "place of gender in such 
relations" (Porter 1987:51-2). 
However, there is a growing body of literature that is 
making women's economic activity in the political economy of 
the Atlantic region more visible. MacDonald and Connelly's 
work (1983) is based on the understanding that in a dependent 
regional economy, households have "always required more than 
the male wage to survive". They have had to combine incomes 
from various sources, whether through wage labour of 
different members of the family, the informal economy, or a 
combination of petty commodity production and wage labour. 
MacDonalr'l and Connelly have concluded that the "allocation of 
women's work between the home and the labour force has been a 
response by the family household to changes in the economy". 
The state has also played a role in altering work patterns as 
fishing families adjusted to regulations of licensing 
policies or the unemployment insurance program (Porter 
1987:47; MacDonald and connelly 1983:68, 1989:46,69). 
The possibi lities for women to develop new work roles in 
fishing households are influenced by external economic and 
political structures that affect employment possibilities; 
but they also depend on internal characteristics such as 
gender relations in the household and personal skills, 
educational qualifications and likes/dislikes of the women 
involved. Consequently, any analysis of household responses 
to economic and political changes must · ... ake into account 
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11gender and household relations" {MacDonald and Connelly 
1989:61). 
For example, changes in state policy in the 1980s, namely 
in unemployment insurance regulations, have made it more 
attractive for women to go fishing with their husbands. But 
the exercise of this option is affected by other factors, 
some of which are related to the personal choice of the 
woman, and some of which are due to a male work culture and 
exclusionary practices that restrict women from moving into 
work roles that were previously only taken up by men. 
An economic logic has pushed women to take on new work 
roles. Taking on wage labour outside the home or moving into 
traditionally male work roles, such as that of helpers on 
lobster boats, has broken down some of the barriers of sexism 
and has given women a new confidence about their own 
abilities. Unfortunately, women have few choices in the kind 
of work available to them, especially in rural communities, 
and often are victims of low wages and unattractive working 
conditions. 
Women view work choices from different perspectives. 
Armstrong and Armstrong (1983) in their study of women and 
work concluded that women explain their work choices in 
rather negative terms. The most common reasons were: 
they needed paid employment, this was the work 
available, it didn't have the worst working 
conditions, and it allowed them to do their other 
work at home (1983:41). 
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Nevertheless, many women in fishing households see their work 
as a way to exercise an active and creative role in the 
survival strategies of their households. It is a mechanism to 
preserve a certain way of life for themselves and their 
families. 
However, changes in ·~rork roles do not necessarily change 
unequal gender relations. In the case of the women working 
on the boat, the fact that the man is the boat-owner and the 
woman a worker maintains an unequal relationship of power. 
In most situations, women, by working at wage labour outside 
the horne, take on a double workload as they still retain 
responsibility for maintaining the household. But changing 
work roles have the potential to change gender relations. 
With more economic independence, women may have more space 
to negotiate their contribution to the fishing enterprise. 
This will have implications for survival. In a 
patriarchal household where work choices are restricted to 
what the male head considers acceptable, work options may be 
more limited. In households where, within the constraints of 
the dominant economic and political structures, gender 
relations allow for negotiation between husband and wife 
about work allocation, there may be more possibilities of the 
household surviving. 
In the model used in this thesis, I have argued that 
survival depends on the contributions of other members of the 
household besides the male producer, particularly women. The 
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theoretical concept of gender is essential in understanding 
how household relations influence the shape of survival 
strategies and in turn how these strategies influence state 
policy. It also helps us to see that the ideas and goals of 
women, which reflect their gendered roles, might provide 
different motives for survival. 
2. 6. Conclusion 
The conceptual framework used in this thesis is drawn 
from three interacting and mutually dependent theoretical 
areas. First, the survival of petty commodity production is 
understood through an analysis of the interaction between 
internal and external forces. The survival of the production 
unit is determined by the context of the social formation 
which exerts certain pressures. It is also mediated by the 
many and varied internal dynamic forces which influence and 
are influenced by the structural context. PCP'S survive as 
integral components of the economic system. As well they 
exist as a product of the conscious and subjective decision-
making of the whole producer household. These decisions are 
based on a mixture of economic and non-economic concerm~. 
The customs and values of the community and the relations 
among the producing households are also important in the 
survival of this form of production. 
The second aspect of the model utilized in this thesis is 
the contradictory role of the state in its interventions. It 
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is not uncommon for the state to ll!gislate two policies in 
the same sector which are at cross purposes to each other. 
These conflicts sometimes are explained by internal 
contradictions within the state institutions which derive 
from the limitations of state actors and the diversity of 
interests the state simultaneously represents and serves. 
However, they may also be the result of different needs, 
desires and interests of people who demand changes in state 
policy and direction. Thus an explanation of the survival of 
PCP must take into consideration the complexity, both of 
producer households as well as state institutions. 
Third, an essential compor 'nt of the conceptual framework 
of this thesis is the impact of gender and household 
relations on the survival of petty commodity production. 
Specifically, this involves focusing on the impact of women's 
work, decision-making, creation of alternatives and the 
negotiation of economic and domestic relationships within 
producer households. 
Using a conceptual framework that considers the 
interaction between the outside macro-structural factors and 
the agency of fishing households allows for a more 
comprehensive explanation of the survival of petty commor.ity 
production. This method of analysis allows us to look at 
households in a more dynamic way. It permits us to take 
seriously the gender and generational dimensions of fishing 
households, and to consider the creative contribution of 
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members of the fishing household other than the male fisher 
in developing survival strategies. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
STATE POLICIES AND CHANGING ORGANIZATION IN THE PEI LOBSTER 
FISHERY 
3.1 Historical Overview 
This thesis is concentrating on changes in state policy in 
the lobster fishery from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. 
However, first I would like to briefly outline the history of 
the lobster fishery to provide some context for its specific 
character and its present role in the PEI fishery. Lobster 
had very little economic value until the mid 1850s because 
there was no way of preserving them. Unlike fish, they could 
not be dried or pickled; they had to be cooked almost 
immediately. Before modern means of transportation and 
refrigeration, lobster were limited to a small local market. 
George Leard in a book on lobster folklore says that 
(i]n early Acadia and down to almost modern times, 
lobster were an unappreciated food that had to be eaten 
fresh. They could not be marketed and were 
accordingly despised by the early settlers (Leard 
1975: 1). 
The commercialization of lobster only became possible with 
the discovery of canning technology. This was first used in 
the lobster fishery in the mid-1800s. As a result of the 
canning process, this prod··lCt became the cornerstone 
of the Island fJ.shery. There were other species in the 
waters surrounding PEI, such as cod, hake and mackerel, but 
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for several reasons, the development of the lobster fishery 
enjoyed the most success (Wells, 1986; DeWolf, 1974). 
There was an abundance of the resource in PEI waters. A 
relatively small amount of capital was required for 
harvesting and canning, and lobster was a highly valued and 
marketable product. Another reason, which is not often 
cited, is that the social structure i.,f Island communities and 
the mult.i-occupational character of fishing/farming 
households was sui ted to the development of the lobster 
fishery. 
The kind of lobster fishery we have today evolved as a 
result o:f state regulations, environmental conditions, 
geographical and market factors. The lobster fishery is one 
of the earliest regulated fisheries in Canada. Very early in 
its history 1 regulations turned the lobster fishery into a 
seasonal fishery. The first regulations, passed in 1.873, 
prohibited the capture of soft-shell lobsters to prevent the 
canning of a poor quality product. By 1876 this regulation 
was changed to a closed season during molting time, lasting 
from one and a half to two months, from July to September. 
Later 1 closed seasons were introduced not only to prevent the 
canning of poor quality lobsters, but also "as a means of 
decreasing exploitation". By 1879 1 the fishery in PEI was 
closed from August 20 to April 20 (DeWolf 1974:17-19). This 
set the stage for today's long closed season of ten months in 
the southern Gulf of st. Lawrence. one effect of this 
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regulation was to make the lobster fishery into a part-time 
activity. Fishers in PEI have always engaged in a multi-
species fishery, and many combined fishing with subsistence 
farming and other wage jobs. 
In the beginning, all of the lobster in the region was 
marketed as canned product. Within the first 30 years, 
however, the live lobster trade started to develop. It began 
on a small scale in 1878 between Yarmouth, Nova Scotia and 
Boston. During the rest of the 19th century the live lobster 
trade was conducted exclusively out of southern New Brunswick 
and western Nova Scotia, because of their proximity to the 
Boston market. As more and more lobster from southern New 
Brunswick and Southwest Nova Scotia were destined for the 
live market in the United States, the canneries disappeared 
from this area. However, in areas such as eastern Nova 
Scotia, PEI and northeastern New Brunswick, which were 
farther away from the American market, the canning inJustry 
continued to grow and develop. Most of this canned product 
was shipped to England until the end of the first world war 
when the markets shifted to the United States (Dewolf 
1974: 18-19; Wells 198 6: 160) • 
By the end of World War I, the Maritime provinces was 
divided into two distinct areas, a 'market' area in the south 
and a 'canner' area in the north. A two-tiered price system 
also developed with the rise of the live lobster trade, in 
which the 'market' lobster fetched a higher price than the 
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'canner' lobster (DeWolf 1974:19-22). This had implications 
for the development of the fishery. In the market area, 
fishers harvested only the larger 'market' lobster and all 
the product was sold on the live market. Consequently, more 
of the surplus was appropriated by the harvesting sector and 
lobster fishers in this area tended to have higher incomes. 
In the canner region in which PEI is included, the fishers 
were harvesting the smaller lobster and hence, the canneries 
played a key role in the development of the industry. 
Because of the need for wage labour in the cann~ries, other 
household members became mol "" directly involved in the 
lobster industry. 
PEI did not start shipping live lobster to the u.s. until 
1928. However, the lobster canneries remained an important 
part of the Island lobster industry up to the mid-1950s, 
though they steadily decreased in number from a high of 246 
canneries in 1900 to 49 in 1947. More recently, with the 
development of freezing technology, canned lobster declined 
in popularity and has been replaced by cold pack and frozen 
lobster in the shell. Although the processing industry has 
changed from canned to frozen products, the PEI fishery 
remains primarily a 'canner' fishery. Over so per cent of 
the lobster caught is sold as a processed product, rather 
than on the live market. 
To summarize, as a result of state regulations combined 
with market forces, the PEI lobster fishery has developed as 
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a canner fishery closely allied to fishing households. 
Because the fishery was seasonal and harvesting took place 
close to home, it could be combined with fishing other 
species and with farming. It became a type of industry 
sui ted to family labour. The men fished for the factory 
owner and both women and men worked in the small factories 
that were dotted along the Island coast. It created an 
industry where fishing households were dependent on multiple 
incomes for survival. 
The particular way the lobster fishery in PEI developed 
makes it a good place to study the interaction between 
external structures, such as state policy and capital 
investment, and the internal dynamics of petty commodity 
households. 
3.2. Changes in State Policy in the 1960s 
Up to the 1960s the fishery was open to anyone who wanted 
to fish. There were no limits on traps and the cost of entry 
was minimal. In the 1960s, new kinds of state intervention, 
in the form of licensing policies and unemployment insurance, 
changed the shape of the lobster fishery and had an impact 
not just on the fisher who held the licence but on the entire 
fishing household in which he/she was embedded. In this next 
section, I outline the implementation of licensing and 
unemployment insurance policies and the response of fishing 
households. I discuss the impact of state policy on the 
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organization and fishing practices of fishing households in 
the area around Naufrage. 
The period from the mid-1960s to the 1980s was very 
significant for the lobster fishery. Although the industry 
had been systematically regulated for over :lOO years, it was 
not until the late 1960s that restrictions were imposed on 
access. For the first time there were limits on the numbers 
of fishers participating in the fishery, and the number of 
traps used (Scott and Tugwell 1.981: 43). Previous 
regulations, which dealt primarily with minimum size, 
protection of egg-bearing lobsters, and closed seasons, were 
mainly concerned with conservation. Licensing policies and 
trap limits represented a new direction for state policy, 
which was more directed toward economic goals. According to 
Gordon DeWolf: 
One of the main goals of the federal government in the 
1960s with respect to the lobster fishery was more 
efficient management in an attempt to increase net 
incomes of fishermen. As it is generally agreed .•. that 
the same total catch of lobster can be taken with much 
less total fishing effort, regulations controlling 
effort were introduced. Effort control is expected to 
reduce unit fishing costs so that net incomes will be 
increased providing revenue does not change (1974:26). 
A real flaw in this argument is the assumption that revenue 
will not change. Without any controls on price, the fishers' 
revenue is a very unstable factor and thus, even if costs are 
reduced, there is no guarantee that net incomes will rise. 
These state policies of limited-entry and gear controls 
were responsible for the elimination of some fishers from the 
41 
lobster fishery, and for those who remained, they encouraged 
a change in the organization of the fishery and in fishing 
practices. In discussing licensing policy I deal 
specifically with limited-entry, personal licensing policies, 
trap limits, the buy-back program and the Bonafide licensing 
policy. 
3.2.1. New Goals for State Policy in the Fishery 
In Canada as in other countries such as Norway, Iceland 
and the United states, state policy in the 1970's was 
dominated by liberal solutions. These took the form of state 
intervention designed to regulate access to the resource 
(Neis 1988:44) • 
Up to this time, government involvement in the fishery 
was limited to researching and developing technology, income 
assistance policie~, such as unemployment insurance, and 
building infrastructure. Ownership and management were not 
part of state policy (Sinclair 1988:163). 
Doug House (1988) maintains that the seeds for policies on 
resource management were sown by the fisheries economists of 
tn~ 1950s. Since the 1950s canadian fisheries policies have 
been based upon the following fundamental assumptions: 
1) fish like any other national resource, should be 
exploited in the most rational, efficient, productive 
manner possible; 2) that rationality can best be 
achieved by industrializing and modernizing the fishing 
industry on the model of other successful resource and 
manufacturing industries; and 3) that the peculiar, 
common property nature of fish as a resource means that 
unrestricted free enterprise by itself cannot 
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rationalize fishing efforts; the state must intervene 
to regulate the industry in the best interests of 
society as a whole (House 1988:179). 
Thus, government regulations, like limited entry licensing 
policy, were promoted to counter "excess harvesting capacity 
and an inefficient use of the factors of production".(House 
1988:179). Limited entry in the lobster fishery was the 
forerunner of more direct state intervention in the 
management of all fish resources. Sinclair (1988) states 
that this change in fisheries policy to more direct 
involvement in resource management, which culminated in 1976 
with the announcement of the first comprehensive policy for 
Canadian Fisheries called Policy for Canada's Commercial 
Fisheries, heralded a redirection in the attitude of 
government toward fisheries management and development. 
Implicit in the new orientation is more direct 
intervention by government in controlling the use of 
fishery resources (Canada 1976:5). 
The 1976 document showed the "powerful influence of 
economic theories of open access resources". Economic 
problems in the fishery caused by too much effort and 
resulting in low incomes were identified as a consequence of 
the 'tragedy of the commons'. Sinclair (1988) summarized the 
main argument of this theory, promoted by various theorists 
(Scott 1955; Scott Gordon 1954; Gulland 1974) in this way~ 
As a fishery becomes commercially attractive, capital 
investment and labour are directed towards it in 
anticipation of profit. When no controls are 
exercised, however, individual fishers acting in their 
own interests will catch as much as possible rather 
than leave fish for their competitors. If prices fall, 
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they fish harder to increase their returns. A frequent 
result of this spiral is an economic decline, as costs 
of production rise, and the possibility of resource 
extinction increases (Sinclair 1988:164). 
Acting on this theory, state planners concluded that the 
biological and economic goals of a common-property resource 
could not be reached without continuous state control over 
inputs (Scott and Tugwell 1981:49). In a symposium on 
Policies for Economic Rationalization of commercial 
Fisheries, the economist J .A. Crutchfield presented the 
position that an open access fishery causes a multitude of 
ills such as excessive use of labor and capital inputs. He 
maintained that theory and experience have shown that 11 no 
management program that does not include control over inputs 
to fishing can offer much lasting improvement in economic 
performance over open access" (Crutchfield 1979:743). 
Many writers (Alexander 1974; Sinclair 1988; House 1988; 
Davis 1984; McMullan 1987) have argued the pros and cons of 
limited-entry licensing policy, concluding that while they 
may have solved some problems for the inshore fishery, they 
also created new constraints. McMullan alleges that 
downsizing the fleet does not necessarily remove excessive 
capacity (1987:126). Sinclair (1985, 1988) concludes that 
limited entry has no doubt improved the incomes of some 
fishers by keeping out competition. However, it has done so 
at some social cost, by creating inequalities and sometimes 
hostility between those who have licences and those who 
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don't. It has also led to significant increases in the cost 
of limited-entry licences such as lobster. 
Neis (1988) has criticized the 'tragedy of the commons' 
thesis as not providing an adequate answer to the problems of 
low incomes for fishers. It "provides an explanation for the 
crisis in the fishing industry as being based on the nature 
of the resource and regulations surrounding access to the 
resource" (p. 48). It ignores the fact that these problems 
can only be solved by looking at "the wider socioeconomic 
system within which the fishery is located" (p.53). These 
economic theories have other limitations in that they provide 
a rationale for limited access based on an assumption that 
the ability of a fishing enterprise to survive is determined 
solely by the economic activities of individual fishers. The 
theories do not take into account that fishers are embedded 
in households. The survival of inshore fishing enterprises 
cannot be adequately understood only by examining the 
activities of fishers. The decisions and actions of other 
household members also have an impact on survival. 
3.2.2. Rationalizing the Lobster Fishery. 
The lo"'ster fishery, as well as other fisheries on the 
Atlantic coast, has long been characterized by inadequate 
incomes and low productivity. Excessive inputs of labour and 
capital were considered to be the major cause of this 
situation. As far back as 1950, H. Scott Gordon, in an 
45 
extensive report on the PEI fishery from 1919 to 1949, 
concluded that "the lobster resources of Prince Edward Island 
could be exploited with half the men, boats and gear 
currently used without lowering the average annual catch by 
so much as a hundredweight" (Gordon 1952: 109). 
During the 1960's, the number c-.f lobster fishers increased 
all over the Maritimes (Table 1). The number of participants 
in the PEI lobster fishery reached a total of 3,103 in 1967, 
the highest in the history of the fishery. According to a 
Report on the Atlantic Fisheries done by the Atlantic 
Development Board there were several reasons for this in-
creased participation. Rumours of restricted entry 
encouraged people to return to the fishery to ensure their 
future participation. Also the price of lobsters to fishers 
increased from 32. 1 cents to 58.2 cents ( 81.5 per cent) 
between 1961 and 1965 (Table 2). Between 1957 and 1965 
lobster landings remained fairly steady but the landed value 
more than doubled from $2.4 million to $5.1 million (Canada 
1969: 30). Unemployment insurance for fishers had been 
introduced in 1957. This would also have aided in making the 
fishery more stable, thus attracting more entrants. 
Although this report points out that incomes improved for 
PEI fishers between 1957 and 1965, it goes on to point out 
that they were still low compared to the provincial and 
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TABLE 1: NUMBER OF LOBSTER FISHERS, 
MARITIME PROVINCES, PEI 
SELECTED YEARS, 1950-1984. 
YEAR 
1950 
1955 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
P.E.I. 
2, 313 
2.380 
2, 659 
2 '810 
21792 
2,798 
21809 
31043 
2, 898 
3,103 
2,993 
2, 654 
2, 470 
2, 353 
2 '705 
2,703 
2,410 
2.391 
21371 
N/A 
1,575 
1,685 
1,893 
1,942 
1,931 
2. 032 
1,310 
MARITIMES 
15,415 
171 137 
161177 
16,485 
16,608 
16,973 
16,981 
18,075 
16,247 
16, 025 
16,420 
14,267 
13,290 
12,847 
12,543 
121500 
13,182 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
10,057 
9,538 
9,838 
9,862 
9,'310 
10,509 
8,561 
Source: Econom~cs Branch, DFO, Ottawa 1959-1971, 
canadian Fisheries Annual Statistical Review, 1972-1984. 
TABLE 2: LOBSTER LANDED VALUE, P.E.I. SELECTED YEARS 
YEAR LANDED VALUE PRICE PER POUND 
($ OOO'S) cents 
1957 2,456.2 28.8 
1961 3,055.0 32.1 
1965 5,177.0 58.2 
Source: F~sher~es Stat~st~cs of Canada. D. B.S. 
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Canadian average. It uses statistics from an extensive 
economic appraisal of the Canadian lobster fishery by 
Rutherford, Wilder, and Frick (1967) for the Fisheries 
Research Board. This survey analyzes the different sources 
and levels of income for lobster fishers (Table 3) . A 
comparison of these incomes with those at the national and 
provincial levels, demonstrates that incomes from the 
inshore fishery were indisputably low. The personal income 
per labour force member in 1961 was $4,37 4 fer Canada and 
$2,970 for PEI. Even though the incomes of PEI fishers, 
which are included in the sections on the Gulf of st. 
Lawrence and Western Northumberland Strait, are the highest 
in the region, they only represent 83 per cent of the 
provincial average and 57 percent of the Canadian average 
(Canada 1969: 33). 
Both the report from the Atlantic Development Board and 
the Rutherford report concluded that there were too many men, 
boats and equipment engaged in a basically limited resource. 
They saw little likelihood of significant increases either in 
the volume or in the landed value of the lobster fishery on 
PEI. There was no other fishery on PEI which could be 
expanded sufficiently to provide this increase. The species 
that did have potential for increased yields, such as crab, 
shrimp and herring, require more investment in larger boats 
and different gear. Therefore lobster fishers could not 
easily move into exploiting these species. 
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TABLE 3: NET INCOME FOR ALL SOURCES PER ENTERPRISE OPERATOR 
IN LOBSTER FISHERY, 1961. 
AREA UNIT NET FORESTRY & LABOUR OTHER TRANSFER U.I. TOTAL 
FISHERY AGRICULTURE INCOME INCOME PAYMENTS 
INCOME 
SOUTHERN s 1,451 24 241 151 77 286 2,230 
N.B. % 65.1 1.1 10.8 6.8 3.4 12.8 100 
WESTERN $ 1,375 40 328 91 112 161 2,117 
N.S. 
' 
65.4 1.9 15.5 4.3 5.3 7.6 100 
s. SHORE $ 845 56 312 13 195 251 1, 672 
N. <; • 
' 
50.5 3.3 18.7 0.8 11.7 15.0 100 
EASTERN s 637 45 368 55 134 236 1,476 
N.s. 
' 
43.2 3.1 24.9 3.7 9.1 16.0 100 
GULF OF $ 1,240 166 532 68 155 273 2,441 
ST.LAWRENCE% 51.1 6.8 21.8 2.8 6.3 11.2 100 
WESTERN s 1,382 169 298 77 280 304 2, 515 
NORTHUMBER-% 55.2 6.7 11.8 3.1 11.1 12.1 100 
LAND STRAIT 
NEWFOUND- $ 584 81 187 2 274 261 1,389 
LAND 
' 
42.1 s.a 13.5 0.1 19.7 18.8 100 
Source: Rutherford,J.B.,D.G. Wilder and H.c. Frick. An Economic Appraisal 
of the Canadian Lobster Fishery. Bulletin 157. Fisheries Research Board 
of canada. ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1967. 
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As a result they recommended that the number of lobster 
licences in the Maritime region be cut in half (Rutherford et 
al 1967:80; Canada 1969:33-36). 
A 1967 economic analysis of the fishing industry on PEI 
aimed at formulating a programme to raise the income of 
individual PEI fishers through improved management of fishery 
resources (Prince Edward Island 1967) • It, too, ascribes the 
inefficiency of the fishery to the common property nature of 
the fishery in that: 
[a) n uncontrolled fishery will always have more 
productive factors than are socially desirable 
.•• The resource does not earn economic rent and the 
fishermen need not economize in its use (Prince 
Edward Island 1967:20}. 
It criticized the kind of regulations that had been 
implemented in the lobster fishery up to the 1960s as a 
"major impediment to improvement in efficiency and income" 
(p.3). Lobster enterprises reacted to restrictive 
regulations, such as the use of the trap as the only legal 
means to harvest lobster, the prohibition on egg-bearing 
lobsters and closed seasons, by intensifying the use of 
productive factors. As a result, the number of fishers, 
boats and gear in the lobster fishery increased. 
Some bureaucrats and fishers were suggesting that to 
improve the lobster fishery, it was necessary to implement 
trap limits and increase the minimum size. The Report 
concluded that controlling some factors of production through 
trap limits or raising minimum size would have no beneficial 
50 
effect if entry controls •.11ere not also implemented. If 
changes in any one factor of production caused an increase in 
total revenue, more people would enter the fishery thus 
dissipating any benefits to individual fishers (Prince Edward 
Island 1967:21-8). Again the assumption in this report is 
that the improvement in the lobster fishery is determined 
only by the activities of the fisher. Input from other 
members of the fishing household are completely ignored. 
In summary, in the lobster fishery on PEI from 1960 to 
1974 two ~'"ings were happening. Landings had steadily 
declined from 10.1 to 6.2 million pounds (Table 4). 1 At the 
same time, however, landed value was increasing from a low c. .. . : 
$3 million in 1961 to a high of $7.5 million in 1973 (Table 
4). High lobster prices together with unemployment insurance 
for fishers attracted new people into the fishery. There was 
great concern on the part of the state that growth in fishery 
revenue would attract new entrants, thus diminishing any 
chances for increased individual incomes. So1L!e fishers were 
concerned that these new entrants were fishing o1~ly lobster 
and were taking 5.ncome from this fishery on which full-time 
fishers were more dependent. In the 1970s, larger numbers of 
traps were being used to offset lower landings, which further 
increased the costs of production. Thus freezes on lobster 
1 These two figures represent the highest and lowest points in landings 
since the 1940s. 
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licences and trap limits were seen as mechanisms to stop new 
entrants, reduce costs and improve incomes. 
TABLE 4: LOBSTER LANDINGS AND VALUE, P.E.I. 
1960-74 
YEAR 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
LANDINGS 
(OOO'S) 
10.1 
9.5 
8.7 
7.4 
7.8 
8.8 
7.9 
9.0 
8.7 
8.2 
8.7 
8.2 
7.3 
7.7 
6.2 
LANDED VALUE 
($ 000 1 5) 
3,212.3 
3,055.0 
3,218.9 
3,155.8 
4,210.8 
5,176.6 
3,925.7 
5,228.9 
5,328.9 
5,375.8 
6,231.2 
5,860.6 
6,360.8 
7,503.2 
6,347.0 
Source: Fisheries Statistical Review, 1989. 
P.E.I. Department of Fisheries. 
It is interesting that in all of the government reports on 
the lobster fishery, they never cite low prices as a reason 
for inadequate incomes for fishers. The explanation that the 
problems of the lobster fishery are primarily due to open 
access is criticized by Barbara Neis (1988) who draws on the 
work of Rosemary Ommer (1985) to argue that the: 
relative wealth and poverty of fishers... are 
determined not so much by the extent to which the 
resource is 'open access', as by the price of fish, 
access to and the nature of markets, the 
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organization of fish processing, and other factors 
(Neis 1988:50). 
The State's solution to low incomes for lobster fishers did 
not challenge any of these factors around price, markets or 
the domination of the processing sector over the harvesting 
sector. Rather their response has been to reduce 
participation in the latter sector. 
3.3. Introduction of Trap Limits and Licensing Policy 
Trap limits were established before a licence freeze. 
They were first implemented in District 8(25) in 1966 where a 
limit of 250 was set. The following year a limit of 500 was 
set for the north side of PEI, in district 7B(24). In 1968 
the trap limit went down to 400 in district 7B and was 
reduced again to 300 in 1977 (Canada 1975:65). The 
difference in trap limits is due to the rhythm of landings. 
In the Fall lobster season, (district 8), over 50 per cent of 
the total landings for the season is landed in the first two 
to three weeks. This area of PEI was also most affected by 
reductions in lobster catches. 
In 1968 the number of lobster licences was frozen. In 
1969, the limit that was placed on the number of operators 
was changed to a limit on the number of licensed boats. 
Placing the limit on boats controlled the actual number of 
enterprises engaged in the fishery, and was a more effective 
way to control new entry. There were two categories of 
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licences for lobster fishing vessels. Class "A" licences 
were given to all boats that had fished a minimum of 100, 75 
or 50 traps in 1968, depending on the district. For PEI the 
minimum number was 100. Boats that had fished less than the 
minimum number were classified as "B" boats. Licences for 
class "B" boats were not transferable. 
In 1977, administrative changes were made to these 
regulations and licensing went back to the pre-1969 practice 
of attaching it to the fisher rather than the vessel. The 
substance of the 1969 regulations remained the same with the 
trap limit applying to the vessels of category "A" or "B" 
fishers. This categorization was clearly a strategy to 
differentiate 'full-time' from 'part-time' fishers. Persons 
were ineligible for a category "A" licence if they were fully 
employed in work other than primary industry employment or, 
they had full-time seasonal employment, and their gross 
earnings during the twelve-month period preceding the 
application for the licence exceeded the minimum wage plus 25 
per cent (Tugwell 1981:29-31). The main result of this was 
to prevent people who had wage jobs outside of primary 
production, from fishing lobster. 
The licence freeze prevented new entry into the lobster 
fishery but it did not reduce the numbers significantly. 
With the categorization of fishers into 'full-time' and 
'part-time', there was pressure from some fishers to get rid 
of part-timers, or 'moonlighters', as they were sometimes 
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denoted. Romeo LeBlanc, the federal minister of Fisheries 
from 1974 to 1984, announced a lobster management plan in 
1976 after he had received a report from the Lobster Fishery 
Task Force set up in 1975. He intended to remove the part-
time fishers from the lobster fishery. LeBlanc announced 
that part-tim~ fishers would be notified early in January, 
1976 that their licences would be revoked. His justification 
was that lobster licences should be restricted to those who 
needed them. Appeal committees were set up in each of the 
twelve lobster districts in the Maritimes. There were so 
many appeals in the three Maritime provinces that they could 
not be settled before the spring lobster fishery in 1976, and 
LeBlanc had to abandon this plan for another year 
(Charlottetown Guardian Mar.31,1976). 
There was some disagreement between the licensing 
guidelines proposed by LeBlanc and the program proposed by 
the PEI Fishermen's Association and the provincial Department 
of Fisheries. The PEI government and the Fishermen's 
Association favoured a buy-back program that would 
voluntarily remove licences, whereas the Federal Government 
was pushing to get rid of the part-timers as a pre-condition 
to setting up a buy-back program. The Lobster Fishery Task 
Force ( 1975) had recommended against a buy-back program, 
saying that "without extremely large expenditures of 
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funds ... a buy-back program would only eliminate the 
marginal2 fishermen and therefore achieve no substantial 
reduction in effort" (Canada 1975:77). 
Clearly there were different interests between federal and 
provincial politicians. Provincial politicians realized ~·hat 
revoking licences from so-called part-time fishers created a 
lot of antagonism among PEI fishers, most of which was 
directed at politicians. Buying back licences was a more 
'politically popular' way of reducing participation in the 
fishery. Furthermore they realized that fishers were not 
going to leave the fishery without some compensation. 
However, at the federal level, it was difficult to get 
approval for public funds that would be used "to pu.rchase a 
privilege in order to protect persons from competition" 
(p.77). 
At the end of 1976, LeBlanc announced that those fishers 
who did not need to fish lobster for a living would be 
removed from the fishery within two years. Fishers would be 
categorized according to three categories: Category A, 
fishers dependent on the fishery for their living and without 
other year-round employment; Category B, fishers with another 
full-time job or who had started fishing before 1969 ; 3 
2 The marginal fishermen here refers to those who may be fishing a small 
number of traps. The concern about large expenditures of funds did not refer 
so much to the cost of buying back licenses in P.E.I. but more to buying back 
licenses in the whole region. 
3 Category B fishers are to be allowed to set 30% of the maximum number 
of traps established for the district. 
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category c, fishers who did not fit into A or B, but who had 
acquired a registered vessel after 1969. Category C licences 
were issued only until the 1978 fishing season (DeWolf 1974; 
Scott & Tugwell 1981; Charlottetown Guardian Nov.9, 1976). 
3.3.1. Buy-back Program 
In 19 7 7, a Lobster Licence Buy-back Program was 
introduced. This was much more effective in reducing effort 
in the Maritime lobster fishery than the limited entry 
program {Scott and Tugwell 1981:44). ThH lobster Vessel 
Certificate Retirement Program4 was first introduced in PEI 
under the Prince Edward Island Comprehensive Development 
Plan. This 15-year Development Plan was initially 
implemented in 1969 by the provincial and federal governments 
to promote the economic and social development of the Island. 
An integral part of this plan was the rationalization of the 
primary industries of fishing and farming. The objectives 
for developing the inshore fishery under this plan were based 
on a number of assumptions. lt stated that: 
The fishery of the Province had a number of serious 
problems ... The limited resource base, the large number 
of small ports, and the over-exploitation of certain 
species, are all reflected in the low incomes from 
fishing and its seasonal nature (Prince Edward Island 
1971:33). 
4 This was the official title of the program which was popularly called 
the Lobster Buy-back Program. Through the program the fishers withdrew from 
the fishery by selling their lobster vessel certificate. 
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One of the main objectives of this plan was to raise the 
income of fishers. The planning document stated that "the 
supply of fish does not permit any appreciable expansion in 
total activity. Accordingly good earnings for the individual 
will be possible only with a smaller number of fishermen" 
(Prince Edward Island 1971:34). The Plan recognizes the 
limits of the resource, but it does not consider a higher 
price to fishers as a way of improving their incomes. The 
state chose an approach that would give higher incomes to 
fewer fishers and at the same time maintain the right of the 
corporate sector to accumulate surplus. 
The objectives of the development plan were in accord with 
the federal government's limited-entry licensing policy. But 
the planners felt the federal program was too slow and was 
not actually reducing the number of participants in the 
fishery. They therefore proposed a compensation plan to 
encourage people to leave the industry. 
The new Federal regulation which licences lobster 
fishermen will limit entry and therefore gradually 
reduc·~ the number of fishermen. This will be a slow 
process however. The need for rationalization as the 
basis for higher incomes per fishe:a: ,;·.:m, means that 
there should be some form of compensation to provide 
active encouragement and assistance to people who want 
and are able to leave the lobster fishery (Prince 
Edward Island 1971:35). 
The funding for the Buy- back program on PEI was shared by 
the province and the Department of Regional and Economic 
Expansion, with the latter providing 90 per cent. The 
project was to last three years and i ts goal was to 
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voluntarily withdraw 400 licences from the lobster fishery. 
The stated purpose was "to ease pressure on the resource and 
to increase the incomes of those remaining in the fishery" 
(Scott and Tugwell 1981: 30) . A total of 187 licences were 
bought back, only 45 per cent of the stated target number. 
Compensation, ba~. ed on average landings for the previous 
three years, ranged from a minimum of $2,000 to a maximum of 
$6,000. 
The program was extremely popular in the first year but 
was less attractive in the second and third year::>. One 
reason was that lobster landings had increased from 9 million 
pounds in 1977 to 11.8 million pounds in 1979, and the total 
landed value had increased from $10 million to $18 million in 
the same peri~d. Lobster fishing was now considered a more 
viable option than in the early 1970s and worth risking an 
investment. As a result, fishers could obtain more for thei r 
licence on the market than from the Buy-back Program (Prince 
Edward Island l979a:63-64; Scott and Tugwell 1981:30). 
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3.3.2. Bonafide Licensing Policy 
By the end of the 1970s there was a lot of confusion 
regarding the licensing changes that had taken place in the 
previous decade. The government licensing policy to remove 
participants from the lobster fishery was welcomed by some, 
but caused a lot of uncertainty for others. Many fishers 
alleged that the DFO was terminating licences that were not 
in ust Ther~ were also constant complaints that patronage 
played a big role in the granting of licences (Calhoun, 
forthcoming) . 
To sort out these problems, Romeo LeBlanc appointed Cliff 
Levelton, former assistant deputy minister of DFO, to study 
the issue and make recommendations. In his 1979 report, 
Levelton agreed with the fishers that "the Atlantic coast 
licensing system has become overburdened, inconsistent in 
application, cumbersome, misunderstood and somewhat 
unresponsive" (Level ton 1981:2) . In response, in 1983, the 
federal fisheries minister announced a new licensing policy 
for fishers in the southern Gulf called the Bonafide 
Licensing Policy. This policy classified fishers as Bonafide 
and Commercial. 'Bonafide' fishers were those who had a 
Class A lobster licence andfor made 75% of their income from 
fishing. What made a fisher bonafide was not a particular 
licence but a 'bonafide permit'. This permit allowed holders 
to transfer or acquire other limited-entry licences and gave 
them priority in receiving new licences. Other fishers were 
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classified as commercial.s To acquire a bonafide permit, a 
fisher had to fish with a commercial licence for two years. 
one of the advantages of this new policy was that it gave 
more flexibility to bonafide fishers to transfer individual 
licences if they so wished. Another change was that the 
fisher was l.censed, not the fishing vessel. Thus s/he could 
transfer his/her licence without transferring the boat. 
The Maritime Fishermen's Union was very involved in 
developing this licensing policy. The Southern Gulf Bonafide 
Fishermen's Licensing Policy has been described as one in 
which fishers had a great deal of input. According to the 
fishers who were fighting for this policy, this policy 
recognized that the fishery in the southern Gulf was a multi-
purpose fishery. The Bonafide permit gave fishers 
flexibility to choose a fishery in accordance with their 
needs, as well as the condition of the stocks. Fishers were 
no longer forced to use their licences every year just to 
keep them {Calhoun, forthcoming). 
The effect of the licensing regulations during the 1970's, 
and especially this Bonafide policy of 1983, was to priorize 
people who were fishing full-time, and remove those who were 
combining lobste:L fishing with other wage jobs that were 
perceived to be well-paid. The logic for this was that 
' A Commercial fisher is a person 16 years of age or older who has 
participated in commercial fisheries and is registered with the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans as a Commercial fisherman (Prince Edward Island 1988:62). 
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the benefits of the lobster fishery should be left to those 
who were making their living primarily from fishing. 
It is clear that these licensing policies changed the 
nature of the inshore fishery. some part-timers did leave, 
although it is difficult to ascertain exactly how many left 
and how many became full time. 6 However, because of the 
licencing policy, some fishers who previously had combined 
lobster fishing with other jobs now became full-time fishers. 
There was increased pressure on full-time fishers to get more 
returns from the fishery. Also, the price of lobster 
licences rose significantly during the next ten years making 
it difficult for young people to enter the fishery. 
The freeze on licences prevented new fishers from 
entering the fishery. The categorization policy and the buy-
back program were responsible for removing some licences from 
the fishery. However, in some areas at least, licencing 
policies did not reduce participation to the extent that was 
originally anticipated. 
6An examination of table 1, showing the numbers of lobster licenses in 
PEl from 1950 to 1984 might lead us to conclude that the number of licences 
were reduced by half during that period. However these numbers may be 
somewhat misleading. Before 1970, all people fishing lobster had a lobster 
licence, both boat-owners and helpers. After the limited-entry policy, and 
categorization of licences, the number of lobster licences reflected only 
boat-owners. After 1977 helpers are not included in the lobster licensing 
statistics. As a result we cannot conclude that the reduction in numbers 
represent a consequent reduction in lobste r enterprises. 
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3.4. Impact of Lobster Regulations on Fishers in Naufrage 
In the area around Naufrage up to the mid-1960s, the 
fishers could be broadly divided into two groups. The first 
group, who would consider themselves full-time fishers, 
fished for six months, catching a variety of species such as 
lobster, groundf ish, mackerel and herring. o·~1ring the 
remainder of the year they would work at wage jobs. The 
second group fished only lobster. '!'hey were considered part-
time fishers, and combined this with subsistence farming, or 
would engage in wage labour immediately after the lobster 
season. Both groups had access to unemployment insurance 
benefits after 1957 with the implementation of the Fisheries 
Regulations as part of the Unemployment Insurance Act. 
Many people in this area also fished along the shore in 
small shore boats of 20 to 30 feet. With the categorization 
of fishers into full-time and part-time, some of these left 
the fishery and others, who had previously only fished 
lobster, became full-time fishers. Those who remained in 
the fisher:· relocated to Naufrage as a point of departure 
because it had a wharf and could accommodate bigger boats. 
Of the respondents who were fishing in the 1960s and 1970s, 
50 per cent had been fishing in small shore boats, but during 
the period 1965-1975 they relocated to Naufrage. 
The removal of part-timers from the fishery received mixed 
support from the fishers along this shore. The comments 
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below from the fishers I interviewed demonstrate a range of 
views: 
I never fished and farmed. A lot of people did. I made 
a living only from fishing. Everyone was getting into 
fishing [in the 60s] so they tried to control it before 
it got out of hand •.• There was some pressure from the 
fishermen on people who had other jobs to leave 
fishing. At one time one buyer had 3 boats in Naufrage. 
Some fishermen had two ;;1eets. Those regulations forced 
fishermen to become fulltime fishermen. Sometimes 
people are pushed into things they didn't want to get 
into .... But there are probably still too many boats up 
there (Naufrage]. 
The regulation to do away with part-time fishermen has 
helped. We would be better off down here with 50 boats 
than with what we got here now. [There are 84 boats in 
1989].The government should buy back now. 
Licensing policies eliminated the practice of fishers 
operating more than one boat or hiring other people to 
operate the boat. The holder of the licence has to be present 
in the bo~t during fishing and they are only allowed to fish 
in one lobster district. 
Not all fishers were in agreement with the 
reclassification of part-timers: 
The government passed regulations a few years ago that 
you weren't allowed to have any other jobs besides 
fishing. They would reclassify your licence if you 
were only part-time. It brought a lot of part-t.ime 
fishermen fulltime into the fishery. I don't think it 
was a good thing. There were restrictions on licences 
anyway. There were no new licences being issued. If a 
fellow had something else to go to, let him go ahead .•• 
That regulation changed the fishery. Before that, some 
people worked on the car ferry. They took their 
holidays and went lobster fishing. 
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As this fisher indicated, it changed the fishery as fishers 
now were expected to make their living only from fishing. 
There was general agreement among the fishers interviewed 
that trap limits were a good regulation. Most thought it 
gave everyone equal access and cut down expenses: 
There was some complaining but people accepted the 
change. It was no good. There was no one m.aking a 
half-decent living at it. some were fishing 1, ooo 
traps and some had 100 traps. When they put the trap 
limits on, everybody was fishing 300 traps. It .,.,ade the 
thing more competitive. All of a sudden everyone was 
fishing the same. 
some thought it was good for conservation: 
In terms of trap limits, it's good to regulate them. We 
are getting as much fish now with 300 traps as with 400 
traps because we are fishing them better. The 
regulations are good for conservation. 
If the fishers are getting as much lobster as before, it is 
questionable whether trap limits decreased effort. What the 
trap limit did was cut down competition. 
When I started [in 1968] the trap limit was 400 traps. 
The people with 1000 traps didn't want to change just 
like today •... There was some pretty poor fishing in 
the 1970's and some left and never came back. 
Economists allege that the limit was set too high to result 
in any real reduction in effort. There is much debate among 
fisheries economists as to whether trap limits actually 
reduced the total number of traps. Most argue that the total 
number of traps went up because before the trap limits many 
fishers were fishing below the limit. DeWolf in his study on 
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the economic effects of regulations in the lobster fiF~hery 
states that: 
licence limitation and trap limits as introduced in the 
late 1960s will redistribute incomes more equally, will 
not affect total fishing effort substantially, may lead 
to an increase in the total number of traps, may have 
an adverse effect on economic efficiency, and will 
increase the value of boats as the right to fish 
lobsters becomes capitalized (1974:53-4). 
Rutherford (1967} maintains that the real motivation for 
the trap limits was a desire on the part of fishers to 
equalize access (1967:91). The actual reduction in total 
number of traps did vary from region to region. It seems as 
if there was some reduction in PEI. The Acres Report (Prince 
Edward Island 1967) indicated that the total number of traps 
in PEI in 1964 was 550, ooo. In 1989 the total number of 
official trap tags issued by the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans was 379,400. 7 However even if the overall number was 
reduced, there is a strong trend to build bigger, more 
efficient traps; thus there is probably increased effort. 
3.4.1 Increase in Concentration of Fishers in Naufrage 
The goal of state policies like limited-entry and removal 
of part-timers was to reduce participation in the lobster 
7 This number was calculated by multiplying the number of bonafide 
fishers in the three lobster districts on P.E.I. by the number of traps 
allowed for each fi~her. 
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TABLE 5: NUMBER OF BOATS FISHING OUT OF NAUFRAGE 1967-89 
YEAR # OF BOATS YEAR # OF BOATS 
1967 78 1978 82 
1968 82 1979 84 
1969 82 1980 82 
1970 97 1981 81 
1971 97 1982 81 
1972 94 1983 81 
1973 96 1984 82 
1974 97 1985 81 
1975 98 1986 81 
1976 95 1987 81 
1977 87 1988 81 
1989 84 
Source: Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Morell,P.E.I. 
fishery and thus increase the income of those who remained. 
If there was some reduction in the overall fishery on PEI, 
this reduction was experienced more in some areas than in 
others. In Naufrage harbour the number of boats actually 
increased in the period 1967 to 1975 (See table 5) . Part of 
the increase in numbers can be explained by the relocation of 
the shore boats to Naufrage harbour. 8 However, there was a 
major increase in fishing effort due to the movement of boats 
from the southeastern part of the Island to the north shore. 
In the late 1960s and 1970s, when lobster landings began 
to decrease in the southeastern part of PEI, fishers came 
over to the north shore where the landings were higher. At 
8
• The relocation to Naufrage only changed the point of departure. They 
were fishing the same grounds as when they were fishing off the shore. Thus 
the addition of these boats did not reflect new fishing effort in Naufrage 
harbour. 
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that time, District 7B included the whole area of the north 
shore and the southeastern shore from East Point to Victoria 
and fishers could legally fish anywhere in the lobster 
district. In the mid-1970s, due to pressure from fishers in 
the Naufrage and North Lake area, the Department of Fisheries 
and Oceans subdivided District 7B drawing a line straight 
east from East Point. This regulation made a new lobster 
district of the area from East Point to Victoria. As a 
result, the fishers who had moved to the north shore were 
prevented from returning to their home port when landings 
improved in the late 1970s. This was an example of two 
different state policies working at cr.oss purposes. The 
regulations on limited entry and removal of part-timers were 
promoting the removal of fishers while another regulation 
actually kept the number of fishers high in this particular 
area . . 
By the early 1980s, limited-entry licensing and the 
categorization of fishers as bonafide and commercial had 
created a lobster fishery much different from that of the 
mid-1960s. •rhe goals of these state policies were to 
rationalize this fishery, remove part-timers who had access 
to other full-time jobs, and professionalize the status of 
those remaining as fulltime fishers. The policies were based 
on the logic that inefficient fishers would drop out of the 
fishery and go to other jobs. Thus the fishers remaining 
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could be more economically efficient, increase their effort 
per unit, and consequently raise their incomes. 
However, in reality, these policies had very uneven 
effects because fishing households responded in different 
ways. In the Naufrage area, due to a lack of other 
employment alternatives, many fishers who previously were 
part-time, did not drop out; rather, they became full-time so 
that they could keep their lobster licence. 9 Conflicting 
state policies maintained a high concentration of fishers in 
Naufrage. The requirement to be full-time fishers resulted 
in increased capital investment and higher costs. In some 
areas of PEI, these rising costs were offset by increased 
landings. However Naufrage experienced only modest 
increases in lobster landings (See table 6} . As a result 
many lobster fishing households maintain that without the 
support of other state programs such as unemployment 
insurance, it would be very difficult to survive as inshore 
fishers. 
9It is difficult to get accurate information on exactly how many lobster 
fishers in this area dropped out as before 1967 DFO did not have clear records 
of fishers according to harbours. Also many fishers in the 1960s in this area 
were fishing along the shore. After limited entry, some of them moved to 
Naufrage and some went to the other neighboring harbour, Red Head. 
One indication that limited- entry licensing policy did not remove many 
fishers from the Naufrage harbour is that in conversation with fishers , they 
always refer to the buy-back program as having the most effect on reducing the 
number of fishing enterprises in Naufrage. As a result of this program, 14 
licenses from Naufrage harbour were bought back between 1977 and 1979. 
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TABLE 6 : LOBSTER LANDINGS , 
NAUFRAGE, P.E.I. 1978-89 
YEAR 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
NAUFRAGE P.E.I. 
347 5036 
351 5354 
335 5354 
346 5399 
340 5535 
391 7033 
322 6171 
282 6806 
263 8303 
319 8575 
412 9982 
389 9664 
Source: Fisher1es Stats Review, 
P.E.I. Department of Fisheries. 
3.5. Unemployment Insurance 
A state policy that has had significant impact on the 
development of the inshore fishery is the Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) Program. Fishers were given access to 
unemployment insurance benefits in 1957 and still remain the 
only group of self-employed workers who have access to this 
program. 
To qualify, self-employed f5shers must have at least ten 
weeks of insurable earnings. With recent changes, only six 
weeks have to be from fishing. The remaining four weeks may 
be obtained from other work. Fishers are eligible for 
benefits under Part V of the Unemployment Insurance 
Regulations and are classified as either "year-roi...:Jd11 fishers 
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or 11 seasonal" fishers. 10 Approximately 90 per cent file 
claims as seasonal fishers. Fishers are eligible for 
benefits for a period of 29 weeks, from 1 November to 15 May 
for fishers on PEI. A week of insurable earnings is 
calculated to be 75 per cent of the gross value of the weekly 
catch, and must be a minimum of $99 to qualify. In 1983, 
changes in the regulations allowed fishers who had 15 weeks 
or more of insurable earnings to base their benefits on the 
best ten weeks. As a result of this change, fishers ~ould 
fish in the shoulder seasons when catches are low or sporadic 
without it affecting the size of their benefits (Canada 
1986:241-3; 1987b:2). 
over the past 30 years changes in the overall economy, as 
well as changes in the licensing system have created a 
situation where unemployment insurance plays a more 
significant role in supplementing the incomes of fishers than 
in the past. Rutherford 1 s study in 1967 indicated that 11.5 
per cent of the incomes of fishers in the Gulf came from 
unemployment insurance. In surveys of fishers' incomes in 
1984 and 1988, unemployment insurance accounted for 29 per 
cent of the total income of full-time fishers in PEI (Canada 
1987a:90; Information from DFO). Insurance claims for 
10 
"I'ear-round" self-employed fishers must have 20 weeks of insurable 
employment. Their last job must have been on a vessel designated by the 
Canada Employment and Immigration Commission as "year-round", and they must 
have demonstrated "year-round" fishing employment. These fishers are entitled 
to the full benefits Qf the regular Unemployment Insurance program. Ten 
percent of fishers fall into this category. "Seasonal fishers" are so called 
because they fish for species that have a designated season (Canada 1986) . 
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fishers in PEI rose from $5 million in 1978 to $19.2 million 
in 1988 (Table 7). 
TABLE 7: AMOUNT OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS 
PAID TO FISHERS ON PEI, 1978-1988 
YEAR 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1S85 
1986 
1987 
1988 
AMOUNT 
($ OOO'S) 
5,035 
5, 900 
7, 244 
7,439 
81686 
121 229 
12, 063 
13' 063 
15,928 
15, 978 
19, 275 
Source: canada Employment and Immigration, 
Charlottetown. 
Limited entry did not reduce dependence on state income-
support programs, such as unemployment insurance, as was 
implicitly expected in the original objectives. As licensing 
policies and changes in the wider economy reduced options for 
fishers, they were forced to invest more in the fishery. But 
in areas like Naufrage, due to a high concentration of 
fishers and limited fish resources, there is less possibility 
that even with increased investment, individual fishers will 
achieve significant increases in income. Thus programs like 
unemployment insurance are all 
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the more necessary for their survival. They give the inshore 
fishery a stability it would not have if fishers were 
dependent only on fishing income. 
Unemployment insurance for fishers has been under severe 
attack since the mid-l980s. It has been criticized in the 
Forget Report (1986) as imposing a heavy cost to taxpayers11 
and for maintaining a "high level of participation in the 
fishery which reduc~s the viability of the industry, impedes 
its restructuring and to some extent the restructuring of the 
provincial economies of Atlantic canada 11 (Canada 1987b: 4) • 
The critics argue that since it no longer acts like an 
insurance program it should be eliminated and replaced by an 
income support program. This has been promoted by various 
governmental and private consultants since the Kirby Report 
of 1983. 
Jim Overton (1990) argues the view that UI no longer acts 
as an insurance program is based on ignorance of the history 
of the program. If we examine the history of unemployment 
insurance, we discover there has been a long debate about 
whether it should just be an insurance program or "meet 
other, broader social objectives". Overton maintains that 
since the 1960s: 
11 Witnesses to the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans noted that 
there is a significant imbalance between premiums and benefits. Over 90 per 
cent of the benefits paid to fishers have been paid out of federal general 
revenues . However the total benefits for self-employed fishers were less than 
2 per cent of all UI claims in 1984. These benefits at the local levels 
provide a minimum of protection in an industry subjected to many external and 
internal pressures (Canada 1987:3-5). 
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the trend has been to extel'ld UI coverage to more and 
more workers and towards the creation of a 
comprehensive national system for pooling the risks and 
costs of unemployment (p.28). 
It has been argued that fishers' UI should be replaced by 
other 'more appropriate' income stabilization programs, 
because of its use in recurring periods of seasonal 
unemployment. The majority of seasonal workers in Atlantic 
Canada use UI as a means of 'maintaining income' in the off 
season. However there seems to be a more systematic 
campaign to replace UI with an income stabilization program 
for fishers than for other seasonal workers. 
Fishers' organizations such as the Maritime Fishermen's 
Union and the United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union in 
British Columbia have expressed grave concerns about the 
dismantling of the unemployment insurance program for 
fishers. They have emphasized its essential role in 
providing a mur.::h needed, basic level of income during the 
off-season. They see UI as minimum protection in an 
industry subjected to many external pressures, such as 
fluctuating export prices and exchange rates, as well as 
internal pressures, such as weather, resource availability, 
and lack of collective bargaining rights. They have argued 
that the income supplementation programs would be more 
vulnerable to countervailing duties (Canada 1987:5). 
Fishing incomes vary significantly in PEI from year to 
year. Fishers emphasize that the benefits they receive do 
not represent a huge amount of money r.· jd if they have a good 
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year and a higher than usual amount of income, it is taxed 
back. 
Unemployment is really important in a year like 
this (1989]. Two years ago I paid it all back to 
the government in taxes. This year I won't pay any 
income tax. I will be glad to get my unemployment. 
Fishers reject the idea that they are a big burden on 
taxpayers. 
If you are making $12,000 net income, you need UI If I 
was fishing lobsters on the south side, I don't think I 
would need it. [UI] is not a lot of money. The 
government knows it's not a lot of money and if people 
are making a lot of money, it is taxed back. 
The continuation of unemployment insurance as a state 
policy is demanded by workers as a way to counteract the 
risks and costs of unemployment. It was based on the premise 
that unemployment is rot the fault of the worker, and that 
the state has an obligation to support workers when they 
cannot find gainful employment. It was extended to fishers 
as a response to the economic reality that fishers could not 
survive on fishing income alone. Interviews with fishers 
make it clear that they look at unemployment insurance as 
part of their fishing income. 
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3.6. Conclusion 
Licensing policies, as well as other changes in the 
economy, have changed the activities of fishers from a 
pattern of occupational pluralism to one where there is more 
concentration on fishing production. This has reduced the 
flexibility of fishing enterprises, an essential factor in an 
industry where producers have no control of the price of 
their product, nor of the resource. Thus state programs such 
as unemployment insurance play an important part in survival 
strategies by supplementing both the fishing income of the 
fisher and the wage labour earnings of other members of the 
household. 
The two policies of licensing and unemployment insurance 
operating at the same time have often had contradictory 
effects. As licensing policies attempted to downsize the 
fishery, unemployment insurance has enabled fishers to 
counter some of the insecurities and thus remain in the 
fishery. Fishing households developed survival strategies 
that responded to the new direction of state policy, but also 
took advantage of the opportunities it offered to extend 
their options in reproducing their fishing enterprise. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
SURVIVAL STRATEGIES OF FISHING HOUSEHOLDS 
4.1 Introduction 
State policy implemented from the mid-1960s to the 1980s 
changed the shape of the inshore fishery. At the same time 
it presented new challenges and new constraints on the 
survival of lobster fishing households. Through licensing 
policy, the state froze new entry in the lobster fishery, 
classified licenses as full-time and part-time, and reduced 
the number of participants by removing part-timers. Fishing 
households responded to these constraints in a multi-lateral 
way by intensifying their fishing efforts and also by 
expanding household income through wage labour. In this 
chapter I will discuss survival strategies that fishers in 
Naufrage adopted, outlining them according to three main 
areas. I will first talk about changes in the lobster 
fishery; secondly, the exploitation of other species; and 
thirdly, other sources of income generated by the wage labour 
of other family members or fishers themselves. 
4.2 Strategies in the Lobster Fishery 
During the decade 1978-1988 the PEI lobster fishery 
experienced overall increases in both lobster landings and 
landed value. Lobster landings rose from 11 million pounds 
in 1978 to 22 million pounds in 1988 (Table 8) • Lobster 
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landed value increased from $16.6 million to $56 million in 
the same period. Figures 2 and 3 showing five-year averages 
of lobster landings since 1893, both for PEI and canada, 
indicate that the increases in this decade of 1978-1988 were 
higher than in any previous decade in this century1 • 
The£e increases in landings, along with the freeze on 
licenses, present a general impression of prosperity for 
lobster fishers on PEI during the 1980s. But not all areas 
of PEI experienced the benefits of increased landings and 
prices to the same degree. Lobster landings in the Naufrage 
area, for example, did not increase to the same degree as 
other areas. To demonstrate the unevenness of lobster 
landings, Table 9 compares percentage increases from 1978 to 
1989 for Naufrage harbour; the lobster district in which it 
is located, 7B; the other spring lobster district, 7B1; and 
PEI as a whole. Because of fluctuations in landings, I am 
using averages of 4-year periods to compare these percentage 
changes. While the 4-year averages have increased 21 per 
No one has an adequate explanation as to why the 
lobster landings have been increasing every year. Some possible 
explanations are diminishing cod and hak~ ~tacks which are . 
predators of lobster, escape mechanisms on traps to let small 
lobster escape before the trap is hauled to the surface, better 
gear resulting in increased effort and warmer than average water 
temperatures. But biologists have no really solid scientific 
explanations for the increases and historically lobster stocks go 
up and do\m without warning. The landings in P. E. I. dropped 1 
million lbs. from 1988-89 after increasing every year since 1978. 
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Fig. 2: PEI Lobster Lai1dii1gs 
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TABLE 9: 
(Metric Tonnee) 
YEAR 
SPAN 7B 
1978-81 2926 
1982-85 3046 
1986-89 3541 
TABLE 8: LOBSTER LANDINGS 
AND LANDED VALUE, 
PEI. 1978-1989. 
YEAR LANDINGS VALUE 
('OOO'S) {$OOO's) 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
11.1 
11.8 
11.8 
11.9 
12.2 
15.5 
13.6 
15.0 
18.3 
18.9 
22.0 
21.3 
16,649 
18,074 
15,458 
18,519 
22,599 
29,056 
23,137 
33,591 
44,494 
49,532 
56,129 
46,058 
Source: Fisheries statistical 
Review,PEI,l989. 
4-YEAR AVERAGE OF LOBSTER LANDINGS, 
NAUFRAGE, DISTRICT 7B, 7Bl, 1978-89. 
FOUR-YEAR AVERAGES 
per cent 7B1 per cent Nau- per cent 
change change frage change 
1312 344.7 
+4 1819 +39 331.8 -4 
+16 3744 +106 345.8 +4 
Source: Statistics Division, DFO, Charlottetown. 
81 
PEl per cent 
change 
5284 
6408 +21 
8649 +35 
cent and 35 per cent for PEI as a whole, and 4 per cent and 
16 per cent for District 7B the avera~es for Naufr~ge show 
only slight variations. An examination of the lobster landed 
value for Naufrage from 1978 to 1989, reveal some fluctuation 
but no significant increases. If we calculate these values 
in constant 1978 dollars, we see that between 1978 and 1989, 
real lobster income for fishers in Naufrage has decreased by 
almost one-third (Table 10). 
In addition the degree of concentration of fishers 
varies from area to area. While district 7B has experienc~d 
lower percentage increases in landings than 7B1, it has 20% 
more fishers (Table 11). As outlined in Chapter 4, the area 
around Naufrage has a particularly high concentration of 
fishers because of the movement of fishers to this area in 
the early 1970s. Considering that all the fishers in 7B and 
7B1 fish an equal number of traps, the possibl i ty of 
individual fishers in Naufrage increasing their landings is 
limited. 
Finally, the overall prosperity of the lobster fishery 
and the freeze on lobster licenses have caused significant 
increases in the cost of lobster licenses and upward pressure 
on other costs. At the same time, the establishment of 
lobster fishers as full-time has increased fishers' 
dependence on fishery income. Fishers have responded to 
these changes by increasing their capital investment with the 
expectation of enlarging their individual share of the catch. 
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TABLE 10: LANDED VALUE OF LOBSTER 
NAUFRAGE HARBOUR, 1978-1989 
YEAR TOTAL LANDED VALUE 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
($ 'COO's) ($ 1 000's) 
current dollar constant dollars 
1,129 
1,183 
927 
1,181 
1,3:>9 
1,616 
1,314 
1,471 
1,203 
1,609 
2,311 
1, 749 
1,129 
1,075 
756 
844 
866 
970 
756 
813 
638 
816 
1,123 
808 
Source: Statistics Divis~on, DFO, 
Charlottetown. 
TABLE 11 
DISTRIBUTION OF LOBSTER LICENSES 
IN PEI BY LOBSTER DISTRICT. 
DISTRICT 
7B ( 2 6) 
7Bl(24) 
8 (25) 
TOTAL 
NUMBER 
LOB.LIC. 
642 
401 
266 
1, 309 
PERCENTAGE 
OF TOTAL 
49.5 
30.2 
20.3 
100.0 
Source: 1988 Annual Report, 
PEI Department of Fisheries. 
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4.2.1. Fishing Harder 
Many fishers improved their equipment by buying bigger 
boats and building larger traps. They have also adopted more 
flexible fishing practices with the use of electronic 
equipment such as the Loran c and fish-finders. This 
equipment as well as bigger and better boats and equipment 
allow them to fish in inclement weather as well as increase 
their ability to exploit other species after the lobster 
season. Eighty per cent of the fishers interviewed hought 
bigger boats in the period from 1980 to 1989. Seventy-five 
per cent of these were new and the remainder were second-
hand. 0~ the five fishers who had started fishing since 
1977, four started with smaller, second-hand boats. Within 
five to seven years they had purchased bigger and better 
boats. 
The trap limits of the late 1960's were implemented 
because it was felt that ther~ was too much effort for the 
amount of lobsters being h"lrvr~sted. The same amount of 
lobsters could be harvested with a much smaller number of 
traps. The limit of 300 traps per fisher was intended to 
equalize access to the resource and keep costs down. Since 
the restriction on traps, nearly every fisher has moved to 
bigger traps, from 3-bow to 4-bow during the 1970's, and to 
large square or double-ender traps in the 1980s. The latter, 
with two openings for the lobster to enter and two bait 
lines, function almost like two traps in one. Of the 15 
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fishers interviewed in Naufrage, 14 are still actively 
fishing. Of these 14, 8 were in the process of changing 
their traps from 4-bow to larger square traps or double-ender 
traps. 
These traps are more expensive to build and they only 
have an advantage at the beginning of the season wh~n there 
are lots of lobst~rs. In June, when there are fewer lobster 
available, they do not fish any better than the smaller ones. 
But fishers using these traps feel that they can get maybe 
1,000 to 2,000 more pounds in May. Everyone feels that if 
they don't change to this type, they will be unable to 
compete: 
This year (1989] my catches jumped 2,000 pounds from 
last year. I built 100 double-ender traps 1 st 
winter. You have to work hard if you want to ca . ch 
any amount of lobster. 
Right now the way everyone fishes, ti1ay have really 
good traps. I'm using double-enders. They're no 
better when fishing is not heavy. But when fishing is 
good, at the start of the season, they fish better 
[than the single bait-line ones]. 
Investing in electronic equipment, such as Loran C's, 
made it easier for fishers to move their gear around the 
fishing grounds, to use shorter strings of traps, and to 
search more actively for grounds where lobster may be more 
plentiful. When they were dependent on visual clues in the 
surroundings to find their gear, they tended to set longer 
trawls and had to set them close together so as not to lose 
them. 
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Without a Loran c you have to keep your gear in a 
line so you can find it. With a Loran c it is 
scattered all over. If you find a good fishing spot, 
you can go right back to that spot. You get more 
fishing time with a Loran ••• It increases your catch 
because you don't lose as many days. Every bit of 
grounds are covered with this equipment. You don't 
save money or you don't save time but you might get 
a better catch. 
Of the 14 active fishers interviewed, nine acquired Loran C's 
in the 1980s. None of the fishers interviewed had Loran C's 
before 1980. 
The use of Loran C1 s, which facilitate navigation even in 
fog and bad weather, and bigger 1 and more seaworthy boats 
allows fishers to fish many more days than previously: 
With better gear you can go out in bad weather. That 
is one reason why people want to improve their gear. 
It allows them to fish more days. 
In May of 1989 fishers in Naufrage did not miss one day 
hauling their traps. Their total number of days fishing 
during the lobster season was between 50 and 60. Data 
collected in surveys done by the PEI Department of Fisheries 
from 1970 to 1974 indicate the average number of days fishing 
per season was 37 days, and from 1977 to 1981 the average 
number of days fished was 39 (Prince Edward Island, 
1974,1977, 1979-1981). These numbers show an increase in the 
average numbers of days fishing over the past 15 years. 
It is obvious from the statements of fishers that they 
are under pressure to increase their catch: 
If you don't move when the fish is there 1 you're 
going to get less fish and you're going to get less 
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dollars to make your payments. Around here the 
fishing is only real decent for three to five weeks. 
The fish are fished way harder than they used to 
be ••• The fishermen that are in it now have to work 
hard at it. Even the good fishermen have a tough time 
to make a go of it. Pel)ple who weren't fishing 
seriously have gotten out of it because it is pretty 
competitive. 
Better equipment doesn't give fishers access to new grounds 
Community rules prevent fishers in this area from fishing the 
grounds of neighboring harbours. Neither does it increase 
the overall number of lobsters on the ocean floor. It just 
allows those fishers who make this investment a chance to 
increase their individual share of the overall catch, 
especially in the fi~st month oL the season. It also means 
that the lobster is caught sooner, with the consequence that 
during the last two or three weeks, landings are low: 
The overall landings at this wharf [Naufrage] have 
not gone up much but with better equipment the 
individual fishers are trying to get a bigger share 
of the catch. The better equipment you have, the more 
likelihood that you will catch more. But this means 
someone else will catch less. 
People improve their gear with the hope of increasing 
their catch. ~:ometimes it happens, sometimes they don't. 
Now we have ·\-bow double-ender traps. If the fishing 
isn't heavy, they're no better. If the fishing is good, 
they are an advantage. 
These higher capital investments, as well as increases in 
fuel costs, maintenance and basic equipment, push up the per 
unit cost of harvesting the lobster: 
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I see a difference from when I was fishing with my 
father. The payments are more. It costs more for 
bait, for a hired man. 
Even though some fishers feel that they could catch the same 
amount of lobster with smaller traps over a longer period of 
time, they feel they have to build larger traps to compete. 
The larger number of traps there are in the water, the less 
effective they are in giving individual fishers a competitiv~ 
edge. It seems highly probable that increasing the effort 
will either put unacceptable pressure on the stocks or will 
raise the per unit cost of production so high that it 
dissipates any economic rent in the fishery. There is some 
concern about the overall effect larger traps will have on 
the stocks. 
I built 150 double-enders last year and I am going to 
build 75 more this year. They already are having an 
effect on the resource. Last year we had a real good 
May and nothing in June. The only way I see it is 
that you have to get them in May when everyone else 
is getting them. 
But many fishers say that, judging from the overall landings 
in the 1980s, the stocks seem to be in better shape than they 
have ever been. 2 
some fishers feel the size of the rings on the larger 
traps could be affecting stocks. They allow them to catch 
larger female lobsters than was possible in the smaller 
2The lobster landings for P·rince Edward Island in the latter 
part of the 1980s are the highest they have ever been this 
century (Figure 3). 
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traps. These females are capable of producing thousands of 
eggs and fishers state that they are catching more of these 
large female lobsters in June, when there is more possibility 
that they have eggs ready to extrude. It could be damaging 
for the future of the lobster fishery. It is only illegal to 
catch females if the eggs are visible on the outside of the 
body. Thus it is not ira any individual fisher's interest to 
return them to the water because it would not guarantee that 
someone else would not catch them. 
The increased capital investments provide fishers with 
some short-term gains in the lobster fishery, but to the 
extent that everyone does it, it will provide diminishing 
returns. As well, no one knows what the increasGd pressure 
wi 11 do to the stocks. But fishers don't make these 
improvements in their boats just for the lobster fishery. 
They also do it to give them more flexibility to fish 
multiple species. 
4.3 Fishing Other Species: Making a Day's Pay 
Most fishers in the Naufrage area emphatically state that 
it is very difficult to survive in this area only on lobster 
income. Thus another survival strategy involves fishing 
other species. Besides the economic factors, most fishers 
don't feel they are 'real' fishers if they are just fishing 
lobster. The lobster fishery is only a two-month season and 
from the point of view of using their skills and capital 
89 
... 
~· 
' 
equipment, most want to fish as long as the weather permits, 
which is generally until the end of october. 3 
Fishers in this area expect to make the largest portion 
of their income from lobst.er, 4and they use the income from 
this fishery to cover the major costs of reproducing their 
fishing enterprise. However, they will engage in fishing 
other species if they can get wages or as they often say 
'make a day's pay'. This income allows them to at least 
cover living expenses during the summer. 
The fishery in Naufrage has always been a multi-species 
fishery. For decades, full-time fishers in this area have 
fished groundfish, (such as cod, hake, flounder), and 
mackerel during the summer months. In spite of yearly 
fluctuations in landings, all of these species were ea~ily 
available on the grounds around Naufrage until the 1980s and 
could be caught with relatively little investment. In the 
next section I will discuss some of the difficulties and 
opportunities that fishers have experienced in the 
exploitation of other species. 
30ne other reason why fishers want to fish until the e~d of 
October is because they are not able to collect unemployment 
insurance until the first of November. 
4 Lobster landed value represents 71.7 per cent of the total 
landed value of the PEI fishery • 
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4.3.1 Ground fishery 
Fishers who fish groundfish with fixed gear can be 
divided into two broad groups. There are some fishers who 
invest considerable money in nets and fish seriously all 
summer. There are others who mainly handline or have a few 
nets. The latter do not invest a lot of money in it and if 
there is not much fish, they don't go out. 
The groundfishery began to experience declining landings 
in the mid-1980s (See Table 12). This has forced fishers who 
want to earn any significant income from groundfishing to 
invest more money in it and use nets which are more costly 
than gear for jigging or trawling. Four of the 15 fishers 
interviewed regarded groundfishing as their main .fishery 
after lobster and used a large number of nets. Besides the 
capital investment, preparing for net fishing requires a lot 
of time and energy in the winter. Monofilament nets are 
better quality than nylon, but they are also more expensive. 
The price of monofilament nets ranges from $40 to $60 a net. 
This represents only the cost of raw material; it does not 
include the cost of the fisher's labour in rigging them. The 
cost of nets has increased significantly in recent years. 
One fisher, for example, stated that, "rigged nets in 1978 
were worth approximately $90. In 1988 they are worth $190 11 • 
The fishers who invest money and time in preparing 40 or 
50 nets want to get a return on their investment. 
About half the boats in Naufrage fish groundfish. A 
lot of them are just jigging. They're not making a 
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lot of money at it but they make spending money. But 
if you have money invested in nets, you've got to get 
that money back. You don't want just a day's pay. 
Of the fishers interviet·!sd, four fish groundfish all summer 
with 30 nets or more and "have had some good years". In good 
years they can make as much money from groundfish as they do 
from lobster. The figures in Table 12 indicate that 
groundfish landings were high for this harbour from 1983 
to 1985 inclusive. They declined somewhat in 1986 and 1987, 
but in those years the price of qroundfish was high (Table 
13). Cod was selling at 25 cents and 30 cents a pound in 
1986 and 1987 respectively, as opposed to an average of 14 
cents a pound for the other years in the 1980s. Hake was 
selling for 30 cents a pound in 1987 as opposed to 8.5 cents 
on average for the other years. 
Another reason for the relatively good earnings from 
groundfish is that only a few fishers are fishing with a 
large number of nets. Thus there is not so much competition 
in this harbour for the resource. Some fishers counteract 
low prices by negotiating special deals with a buyer. They 
agree to truck the fish to a special buyer for a better 
price. 
This summer [1989]we weren't getting that big a price 
for cod. I did better because I sold to a guy in 
Fortune. He has a small operation and supplies a 
local market. I had to truck them over but I got a 
better price. When I first started fishing 
groundfish, I didn't have nets. I would put out 
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TABLE 12 
GROUND FISH LANDINGS FROM INSHORE SET GEAR, NAUFRAGE, 
1980-89 
YEAR COD HAKE FLOUNDER TOTAL 
(Pounds) 
1980 259,190 100,034 10,412 369,636 
1983 566,071 78,287 4,823 649,183 
1984 462,405 60,256 5,284 527,945 
1985 452,174 72,705 2,669 527,345 
1986 384,308 88,851 11,855 485,107 
19S7 388,539 244,128 43,202 676,316 
1988 182,544 158,469 7,362 351,722 
1989 165,382 65,914 1,710 236,831 
Source: Statistics Divl.sion, DFO, Charlottetown. 
TABLE 13 
LANDED VALUE OF COD AND HAKE, NAUFRAGE HARBOUR 
1980-1988. 
YEAR COD PRICE HAKE PRICE 
PER LB. PER LB. 
(dCJllars) cents (dollars) cents 
1980 36,287 14.0 9,203 9.2 
1983 70,759 12 . 5 4,697 6.0 
1984 57,801 12.5 3,615 6.0 
1985 63,304 14.0 5,816 8.0 
1986 96,077 25.0 7,997 9.0 
1987 116,562 30.0 73,238 30.0 
1988 27,383 15.0 15,847 10.0 
Source: Fisheries Statist1cal Rev1ew , 1989. 
Statistics Division, DFO, Charlottetown. 
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trawl and catch 400-500 lbs. a day. At that time you 
could jig and get some good fish. Now what you take 
jigging is not wo~th catching. You have to use nets. 
F is:1ers who are using nets acknowledge that they have to 
use more and more nets every year to catch the same amount of 
fish. One stated: "With 12 nets I could catch 1500 pounds/day 
in 1977-79. In 1988 I was lucky to catch 1200 -1500 pounds a 
day with 40 nets." They blame the destruction of the 
groundf ishery on the big draggers. They maintain the 
draggers are catching a lot of small fish and ·throwing them 
over without including them in their quota. Besides the 
scarcity of fish and the smaller size, a more recent problem 
for fishers fishing groundfish in this area is the increasing 
number of dogfish. These fish destroy the nets. The dogfish 
were so bad in the summer of 1989 that the fishers had to 
stop fishing for periods of time. 
Other years I made wages in groundfish. After you 
take out the cost of your nets you can make wages. 
This year a lot of weeks I could not make ·,o~ages. 
Between the dogfish and the seiners, it is pr.etty 
near finished. It used to be the draggers could only 
drag in sand. Now with rock-hoppers they ca~ drag 
everywhere. 
With the exception of a few fishers, groundfish and 
mackerel do not represent a major part of fishing income in 
this area. Nevertheless they are an important supplementary 
income to lobster. All fishers lament the scarcity of 
ground fish. With mackerel, the problem is more one of 
marketing. They talk of earlier years when these fish were plentiful: 
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When I started fishing (l964]there was no worry about 
other species. Now there are only one or two people 
fishing mackerel. There is not much difference in the 
price of cod 20 years ago than now. It was no problem 
then to get 2,000 pounds a day but now you cannot get 
them. 
There were lots of groundfish then. we jigged, used nets 
and trawls. Sometimes you would get codfish that would 
weigh 80 pounds. We tried to make a day's pay. If you 
could get 400 pounds/day just jigging, you could make a 
day's pay. In those days everyone fished groundfish, 
mackerel, different species. The cod prices haven't gone 
up that much. The mackerel have gone down. 
I never fished groundfish for a season. I fished it in 
spurts. For a couple of months, you could make $500/wk. 
If you were by you~~elf you could make $1,000/Wk. That's 
not really big fishing. But you cannot do it now. 
Shortag~; of groundfish represent an important constraint on 
the survival strategies of inshore fishers. Groundfis~ and 
mackerel were species that everyone fished and in earlier 
times they gave fishers some secure income during the summer 
months without a great deal of capital investment. Declining 
landings, uncertain prices combined with higher costs of gear 
make for unpredictable returns from these species. 
4.3.2 Tuna Fishery 
Another species that provided significant income for some 
years to a number of fishers in Naufrage was tuna. The 
number of tuna caught in Naufrage ranged from a high of 83 in 
l976 to a low of 4 in 1987 (Table 14}. The landed value for 
tuna was highest in 1978. In District 88 it reached almost 
half a million dollars. In addition, the costs involved in 
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catching tuna were relatively low. By the mid-1980s, 
however, tuna disappeared from the waters at this end of the 
Island. 
Tuna fishing is still an option for fishers from Naufrage 
but they now have to travel to the south side of the Island 
or to Nova Scotia to catch them. This increases their costs. 
The number of fi~hers who participate in this fishery varies 
from year to year depending on income from other fisheries 
and the availability of tuna in the area. In 1989, of the 15 
fishers interviewed, 5 were engaged in the tuna fishery. It 
is difficult to get accurate data on the number of tuna 
caught by fishers in Naufrage as they are landed in other 
ha~bours and do not appear in the statistics for Naufrage. 
There is a great deal of uncertainty in the tuna fishery. 
As one fisher exclaimed, fishing for tuna is 'like playing 
the lottery'. They can invest a lot of time and money and 
not catch any. Hot1ever, the price in the late 1980s has 
ranged as high as $15.00 per pound. Hence, a tuna weighing 
1, ooo pounds could net the boat as much as $15, 000. This 
makes it worth taking the risks. 
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TABLE 14: NUMBER OF TUNA LANDED 
IN NAUFRAGE, 1974-1988 
YEAR NUMBER YEAR NUMBER 
1974 24 1982 10 
1975 17 1983 61 
1976 83 1984 44 
1977 47 1985 34 
1978 69 1986 4 
1979 N/A 1987 4 
1980 N/A 1988 0 
1981 N/A 
Source: Fisher~es stat~stical Review, PEI 
Department of Fisheries, 1978,1988,1989. 
4.3.3 Herring Fishery 
Before the mid-1980s, fishers in Naufrage fished herring 
mainly for bait. In the mid-1980's a number of fishers in 
the north side of the Island started fishing herri ng for roe. 
They h~ve to travel to the southeastern ~hore of PEI as this 
is where the large schools of herring are located. The 
herring roe fishery became an important fishery in PEI 
because of the rejuvenation of the herring stocks C\nd 
increased demands for roe in Japan. The price hovered around 
9 to 11 cents until 1988 when it dropped to 8 cents. In 1989 
it plummeted even lower to 6 cents and in some cases as low 
as 4 cents. Many fishers who geared up for catching herring 
in 1986 and 1987 didn't even bother going fishing in 1989. 
Fishing for herring roe was a new fishery for fishers in 
Naufrage harbour in the second half of the 1980s. It is 
expensive to gear up because fishers have to put decks on 
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their boat and buy nets. They were also encouraged to invest 
in insulated boxes to maintain as high a quality as possible • 
./ 
Initially, it seemed like a very promising fishery, but the 
volatility of the market has made it q\. ite uncertain. An 
examination of the Herring landings and landed value for 
District 87 from 1980 to 1988, show the volatility of both 
landings and prices (Table 15) . 5 
This fisher's experience sums up the uncertainty of 
fishing this species. 
I started fishing herring three years ago when I got 
my new boat. With my old 1"" 'iat I couldn't do this 
kind of fishing. The first year I caught about 
200,000 pounds at 10 cents a pound. Last year [1988] 
I caught only 100,000 pounds at 8 cents a pound. This 
year I got about 80,000 pounds at 6 cents ~ ~ound. 
some people got as low as 4 cents a pound. That will 
give you some idea of how the thing goes. 6 
Another young fisher expresses it thus: 
Last year (1988) I went at the roe fishery. You have to 
buy all new equipment, put decks on your boat. My father 
bought all the equipment last year and we paid for it and 
this year we thought we could make some money. The price 
went down and we fished two nights and we came home ••. The 
same amount of fish has been there for the past number of 
years but the price has gone down. 
5The fishers from Naufrage engage in the herring roe fishery 
on the southeast side of the Island. Thus their landings would be 
included in those of District 87 instead of 88, where Naufrage is 
located. 
6The differences in landings are due to various factors. 
For instance, in 1988 the fishers had a strike during the season. 
By the time they went back fishing the better part of the herring 
season was over and thu fish had moved to Nova Scotia. In 1989 
the price was so low that fishers gave up fishing. 
98 
4 • 3 • 4 • Irish Moss 
Irish Moss is one of the many seaweeds that exist in the 
. . 
waters around PEI. Irish Moss became marketable during the 
second World War as a source of carrageenin7 • When American 
imports of a Japanese product called Agar were cut off, a 
technical breakthrough made carrageenin commercially feasible 
(Wells 198G:168). However, it was not until the l~Sos that 
Irish Moss reached any significant value as a fishery in PEI. 
The Irish Moss that produces carrageenin is harvested at 
the west.ern end of the Island. A similar seaplant is 
harvested,in somewhat lesser quantities, at the eastern end 
of PEI. 8 The accessibility of this seaweed as well as the 
relatively good prices during the 1960s and 1970s nade it 
attractive for many families to get involved in harvesting it 
along the shore from st. Peters to East Point (See Figure 3). 
The peak year was 1974, when 34.7 million pounds was 
harvested in District 88 with a landed value of $736,804. 
The majority of that amount w~s landed at Naufrage and the 
neighbouring harbour, East Point. In the early 1980s, 
landings had declined sharply and by 1988 landings in 
7It is a generic term for the extract of the seaweed that is 
used as a stabilizer as well as a thickener and a gelling agent 
in food products. 
8The extract from this plant is actually called Furcellaria 
which has similar uses as Carrageenin though it is not considered 
t~ be as high a quality. Both are p~pularly know as Irish Moss 
and are lumped together in the statistics . Thus it is difficult 
to know how much of each is produced. 
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Naufrage were down to half a million pounds (See Table 16). 
This was partly due to less moss washing ashore, and partly 
due to marketing problems. 
This product was unique in the fishery because it was 
harvested by the whole family. Many women were involved in 
gathering moss and it was an important part of fishing 
household income. People gathering moss were eligible for 
unemployment insurance. In terms of survival strategies, 
families along this shore saw it as an important contribution 
to household income. 
There are two methods of gathering moss, either by tidal 
action or by mechanical means (Anderson et al 1978:3). The 
former was the only one used in eastern PEI until 1988 when 
an experimental project was started in Naufrage to gather 
moss using mechanical means. Six more licenses were issued 
in 1989 and on the basis of the results of these experiments, 
a limited number of permanent licenses may be issued. 
An interesting difference between the mechanical type of 
harvesting and that of raking it on the shore is who is 
involved in it. Shore-gathering moss is not a limited-entry 
fishery and many harvesters were part-time fishers. However. 
only bonafide fishers will be eligible for the new licenses 
being issued for mechanical harvesting. It will also require 
more investment as you need a boat and mechanical equipment, 
and the harvesting method is not as 
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TABLE 15 
LANDINGS AND LANDED VALUE OF HERRING, 
DISTRICT 87,88 1974-88. 
YEAR DISTRICT 87 DISTRICT 
LANDINGS VA ·.;JE LANDINGS 
('OOO's) ~ ( 1 000'S) 
1974 34 1,105 33 
1975 16 
1976 26 
1977 1 36 14 
1978 2,857 272,272 456 
1979 nfa nfa 
1980 1,012 142,462 272 
1981 2,106 218,805 101 
1982 7,015 701,457 142 
1983 7,013 701,275 682 
1984 7,462 746,226 726 
1985 8,040 803,974 694 
1986 14,947 1,494,746 563 
1987 20,402 2,244,223 663 
1988 11,445 1,030,031 1,062 
sq 
VALUE 
$ 
1,942 
620 
1,246 
552 
40, 307 
38, 319 
10,499 
14, 153 
68,225 
72, 577 
69,430 
56,331 
72,877 
95, 617 
Source: Fisheries statist1cal Review , PEI Department 
of Fisheries. 1978.1989. 
TABLE 16 
IRISH MOSS LANDINGS AND LANDED VALUE, 
NAUFRAGE, 1980-89 
YEAR 
1980 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
MOSS (WET) 
LANDINGS VALUE 
(OOO's) $ 
5,118 
1,143 
396 
358 
533 
225,880 
57,156 
19,823 
25,077 
42,648 
Source: statist1cs Div1s1on,DFO, Charlottetown; 
Fisheries Annual Review, PEI Department of Fisheries, 
1989. 
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sui table for family labour. However, if it produces a 
marketable product in sufficient quantities, this will be one 
more option for fishing households in an area where 
alternative species are needed for survival. A small amount 
of shore harvesting is still done but the mechanical method 
provides a larger quantity and allows the harvester to 
actively rakP it rather than wait for it to be blown in on 
shore. 
4.3.5. Unpredictability of Secondary Species 
Most striking about the stories of the fishing activities 
of these fishers is the uncertainty associated with fishing 
secondary species. Because of this uncertainty, it is always 
difficult for fishing households to decide whether they will 
gear up to catch other species. When they either cannot 
catch them or cannot sell them, their losses are bigger than 
if they had not made any investment. The summer of 1989 was 
an especially difficult one for fishers in the Naufrage area. 
The following testimony gives some idea of the fishing 
experience of these fishers in 1989: 
I have been fishing groundfish for the past tHo or 
three years, usually later in the fall. This year 
[ 1989] I tried it right after lobstering. I got a 
bunch of nets geared up and a drumhauler. It was a 
big mistake. Tom and I put out 30 nets and then we 
fished them 2 or 3 days. Other years I made wages 
fishing groundfish. [meaning they don't make any 
return on the investment in their gear].This year I 
couldn't make wages. Between the dogfish and the 
draggers that are at it now, it is pretty near 
finished. There was just none. We were then going to 
go mackerel seining, but that didn't work out. Then 
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we were going to go at herring. We couldn't find a 
buyer. We would have to get pans and deck the boat. 
To get geared up for herring it would take $2500 and 
it was too much of a gambie this year. Last year we 
went on str ·~ • ..:e for 8 cents. How could you spend $2500 
and go fishing for 4 to 6 cents. Then I went fishing 
tuna. This is the first year since 1979 that I didn't 
catch a fish. 
In interviewing fishers, I was struck by the stress that 
this uncertainty causes and how it affects family 
relationships. In times when there was an abundance of 
groundf ish and mackerel , it was taken for granted that 
fishers would fish all summer if the weather was suitable. 
They would not make a lot of money, but neither would they 
have big losses. In the 1980s, fishers have less assurance 
that the landed value will give sufficient returns to the 
fisher to make up for this added investment. If not, then 
fishing households are compelled to turn to other means to 
increase their income so as to cover this capital investment. 
4.4 Other Household Incomes 
As fishers invest in more equipment and different types 
of gear to increase their fishing income, there is an 
increasing need for more cash in fishing households. 
Consequently, wage income becomes an important component of 
household strategies. It can be contributed by the fisher or 
by other members of the fishing household. I will first 
discuss the options of the male member of the fishing 
103 
household and secondly, contributions of women in these 
households. 
4.4.1. Options of Fisher-men in Generating Wage Income 
A few fishers decide to fish only lobster and after 
lobster season they will work at other wage jobs. Fishing 
other species involves buying a bigger boat and investing in 
more gear and some fishers think that the income is too 
unpredictable and not worth the risk. Of the 14 active 
fishers interviewed, however, 11 of the men are involved only 
in fishing activities. Two others fish only lobster and work 
at other jobs after the season is finished/ and one is 
engaged in a combination of fishing and farming. A small 
rninority of fishers in this harbour live only on lobster 
income and unemployment insurance. It means having a 
marginal income, and is more possible if their wives earn a 
secure income, if they have minimal costs, or if they are 
single without a family to support. 
Most fisher-men in this community use fishing activities 
as their main source of income. There are various reasons 
for this. Their identity is connected with fishing. Hence, 
if they can make a living fishing, that is their choice. 
once fishers have decided to invest time and money in 
preparing for fishing activities, it is difficult to shift 
90ne of these men was not the boat-owner. His wife was the 
boat-owner and he was the helper. All the other men interviewed 
were boat-owners. 
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back and forth from fishing to non-fishing activities. 
Licensing policy, which states that bonafide fishers "cannot 
have year-round employment or full-time seasonal employment 
during the period that coincides with the fishing season in 
which he or she may wish to fish", has discouraged the 
practice of engaging in non-fishing activities (Canada 
1989:14). Another reason is that there are few alternate 
employment possibilities in this community that would provide 
them with more income than fishing. 
4.4.2. Women's Contribution: Non-paid labour and Wage 
Income 
survival for fishing households in the community of 
Naufrage does not depend on just the activities of the 
fisher. The contribution of women, both in the form of wage 
income and of non-paid labour, has played an important part 
in household survival strategies. Women's contributions to 
the houGehold take many forms, such as income support, 
emotional support, organizational support and management of 
tension. In this thesis I am priorizing the contribution of 
women's labour in fishing households. 
Nadel-Klein and Davis ( 1988) lament that too often 
women's role in fishing communi ties has been cast as a 
passive one, of 'waiting at home for the man to return from 
the sea' • They argue that we must call attention to the 
"enormous variety of contributions that women make to fishing 
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communities and to the way in which women see themselves and 
their work." It is also important to remember that women's 
role is not static, that as economies are transformed, so are 
women's roles. They are dynamic and creative actors who 
respond to new situations as they present themselves (Nadel-
Klein and Davis, 1988:8). The contribution of women in the 
fishing households of Naufrage has demonstrated their 
creativity and adaptability in responding to different 
situations in their wider social and economic environment. 
An ex~mination of the work of women in fishing families 
from tho older group (over 25 years fishing) indicates that 
their contribution was primarily through activities in the 
household. Their work included such tasks as knitting 
'heads' for traps10 , preserving food for winter, making 
children's clothes, looking after farm animals especially 
when their husbands were out fishing, preparing of meals and 
childcare. Besides this unpai d labour, they often made 
small, though important cash contributions to the nousehold 
through picking and selling berries, keeping boarders, etc. 
Before the availability of unemployment insurance, these non-
paid and cash contributions were essential in a production 
enterprise where there was little or no cash income from 
October to May. The following story of one woman whose 
husband was an active fisher from the late 1930s to the mid-
1~he 'heads' are the part of the trap which is made of 
twine. They are constructed using a needle and with an action 
similar to crocheting. 
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1960s demonstrates the importance and variation of tasks that 
women were involved in: 
In those days we knit all the mitts and socks and I 
made the children's clothes. We were farming then 
too. I raised chickens and looked after the cattle in 
the morning when [her husband) was fishing. I used 
to can lobsters and chicken for our own use during 
the winter. I picked wild strawberries until they 
came out my ears. I'd put them up for the winter. I 
usually boarded a couple of teachers for $10 a month. 
You could buy a lot of stuff with that money then. 
When we started mossing I was involved with that and 
all the kids helped. I was out picking moss the day 
I had to go to the hospital and Gerard was born. 
Women continue to do these activities but as rising costs 
could not be met adequately with fishing income, women also 
looked for ways to earn wages to enable the f ishir~g 
enterprise to continue. 11 Of the 13 women interviewed, 12 
have worked outside the horne. Two of these are 
professionals, one a teacher and one a nursing attendant. 
The remaining ten have worked at a variety of wage labour 
jobs. At present seven are fishing, two are working at 
fishplants, one is retirad but has \ororked at a fishplant. An 
11 In this thesis I am discussing women's wage work since the 
1960s. However it is important to note that, historically, the 
development of the lobster fishery as primarily a cannery 
industry meant that women in many fishing households worked for 
wage labour in the canneries. In the coastline of P. E. I. around 
Naufrage, there were a nunaber of lobster canneries operating from 
the early 1900s until the early 1950s, which were an important 
contribution to employment in this area. Both women and men 
worked in these factories. The limited data I have on the 
canneries suggest that the majority of the women working on the 
production line were young, unmarried girls with some married 
women employed as cooks. 
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examination of work histories indicates that women's wage 
work has changed as new opportunities in the area have 
presented themselves. 
Moss harvesting became an important commercial fishery in 
the mid-1960s and women and children, as well as men, were 
involved both in gathering the moss off the shore, and later, 
in cleaning and drying it in preparation for sale. Of the 
ten women working at wage labour, six had been involved in 
gathering moss. 
Fish processing (including lobster) moved into frozen 
products in the 1960s. Plants were established in Souris and 
Morell, neighbouring communities of Naufrage. At this tim~, 
many women from fishing households began working in these 
plants. Seven of the ten women worked in fishplants in the 
area at some time in their working lives. Five of these were 
seasonal jobs in non-unionized plants paying minimum wages or 
slightly higher. The seasonal fishplants process inshore 
fish, principally lobster, but also some other species such 
as mackerel, herring, or crab. Three of the women worked at 
a year-round fish processing plant. This plant is unionized, 
pays better wages, $7 to $8 an hour, and the workers are 
employed approximately ten months of the year. The year-
round plant procgsses off-shore fish, mostly redfish and in 
lesser amounts, cod, flounder and other groundfish species. 
More recently, in the late 1970s and 1980s women started to 
fish with their husbands. This was a new area of work for 
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women and an increasing~ly attract! ve one especially for 
younger fishing families. (I will deal with this in more 
detail in the next chapter.) 
In this particular community at the present time, a high 
percentage of women are working outside the home, compared 
with the national average. According to Statistics Canada, 
in 1980, 50. 3 per cent of women in Canada were participating 
in the labour force (Armstrong and Armstrong 1983: 249). 
Information from the interviews and discussions with key 
informants in the community suggest that, in 1989, there were 
only two or three households in the whole community which 
were dependent on one income, that of the 'male head of 
household' . 
Despite the different types of work that women choose, it 
was obvious from almost every interview that the income of 
women is very important to the household. Their incomes 
provide some measure of security in a very vulnerable 
fishery. 
All of the women interviewed state that they see their 
contribution to the household as part of a shared project. 
They don't look at their household income in a fragmented way 
that separates 'my' incon1e from 'my husband's' income. This 
arrangement often hides the fact that the fishing enterprise 
cannot reproduce the production unit on fishing income alone. 
Many fishermen say that maintaining or expanding the fishing 
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unit has priority when it comes to alJocating fishing income. 
one fisherman expressed it this way: 
To increase income, people tend to spend more money 
and go into another fishery. The fishery comes 
first. Your money goes to the fishery before the 
house. When I bought my boat, I could have taken the 
money and bought a house. But I cannot make money 
with a house. Everyone I talked to said to me,get the 
boat first and then get the house later. 
But they can only do this if the woman's income is available 
to pay the day-to-day expenses of the household. The women 
recognize that their income is necessary to pay household 
expenses. 
My income pays the day-to-day expenses, lights, 
phone, groceries. I wish sometimes it was more secure 
so that not all our income would have to go into the 
fishery. We need two incomes to keep the family 
going. 
The income from my job is used to pay for things 
around the house, like lights, groceries, 
etc ... Things would have been fairly slack these past 
few months (summer of 1989]if I had not been working. 
If I wasn't working this household would have a more 
difficult time surviving, especially this year. 
Other wage incomes in the household keep debt levels down: 
I certainly think it has a bearing. Jack does not 
have a boat payment. If I hP.d not been working, maybe 
he would still have a bo~t payment. He can buy more 
things with cash now. If I had not been working, he 
may not have been able to pay cash. My income goes to 
pay a lot of household expenses. I never minded that. 
That's our way of living. 
Another fisherman discussed the importance of a wife's income 
in bad years and for people buying a new outfit: 
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Now people are worrying about the fishery. The 
Bankers are worried. The fishermen are worried but 
some of their wives have real good jobs. They could 
have no money at the end of the year but if their 
wife is making good money, it helps. Most fishermen 
that are paying those big prices for outfits cannot 
do that unless they have another income in the home. 
However, some women added that financial necessity is not 
their only reason for working. They also want to work outside 
the home: 
I am not going to work just because we need the 
money. I couldn't live out here if I wasn't wo:. '~ . lng. 
I couldn't sit around the house and do nothing ..• Even 
with a new baby, I was glad to go back to work. I 
have been working since I was 18 years old. 
I needed the money. But I like to work outside the 
house too. The income is necessary to keep the house 
going. If (husband] needed money for fishing 
supplies, I wouldn't see him stuck. 
The high incidence of women in fishing households working 
for wages may be a result of various factors. The increased 
investment and rising costs in boats, gear and electronic 
equipment indicate a need for more cash income in the 
household. The difficulty and unpredictability of generating 
sufficient fishing income to sustain the reproduction of 
fishing entarprises create insecurity among fishing 
households. Having another income in the household provides 
some stability especially in years when landings or prices 
are down. However, the presence of fish processing plants in 
the area also increases the need for female workers. 
Armstrong and Armstrong in their study on working women state 
that women have been 11pushed into the labour force by 
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economic necessity." But they also have been "drawn into the 
labour force by the growth in demand for female workers" 
(1983:32). 
Women have taken an active and creative role in enabling 
fishing households to survive. They have taken advantage of 
changing economic opportunities such as moss gathering, 
working in the fishplants, and most recently, going fishing 
with their husbands. As state licensing policy caused 
increasing pressures on fishing income, the earnings of 
women provided survival options. Other state policies such 
as unemployment insurance supported th.:> ir ability to 
contribute to household income by supplementing their 
seasonal and often minimum-wage earnings with unemployment 
insurance benefits. 
In the 1980s, prompted by demands of women fishers, state 
regulations were changed to make benefits available to women 
who were fishing with their spouses. 
4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the various strategies that 
fishing households in Naufrage have developed in response to 
changes in state policies. Licensing policies forced fishers 
to generate a greater part of their income from fishing. 
Consequently, they increased their capital investment to 
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intensify fishing efforts both in lobster as well as in other 
species. As rising costs increased the need for more cash 
income, wage labour became a necessary part of survival 
strategies. 
Women in fishing households actively responded to this 
need by engaging in wage labour outside the home. They have 
shown creativity and adaptability in responding to different 
economic and political situations in their external 
environment. The variety of ways they have explored to bring 
another income into the family is testimony to the diversity 
and versatility of fishing households. The strategies used 
are interrelated and the success of one often depends on 
another. The fact that women's wages bring another income 
into the household often gives fishers the flexibility to 
invest in new gear or equipment for the boat. This in turn 
gives them more options to offset fluctuations in landings 
and prices. 
It is evident from the examination of survival strategies 
used by fishing families, that the continuance of fishing as 
a petty commodity form of production depends on the 
contribution of various members of the fishing household. 
The future of this form of production will be influcenced by 
forces which provide support or present obstacles to the 
inshore fishery. It will also depend on the availability of 
sources of wage labour for other members of the fishing 
household as well as their ability to take advantage of them. 
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As new economic pressures present themselves in the 
1980s, fishing households look for ways to cut costs and 
concentrate fishing income in the household. Some ;Jomen 
responded to this challenge by going fishing with their 
husbands. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
WOMEN FISHING 
5.1. Introduction 
Fishing is a new option for women that has only been 
exercised in PEI during the last 15 years. I am devoting a 
whole chapter to this issue because it demonstrates in a 
particular way the model for understanding survival that I lm 
adopting in this thesis. The thesis has argued that the 
survival of lobster fishing enterprises has depended on the 
ability of household members to respond in a creative and 
dynamic way to the ever changing economic and political 
factors in their environment. The model also challenges ways 
of analyzing survival that consider only the activities and 
decisions of the male fishers in the household. As I 
discussed in chapter 5, many women in fishing households 
responded to rising costs and new uncertainties in fishing 
income by engaging in wage labour outside the home. 
In this chapter, I will focus on how some women have 
extended the options of wage labour by moving into the non-
tradi~ional area of working in the boat. It was a way of 
maximizing fishing income by keeping the helper's Wc.~es in 
the household. As well, it gave women the opportunity to 
earn a higher income and nave more flexibility in responding 
to child care and household responsibilities. 
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There are still only a small number of women engaged in 
fishing. However. I am discussing this strategy in more 
detail because I feel it is an important example of how women 
are actively searching for ways to survive, when faced with 
new economic pressures. It also demonstrates how women's 
responses to state policy forced changes in government 
regulations so that the benefits of state programs were 
extended, 
strategieo. 
hence opening up new options for survival 
The changes in government regulations were not 
as a result of particular actions of women in Naufrage, but 
they benefited from the actions taken by women in other 
regions. 
It should be noted that women's involvement in non-
traditional work activities is not new in most rural 
communities. In farming households women have always moved 
back and forth between household work and farm activities. 
However, this fluidity between household and area of 
production did not extend to fishing households in PEI to the 
same degree. Women have always done a variety of tasks to 
support the fishing enterprise, but except for rare examples, 
they did not engage in the harvesting of fish. The 
combination of new economic pressures in the 1980s and 
changing state policy has created a situation where some 
women have adopted this strategy. 
In 1975, the first woman went fishing in Naufrage 
harbour. In 1989, approximately 12 per cent of the 84 boats 
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fishing out of Naufrage harbour have women working as full-
time helpers. All of these women are fishing ~iith their male 
partners with the exception of one, who is fishing with her 
brother. Their growing presence as fisher~' helpers 
testifies to the need, in many fishing households, to find 
new ways of dealing with high costs and unstable fishing 
income. 
5.2. Supports/Constraints for Women Going Fishing 
There are many factors that provide both supports and 
constraints to the use of this strategy. In the next section 
of this chapter I will discuss some of these factors such as: 
the nature of the lobster fishery, changes in unemployment 
insurance policy, women's own initiatives in developing 
survival strategies, life cycle in fishing households, and 
attitudes both in the household and community towards women · 
engaging this work. 
5.2.1. Nature of the Lobster Fishery 
The presence of women in fishing is more common in the 
lobster fishery than in other fisheries, although in Naufrage 
some women have also participated in the groundf ishery. 
There are some characteristics of the lobster fishery that 
have facilitated the entry of women to this fishery. It is a 
day fishery, which does not require fishers to travel long 
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distances from the harbour. While they tnay leave the harbour 
early in the morning, in the Naufrage area, most lobster 
boats are hack at port between 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. This 
makes it more convenient for women to combine this work with 
household and child care responsibilities, especially if the 
children are young. 
The work process on a lobster boat is such that helpers 
do not require much previous fishing experience. Most boat-
owners treat reliability, good work habits and willingness to 
learn as important as experience in choosing a helper. This 
is advantageous for women because they often have not had the 
same opportunities as men to learn these skills. Men often 
learn these fishing skills as young boys through fishing with 
their fathers, but daughters rarely fish with their fathers. 
5.2.2. Changes in Unemployment Insurance Regulations 
The other factor that has made fishing more economically 
attractive to women in the 1980s has been changes in state 
policy giving women who fish with their husbands access to 
unemployment insurance benefits. Although some women went 
fishing before wives of fishers were eligible for 
unemployment insurance, many women would not have found it 
advantageous to choose fishing over a job that would provide 
UI benefits. Because the se changes had important 
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implications for fishing women, I will outline the process by 
which these changes occurred in some detail. 
5.2.2.1. Eligibility for Wives of Fishers 
Prior to 1980, women fishing with their husbands could 
not collect unemployment insurance benefits. This was due to 
regulation 195(2) of the Fishermen's Regulations, the 
section of the Unemployment Insurance Act governing self-
employed fishers, which stated that in a situation where the 
wife of one of the crew was also a member of the crew, the 
earnings of the wife would be added to those of her husband. 
This meant that wives who were fishing could not collect 
unemployment insurance benefits in their own name. In the 
1970s, there were a number of complaints from fishing women 
in Newfoundland1 who were denied UI benefits because they 
were fishing with their husbands. They took their case to 
Ottawa but only managed to get some minor revisions. The 
basic discrimination against women remained. In 1980, a 
British Columbia woman who was working in a boat with her 
husband was cut off from benefits. She took the case to the 
British Columbia Human Rights Commission and won. (Women's 
Unemployment Study Group,[n.d.] p.71). On the strength of 
this, a group of five ~1omen filed a complaint through the 
1For more information on these cases read "Not for Nothing", 
a booklet on Women, Work and Unemployment in Newfoundland and 
Labrador, published by the local Oxfam Committee, St. John's 
Newfoundland. 
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appeal court of the Unemployment Insurance Commission. on 
July 22, 1980, Judge J.J. McGuire, a commission Umpire heard 
the appeal and ruled that this regulation was ultra vires 
(Federal Court of Canada, NF 624, 1980). After this ruling, 
wives were treated like any other member of the crew as far 
as the Fisheries Act was concerned. However another 
regulation in the regular Unemployment Insurance Act 
prevented women from having the same options as other members 
of the crew. 
5.2.2.2. Eligibility for Spouses of Self-employed Workers 
For people engaged in fishing, there are two possible 
ways to qualify for unemployment insurance. In some cases 
the crew on a boat are regarded as co-adventurers. This is 
the case where the proceeds of the catch are shared among all 
members of the crew and every member of the crew is liable 
for risk of loss, as well as a share in the profit. Under 
this arrangement, crew members are r~garded as self-employed 
fishers, and for UI purposes, are governed by the Act which 
refers to Fisheries Regulations. Thus they can draw benefits 
from November 1 to May 15 if they are "summer" fishers, or 
May 1 to November 15 if they are "winter" fishers. A second 
arrangement allows crew members to enter into a contract of 
service with a boat-owner where they are paid a wage and are 
not liable for losses or expenses incurred in the fishing 
activities. These workers are eligible for unemployment 
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insurance under the regular part of the Unemployment 
Insurance Act, the same as any worker in any other insurable 
employment. In the latter case, they can draw benefits as 
soon as they have completed the required minimum number of 
work weeks. 
Before 1988, crew members who were wives of boat-owners 
could not use the second option outlined above, because of 
another regulation in the Unemployment Insurance Act. 
Section 3(2)c of the UI Act precluded coverage of persons who 
were employed by their spouses. In the case of self-employed 
people who hired their spouses, these spouses were not 
eligible for UI benefits. As a result of the regulation, 
women fishing with their spouses were not eligible for 
benefits under the regular Unemployment Insurance Act. Thus 
they could collect benefits only under the fisheries 
regulations. 
This regulation was declared discriminatory as a result 
of ruling by the Human Rights Commission on the "Drukin Case" 
in 1988. The Drukin cas~ involved four women who went to the 
Human Rights Commission cla 'lming discrimination because of 
marital status. They had been denied unemployment insurance 
benefits because they were spouses of their employers (Canada 
1987c, 1988a). On August 15,1988 the Federal Court of Appeal 
upheld a canadian Human Rights Tribunal finding that the 
regulations which denied access to unemployment insurance 
benefits for the spouses of self-employed persons were 
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invalid (Canada:l988b). As a result of this ruling, in 1989, 
women fishing with their husbands could claim benefits under 
the regular Unemployment Insurance Act, the same as any other 
fisher's helper. They can claim benefits as soon as they 
fulfil the minimum number of weeks required. 
Both of these changes have opened up important new 
options for women in fishing households. It is important to 
note that these regulations were changed as a result of women 
taking a stand against discrimination. Fishing women have 
used their constitutional rights and the support of the wider 
women's movement to push for changes in state policy which 
have, in turn, had implications for the survival of fishing 
households. 
5.2.3. Naufrage: Women Took the Initiative 
Of the women interviewed, those who are now fishing were 
all engaged in other forms of wage labour before deciding to 
go fishing. They decided to go fishing with their partners 
because they saw it as a way to increase their earnings, cut 
fishing costs, as well as to integrate work and their family 
responsibilities. All of the women state that the decision 
to go fishing was their own: 
I always wanted to try it. I do not have a fishing 
background at all. I worked at the fishplant one 
year. After that I said, forget it. I'm going lobster 
fishing next year. 
I was the one who wanted to go. I was working in 
Parkdale. I wasn't horne with the kids. Other people 
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who were smaller than me were doing it and they 
didn't seem to mind, So why not? 
For some women it meant working at something they liked, 
earning a good income, and working as a family unit: 
Ben 1 (my husband] was elated when I said I'd go. It 
was my initiative to go. I never talked to other 
women about what it was like. My main reason for 
going fishing at the time was that it was a job. I'd 
be working with Ben and it was outdoor work. I always 
enjoyed outdoor work. I could get my unemployment 
stamps, although that was never a problem. I was 
messing before I went fishing with Ben and we got our 
stamps there. It was a good, healthy, clean living. 
My reasons for continuing are the same. I'll fish 
until I can't get out of the boat. I can't think of 
anything else where you can go to work at 4:00 a.m. 
and be home at noon. Your day is done then. I can't 
imagine any other job like that and if you enjoy 
it ..• an awful lot of people are doing work that they 
don't enjoy. 
Most women had to overcome some resistance from their 
husbands/fishing partner to letting them work on the boat: 
I loved the water and the outdoors. I wanted to go 
for years, but my husband didn't think it was the 
right kind of work to do when you are planning on 
having babies. When I was done having kids J thought 
fishing would be the answer [to economic pre~ 1~ms]. 
I was working at the f ishplant and I didn't 
particularly like it. I couldn't see why he hired a 
man. I bugged him and bugged him to go fishing. One 
year he did it. I was green at the time. I'd never 
seen lobster fishing done. It grew on me. It wasn't 
easy. But now I like it. 
This fisher tells how his wife convinced him that it was a 
better deal for her to go fishing than continue at her other 
job: 
Julie wanted to go fishing. I had some reservations 
about it because I thought the work was too hard for 
her. She had a good job... and was making fairly 
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good money. But she had to travel 80 miles every day 
and she couldn't be with the family. This way she can 
be home \. ith the children for much of the year and 
make some money besides. 
What surprised me when talking to women in fishing 
households was the confidence they showed even though many of 
them had no previous experience doing this work. As this was 
a non-traditional job, they had to convince people, 
especially men, that they could do the job: 
I wasn't the first (to go fishing] but it was still a 
new venture. I didn't have any thoughts that I 
couldn't do it. It's easier than housework. I knew 
that women could do it. If men could do it, women 
could do it. Some of the fishermen there are so 
tiny. You wonder how they can handle it. 
I always had an approach to life that I could do 
whatever I wanted to do. I worked at other jobs that 
weren't traditionally for women ..• I had been out in 
the boat a few times but I never fished. I was a 
little nervous in the beginning, but not now. There 
are some hard parts to it but I know it's a job I can 
do. I needed the job and I thought it would be 
interesting. I like fishing most days. Some days I 
wish I was hom@. but most jobs are like that. 
Many of the fishing women I talked to had a very enthusiastic 
attitude towards working in the boat and highlighted the 
positive aspects of the work. This might be partly due to 
the fact that women in a non-traditional work situation often 
feel that they have to emphasize work satisfaction to 
counteract popular attitudes that women can't do these jobs, 
or that it is not appropriate work for women. How~Ner, their 
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strong assertion that they took the initiative to move into 
this kind of work was an indication of their active 
involvement in survival strategies. 
5.2.4. Flexibility in combining Work and Child care 
Responsibilities 
An examination of women's choice of work outside the home 
reveals the complexity of fishing households and the variety 
of motives that influence women's choice of work. Many women 
who are fishing chose this work because it gave them a decent 
income and allowed them to have time at home with their 
children. The women were asked to outline the activities of 
a typical day during the fishing season. The following are 
two sample descriptions and they amply demonstrate that, 
despite women's paid work, the majority of the childcare and 
housekeeping tasks remain their responsibility: 
I usually get up around 3:00 in the morning. I would 
make breakfast. When breakfast was ready, I would get 
Jack down. After breakfast we would gather our 
things and go. We would leave the harbour by 4:30. 
We would start hauling and haul until we were all 
done. We don't stop for lunch or Q~ything like that. 
Then if we had to haul the nets for balt, we would do 
that. Then we would go in, sell our fish =!nd go 
home. When we get home sometimes I would do some 
housework, sometimes go to town. Sometimes we would 
have a nap but not always. I would get the evening 
meal. I would help th~ kids with their homework and 
get them ready for bed (when they were younger). 
Jack doesn't do a lot in the line of household 
chores. I don't mind that. The division of work 
overall is pretty even. He does other things. I'd 
rather do the housework so I know that it is done 
properly. 
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We get up around 3:30 a.m. I get breakfast and I 
pack 1 unch in the morning. We leave here around 
4:30. We go to the harbour, untie the boat, get the 
bait. on the way to the first buoy I prepare the 
mackerel. At 10:30 we finish fishing. I havE: to 
clean up the boat, and put water in the tank. At 
12:00, we come home and get lunch. If she 
(housekeeper) didn't have something ready I would 
make hamburgers or something. The kids have usually 
eaten by the time we get home. In the afternoon you 
don't have that much to do. You might have some 
laundry to fold or something like that. Then you get 
supper and get the kids fed and bathed and ready for 
bed. I do all this myself. Sometimes I get the lunch 
ready or I do it in the morning. We do ti:..a grocery 
shopping together. I do the shopping for clothes. I 
take the kids to doctor's appointments and things 
like that. Either [my husband] or I pick the kids up 
at school. We don't have a garden. I would like to 
but I don't have time. sam looks after repairs on 
the boat and all those kinds of things. I don't have 
a nap in the afternoon, but he sometimes falls asleep 
on the couch. My husband doesn't help me much with 
household tasks. The housekeeper we had last year was 
really good. She did the children's laundry and she 
baked for us and many times she put a roast on for me 
when I came home. 
Of the seven women who are fishing, five of them have 
children who are living at home and in need of parental 
:;upervision. The sixth woman has two children, but they are 
both teenagers and the seventh woman has no children. While 
not the vnly reason for women's decision to go fishing, the 
flexibility it gave them to combine work and child care 
responsibilities was an important factor. one woman left a 
full-time job as secretary with good pay to gc- fishing 
because it gave her a chance to be home with the children: 
I wanted to be horne with the kids and this seemed 
like a good way to earn some money and be home with 
them. I was working in Parkdale. I wasn't home with 
the kids. Other people who were smaller than me wer.e 
doing it and they didn't seem to mind. So why not? It 
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allows me to be home with the kids when they are 
growing up. I have a secretarial certificate from 
Holland College and I worked for three years with the 
Schoolboard. But when the kids are small, I like to 
be home with the family. 
Another woman with three young children states her preference 
for fishing over working at the fish plant, because with the 
wages she was earning at the plant, it did not pay her to 
work if she had to hire a babysitter. 
There were many reasons[to go fishing]. One is the 
kids. When they're small, you're home with them so 
much of the time. So it's good to get out of the 
house. The hours are good for the kids because I am 
home early in the day. Plus the money. The money 
stays in the family. If you have to pay a hired hand, 
it's expensive. I always wanted to try it. I do not 
have a fishing background at all. I worked at the 
fishplant one year. After that I said, forget it. 
I'm going lobster fishing next year. By the time we 
paid a babysitter and a hired man I wasn't making any 
money. 
The women chose fishing because they saw it as a better 
option than mos·... other labour jobs that were available to 
them. It gave them a higher income and kept the helpers' 
wages in the household. 
5.2.5. Life-cycle 
Another factor influencing whether women will go fishing 
or not is the life cycle of the fishing family. Fishing 
families in Naufrage have a high incidence of kin relations 
between boat-own~r and helper. Thus, if the family has a son 
old enough to go fishing this can compete with the mother 
working on the boat. Of the 14 active fishing households 
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interviewed, the crews are related in the following ways: 
four crews are father fson relationships; one crew is a 
son/ father where the son is the boat-owner; two crews are 
brothers; one crew is a brother 1 sister; six crews are 
husband/wife. Two of the households where women are fishing 
have sons who are old enough to fish as helpers. But these 
two women have stated that their sons will not replace them 
as helpers. 
This has not been a major issue yet, as in most of the 
households where women are fishing, the children are still 
young. One of the factors influencing whether the son or the 
mother works as a helper will be the economic situation of 
the household. But gender relations will also determine if 
the woman will be able to freely negotiate whether she will 
continue with the job as helper or give it over to the son. 
some boats have two helpers, but as fishing income declines 
and unemployment insurance regulations tighten, this will 
become more difficult. 
5.2.6. Household and Community Attitudes Towards Women 
Fishing 
The ability of women to enter non-traditional work roles 
such as a l.'isher' s helper is influenced by social and 
cultural supports and Cl.)nstraints. One of these factors is 
household and community attitudes to women fishing. 
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5.2.6.1. Household Attitudes 
since, for the most part, the men in the household are 
the boat-owners, the husband's support is essential if a 
women wants to go fishing. since half of the households in 
this sample have women helpers, it is understandable that 
there would be a high proportion of the sample demonstrating 
positive attitudes to women fishing. Of the 15 men i n the 
sample, 11 were generally open to the idea of women fishing. 
The statements of the men in favor of women fishing ranged 
from a position of tolerance to enthusiasm. Many fishers 
stated that if women could do the job, they had no problem 
with it. Others alleged that it was an economic advantage to 
households, and some claimed that having their wife with them 
was a distinct advantage over other helpers who did not have 
the same vested interest in the fishing enterprise: 
I suppose my attitude has changed some. I was never 
against women fishing, but I remember when the first 
woman went fishing. There were a lot of snickers 
that she wouldn't last. It was considered weird. But 
now people have chang~d their mind. They accept the 
fact of women fishing. Julie wanted to go fishing. 
I had some reservations about it because I thought it 
was too hard a work for her. She wanted to be home 
with the children for most of the year and make some 
money besides. But she works hard. She has a day's 
work after she gets home from fishing. I don't know 
how she does it. She has more energy than I have. 
The first few years we fished together, I don't think 
we did as well because I was babying her a bit. But 
now I prefer having her to another man. Last year 
when she was off for pregnancy, I missed her. We work 
well together now and she knows where there is good 
fishing, etc. She takes more interest in the fishing 
than a hired man because she is benefiting directly. 
She understands the fishery much better since she has 
been fishing. For example, before she could never 
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understand why I would be fretting over whether I 
would leave gear inside if there was bad weather. 
Now she understands you have to go where the lobsters 
are. 
I never saw anything wrong with it. If they can do 
the work and they want to-- go ahead. My wife fishes 
with me and as far as I am concerned, I never had a 
man that was any better in the boat. I really miss 
her in the boat when she doesn't come with me. I'm 
sure that everything is going to be done right. She 
has been fishing with me for 13 years. 
For many fishers, as for their wives, women engaging in 
fishing represent economic advantages for the household. It 
helps keep expenses down and increases household income. 
I never had a problem with women fishing. Some men 
are very superstitious. There was a very strong 
feeling that women in a boat were bad luck. People 
are faced with high costs. They have to cut costs, 
so they take their wife in the boat. I see the number 
of women who are fishing increasing. It keeps your 
expenses down. The way the fishing is here now, with 
the cost of things, we make almost as much on our 
stamps2 as we do on Fishing. Look at your income and 
figure out what you have to pay a man. Four hundred 
dollars a week, that's $4,000 a year. That's $4,000 
you don't have to pay (out of the household]. Of 
course you don't gain it all, because you have to pay 
a babysitter. 
some saw it only as an economic issue. When women could not 
collect benefits from Fishers UI during the summer, there was 
more economic advantage in working as a wage laborer than in 
fishing: 
I am in agreement with women fishing if they can do 
the work. Some go out every day and they seem to be 
doing well. Before this year, women could only draw 
UI for six months of the year. I told [my wife) that 
it wouldn't help during the summer months. She got a 
2Stamps refer to unemployment insurance benefits 
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job on the road the last two years and before that 
she worked at the plant. 
A numbPr of men stated that old superstitions against women 
fishing were based on ignorance and narrow-mindedness. They 
felt the only criteria should be wo.'\en's desire and 
willingness to do the work: 
It really doesn't bother me. If they want to go out 
there and they can do the work, it might as well be 
them as some young fellow in the boat who doesn't 
want to work. A couple [of women] down there are like 
splinters, they're so small. One works all summer 
with her husband at nets. I don't know how she does 
it. She's tough. 
Some men don't like it. But I don't see anything 
wrong with it. They have stupid reasons. 'No place 
for a woman'. I don't see the sense of that. If 
they can do the work, why not. I don't hear too many 
around here that it is bothering. There are not too 
many women fishing around here yet. Most of the women 
just fish lobster; a few fish cod. There's no reason 
why they can't. It's not really that hard a work 
anymore. There would be some things that women 
couldn't do but there are SC"""le things that men 
couldn't do either. 
I remember days when there wasn't a woman allowed on 
the wharf. Some of the old fellows would have forty 
fits. My attitude has changed. There is not a thing 
wrong with it if they fish. More and more women are 
fishing fulltime. I never thought that my wife 
couldn't do it. She was out a few times before. It 
didn't change anything from having a man the year 
before. 
But there are also attitudes among men that are less 
supportive of women going into fishing. Some object that the 
work is rough and dangerous and not fit for women: 
Many people think it is not a job for women. I 
myself don't think it's a job for women because it's 
131 
I 
·', 
~·: 
rough, dangerous work. I don't think my wife would 
fish if I had anything to say in it. I think it's too 
hard. 
other men say quite clearly that while they are not against 
women in general fishing and recognize the financial 
advantages, for personal reasons they themselves do not want 
to have their wives as helpers: 
If she was going to fish, she would have to fish with 
somebody else. If you had a little spat in the 
morning, you don't want somebody there who is going 
to be in bad humour all day. Some days when you come 
in, you sit around and have a couple of beer. You 
don't want somebody there nagging you, let's go home. 
I don't think I would feel comfortable fishing with 
my wife. There's a lot of people like myself who 
don't want a woman in the boat. It's mostly wives 
and husbands fishing together. It's quite a saving. 
over 10 weeks it's over $5,000. If the woman is 
capable of doing the job and you want to have her 
there, no problem with me. 
The most common objections to women going fishing are 
that they are not able to do the work, and that the Captain 
is at a distinct disadvantage if he has a woman helper. This 
statement from a young fisher is a sample of this attitude: 
Where the wives are going at it, it's cutting 
corners. I know a lot of fellows that have their 
wives fishing, no matter what they say--that she 
loves it and all that-- it's for the money. It's not 
a place, as far as I am concerned for a woman. It's 
too hard a work for a woman. The lifting is too hard. 
The bigger traps, rough weather 1 dangerous weather 1 
it's not a very safe job. A lot of things can happen 
out there. If you have a husband and wife out there 
and something happens and the boat goes down, they 
both go down. 
Like I say the bottom line is money. If I do 
get married myself, and she's out there [fishing], it 
will be because we need the money. There are still 
those who make out they like it. Bullshit. I know for 
a fact that it doesn't do anything for them. It's 
great on a nice day when the sun is out and there's 
lots of fish. But not all days are like that. 
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You get some where the husband is a good 
worker. If I was working as a helper with them, and 
if I wasn't doing my share, I would be ashore and he 
would have someone else in the boat. If your wife is 
out there you're doing it for them. Some fishermen 
don't get the fish and that could be part of the 
reason. They don't want to move the gear and the 
wife is tired or it's a dirty day and they don't haul 
those last ten trawls. If the helper was a young 
fellow, he'd probably haul those last trawls. 
Although the attitudes of men can act as a support or 
constraint to women going fishing, the response of other 
women is also important. In the interviews, it was striking 
that not one woman respondent expressed negative views about 
women fishing. 3 Women who are not fishing themselves see the 
economic advantages for the households: 
With the way everything is today and everything 
costing so much, it takes two working to rear a 
family. It's wonderful that they have the opportunity 
to do that. It think it's great. It's not as if they 
are away all day. They are in early [from fishing). 
When the women went first, I admired them for the 
courage they had to go out in the boat. I never 
wanted to go out in the boat. Some days it wasn't too 
hot out there, especially in the spring. Now the 
boats are comfortable. 
Some women said that they have changed their attitudes after 
seeing women in this work. Many openly expressed support and 
encouragement for moving into this male-dominated field: 
My attitude has changed. one time you would never 
think of it. You would never see a woman fishing. I 
don't see anything wrong with women fishing. If they 
can go out and fish, fine. 
3The fact that the interviewer was a woman may have had some 
influence on the responses. 
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More power to them, if they can do it. The work 
wouldn't bother me. It's not that hard. There was a 
woman working at the plant who used to fish and she 
said that it was easier than working at the plant. 
You're not eight hours on your feet; you are your own 
boss; if you want to sit down, you can sit down. At 
the fish plant you're standing there in one place for 
eight hours. I never had a desire to fish but I 
always felt that if they wanted to do it, they could 
go ahead. 
Some women wondered why more women were not fishing: 
I think there should be more women at it. I don't 
think they understand. It's not as hard as they 
think it is. They have not spent a lot of time around 
the water as much as my family. For a lot of women, 
there is no fishing in their family. They probably 
think they don't know enough about it. If they gave 
it a try, they would know there is nothing to it. 
The openness and acceptance that women expressed towarets 
other women doing this work is an important far:tor in the 
continuance of this option as a survival strategy. 
5.2.6.2. Community Attitudes 
While there were some objections to women fishing, 
especially in the beginning, there did not seem to be strong 
negative reactions in this community. One group in the 
community directly affected by women going fishing is young 
men who are interested in working as fishers' helpers. At 
present, approximately 12 per cent of fulltime helpers in 
this harbour are women. Previously, these jobs were 
exclusively available to males. Although the number of women 
fishing is still a minority, 10 to 12 jobs in a small 
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community is a significant number. I did not interview any 
of the male helpers but I attempted to find out from the 
fishers how young men in the community felt about the 
increasing participation of women in fishing. 
There was a mixed reaction but more positive response 
than might be expected, considering the fact that the 
advantages of better pay and more flexible working conditions 
make the job of fishermen's helper as attractive to men as to 
women. But it is important to note that, while the 
interviews give me some idea of general opinions in the 
community, I did not hear from the people most directly 
affected. 
In general the fisher-men did not perceive any negative 
response from the young men in the community, although one 
man mentioned that it is a lot more difficult to get a job as 
a fisher's helper now, than it was ten years ago: 
You never hear anything from them. Most of the women 
fish with their husbands. There's nothing you can do 
about it. 
As I said before, I corked4 for five years [before he 
bought his own outfit] and I never once had to ask 
for the job. People came to me and asked. But now 
you can probably ask ten people and not get a job 
fishing. One of the reasons is because more women 
are fishing. But I don't hear men complaining about 
it. 
411 Cork 11 is a colloquialism for fishers' helper in P.E. I. 
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The women responded more to this question than the men. some 
had heard comments suggesting that women were taking jobs 
they weren't capable of doing: 
I haven't heard anything directly. My mother has. 
someone mentioned to her about these women out 
fishing and taking the jobs from 'capable' men. Which 
I suppose it's true. But everyone has a right to a 
job. 
There are not that many jobs around here for men. 
It's a problem for young fellows just starting out 
getting a job fishing. They're starting to complain. 
They haven't come right out and said that it's the 
women's fault but I think that's what they are 
implying. We have ten women fishing full time. So 
they must be feeling the pinch. That would be ten 
male jobs in a small community. 
There may be some resentment. Some men feel that they 
are more qualified. They think that women are not 
qualified for these jobs; they only get them because 
it is their husband's boat. But I think that women 
have as much right to these jobs as men do. 
But more said that while there lias more competition for jobs, 
there was also an understanding of why women were going 
fishing: 
What I hear most is that it's better for the wife to 
be fishing. Most know what it's like to work for 
$4.50 an hour. You have to pay $2.50 an hour for a 
baby-sitter. That's not much to make. When you pay a 
Cork besides, you're only making half of his wages. 
You're losing $150 a week that you could be getting 
if you were in the boat. 
I don't think they mind. I suppose if there were a 
lot of women fishing, maybe the men would complain 
that they can't have these jobs. 
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The fact that the women are fishing with their husbands 
has a double ~ffect. It generates both understanding and 
resentment among young men in the community. on the one hand 
they know that women are working as part of the family 
enterprise, and that it's important for survival. If women 
were competing for helpers' jobs outside their family 
enterprise, then it would probably generate more conflict. 
On the other hand, there is a perception that women are not 
'really qualified' for these jobs. They only have them 
because of their position as tb.e wife of the boat-owner. 
Many men (and women) stated that women working as 
fisher's helpers was only workable if they were fishing with 
their husband or another member of their family. Most felt 
that women helpers were operating with some handicap by 
reason of the fact that there were some tasks they did not 
have the physical strength to do. All stated that their 
husbands have to hire someone extra to set traps at the 
beginning of the season and to land the traps on the last day 
of the season. several women suggested that having them as 
helpers meant their husband had to do some of the heavier 
work in the boat. There probably are some limitations to 
having a woman helper. However, all workers bring various 
strengths and limitations to whatever job they have. Perhaps 
there are some tasks that women cannot do as efficiently as 
men because of the physical strength required. But it is 
equally true that they bring certain strengths to this work 
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that not all male helpers would have. These may be 
conscientiousness, creativity, willingness to learn, and 
certainly for women who are fishing as members of a family 
enterprise, a vested interest in working for the best 
possible results. These may more than compensate for any 
limitations they might have in physical strength. 
5.3. Implications for Survival 
Women working as helpers has implications for the future 
survival of the fishing enterprise. It is a way of 
concentrating more income from fishing in the household. 
However, it also makes the fishing households more 
vulnerable. All of the sources of income for the household 
are dependent on the fishery. State policy is a key factor 
in women deciding to use this option. Thus households 
adopting this strategy are more susceptible to changes in 
state policy. Households where woman are earning wages from 
other sources may have more stability in the event of a 
downturn in the fishery. On the other hand if women are not 
directly engaged in the fishery, they may be less willing to 
use their incomes to sustain the fishing enterprise. 
5.3.1 Changing Gender Relations 
More direct participation in the fishing enterprise has 
affected gender relations in the household and in the 
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community. The statements of both men and women indicate that 
the actions of women have broken down sexist attitudes and 
prejudices against their working in the boat: 
I think that most of the fishers are accustomed to 
the fact that it's a way of life. At first they 
probably thought that they (women] didn't belong 
there. But now they accept it. 
People don't care. I remember when it happened 
first. The younger people didn't mind, but the older 
people said that it was bad luck for a woman to get 
in a boat. Once they got at it, attitudes changed. 
You never hear anyone talking about it now. 
Some men at the harbour thinY. it's not a good job for 
women. But attitudes are changing as more and more 
women go fishing. Tony thinks that there is a place 
for women fishing but men are better helpers than 
women. 
Changing gender attitudes have created an environment 
allowing more women to choose to fish with support from the 
community and the household. As a result more households can 
choose this option as a survival strategy. Some fishermen 
told me three years ago that "their wives would never go 
fishing". In 1989, women in these households are fishing 
with their husbands. It is true that these changes are 
motivated more by economics than by equality. However it is 
a dialectical process. As economic pressures build, some 
women decide to go fishing. The action of more women fishing 
promotes changes in gender relations. 
Although the 'production' relationship of men and women 
in the fishing boat is still one of boat-owner to helper, 
women have entered into a process of partnership. They do 
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not have equal power but they do have a much closer 
identification with the fishing enterprise. They have proven 
that they can competently perform most of the tasks of a 
helper on a lobster boat. They have gained some experience 
and knowledge of other tasks like operating electronic 
equipment and sailing the boat. They are also aware of the 
issues in the fishery and have demonstrated interest in 
learning more about these issues. Thi~ has given them a new 
confidence, which hopefully will translate into more 
decision-making power. 
on the other hand, the entry into this new area of work 
may not be a liberating experience for women. In some cases, 
they are under the domain of their husband both at home and 
at work. For some women, working outside the house gives 
them the opportunity to develop talents and skills and to 
have friends and colleagues away from the influence of their 
husband. It provides them with a freedom they don't often 
have in the home. Working closely with their husband may 
create new tensions, which, when combirted with economic 
pressures, sets up a very stressful situation for women. 
\~omen going into the boat also has implications for 
intergenerational survival. In many fishing families, the 
fishing enterprise is handed on to one of the sons. It has 
been the custom in many families in this community for sons 
to fish as helper. In this way skills and knowledge are 
passed on from one generation to another. If the 1nother has 
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been working as helper, then this means that a young person 
who wants to go fishing has to find a job with some other 
boat-owner. Again the decision as to whether son or mother 
works as the helper is influenced by various factors. At the 
economic level, the woman may have to continue as helper 
because her income is necessary for the survival of the 
enterprise. If the helper's salary goes to the son, then it 
will not be used to cover household costs. At another level, 
the woman may not want to give up this job, even if there are 
economic reasons for her to continue. Her option to continue 
will depend on gender relations in the household. 
5.4. Conclusion 
The ability of women to move into different kinds of work 
in response to political and economic changes in the fishery 
challenges existing theories, which say that survival depends 
only on the activities of the male producer. It has 
strengthened the theory that survival depends on the 
cooperation of the whole household. It also demonstrates that 
fishing households are not just restricted to responses to 
state policies, but they also actively shape state programs 
to be more in accord with household needs. 
Economic pressures as well as women's active desire to 
find ways to deal with them, created a situation where women 
moved more directly into fishing. Their ability to do this 
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has been influenced by gender relations in the household. At 
the same time the practice of women fishing has broken down, 
in turn, many stereotypes and prejudices against their doing 
this kind of work. Women need to become more involved in the 
fishery at an organizational and political level. If they 
are prevented from doing so because of the male, hierarchical 
structure, they may push to change this structure. If it is 
not changed, the process of creating conditions of equality 
between men and women will have severe limitations. 
In the long run, it is clear that the best strategies for 
survival include mechanisms that provide for maximum input of 
men and \oTomen. Women in fishing households in Naufrage have 
made key contributions at the economic and social level. 
Their contribution on the organizational and political level 
has been less significant. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The survival of petty commodity production has been a subject 
of much debate in the literature. Llambi (1988), Friedmann 
(1978, 1980), Chevalier (1983) and Bernstein (1988) have 
approached it by looking at the tension between external 
factors, such as the constraints and opportunities imposed by 
the political and economic environment, and the internal 
dynamics and practices of production households. However, 
petty commodity households are often treated as monolithic 
units and not enough consideration is given to how the 
interests and needs of the individual members can influence 
survival strategies. Llambi and Friedman discuss how 
responses of households vary because of internal differences, 
but they do not consider that they can also influence changes 
and adjustments in external structures. There is little or 
no recognition in the literature that men and women in PCP 
households may have very different reasons for supporting or 
not supporting the continuance of the production unit. 
This thesis has looked at different dimensions of the 
survival of lobster fishing production in Prince Edward 
Island. It has examined the impact of external structures, 
such as state policy, on the development of the fishery, as 
well as the active involvement of fishing households in 
responding to state policy. I have argued that an adequate 
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understanding of survival must consider the responses of PCP 
households in a more dynamic and gender-conscious way. The 
model it uses for explaining survival assumes that survival 
strategies reflect the impact of the varied interests, needs 
and concerns of different members of fishing households. The 
analysis focuses on the interactive process between fishers 
and state initiatives, fishers and their spouses, and between 
spouses and state initiatives. 
Changes in state policies in the area of licensing and 
unemployment insurance have had a significant, and sometimes 
contradictory, impact on the development of the lobster 
fishery. Licensing policies were introduced in the 1960s to 
reduce participation in the fishery, thus improving incomes 
for those remaining. The policy was based on the logic that 
with fewer participants, their chances for survival would 
increase. However, the state planners' definition of 
economic viability is not the same as the definition of 
survival of fishing hou~eholds. 
State planners develop policy on the assumption that the 
survival of fishing enterprises depends on the income and 
activities of the fisher, which in most cases is the male 
head of household. Fishers, however, are embedded in fishing 
households and state policies affect all members of the 
household. In an area like Naufrage, for example, a fisher 
leaving the fishery often results in the whole family having 
to move from the area. Since this is not always an 
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acceptable alternative, members of fishing households will 
find ways of extending and supplementing fishing income so 
that the fishing enterprise can continue. 
The recognition that fishers are embedded in households, 
whose members are active participants in reproducing their 
own existence, has implications for understanding the 
contradictory impact of state policy. For example, members 
of fishing households took advantage of opportunities created 
by changes in other policies, like unemployment insurance, to 
remain in the fishery. This undermined the effectiveness of 
licensing policies in reducing the number of fishers. 
6.1. survival Strategies and Changing state Policies 
Licensing policy has both presented challenges and imposed 
constraints for the survival of fishing enterprises. It has 
prevented new entry to the fishery and thus restricted 
further erosion of the economic rent of the resource. 
However, the move to full-time fishing has put new pressure 
on lobster fishers to intensify fishing effort. They have 
invested more capital in bigger boats, larger traps and 
electronic equipment, which has meant more efficient fishing 
of the grounds and additional days fishing. The increased 
investment has improved catches in the short run but it has 
also made fishing households more vulnerable by creating 
higher capital costs, heavier debt loads, and consequently, 
more cash requirements. The greater pressure on fishers 
145 
to fish harder and to maximize their landings has 
implications for the future of the stocks. Though the 
lobster fishery does not seem to have experienced the same 
problems with stock depletion as the groundfishery, more 
investigation should be made of the effects on the lobster 
stocks of increased catching capacityJ efficiency of gear and 
increased effort per fishing unit without a corresponding 
reduction in the units of effort. 
Fishers have increased their capital investment, not just 
to improve their lobster catches but also to give them 
greater flexibility in exploiting other species. Even 
though these species represent a relatively small part of the 
:·otal landed value of the PEI fishery, nevertheless, they 
play a key role in its survival. The lobster fishery is only 
a two-month fishery. Apart from the economic difficulties of 
living off an income from the lobster fishery in an area like 
Naufrage, multi-species fishing is important in terms of 
symbolic identification as a fisher. 
But in the mid-1980s, fishing other species has created 
vulnerabilities as well. On the one hand, there have been 
some opportunities to increase fishing income by engaging in 
the tuna fishery, herring roe fishery, or the groundfishery 
(using gillnets). But the volatility of prices, the 
insecurity of markets, as well as the unpredictability of 
supply resulted in significant diff erences in income from one 
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year to the next. Consequently, it has also made gearing up 
for these fisheries an uncertain investment. 
Limited entry, first introduced in the lobster fishery in 
1967, has significantly increased costs for new entrants into 
the inshore fishery. In 1981, licence restrictions were 
extended to groundfish, herring (gillnet) and tuna licences 
in 1981, and to mackerel licences, both gill-net and purse-
seine, in 1987. Fishers entering the fishery in the 1980s 
have to buy all these licences on the market, thus adding to 
their initial capital investment. 
6.1.1. Women's Contribution: Multiple Incomes 
Even with the intensification of effort, it is very 
difficult for fishing households in Naufrage harbour to 
survive just on fishing income. The increased capita 1 
investment has created a need for more cash. The 
contribution of women's income has been a key factor in 
counteracting rising costs and uncertainties in fishing 
income. Women challenged state policies and extended 
survival options by going fishing with their husbands. They 
have broken through the barriers of sexism and have moved 
into a new area of work that previously was only open to 
males. Their activities have been an expression of 
resistance to the constraints of state policy and of creative 
response to the changing political and economic situation 
around them. 
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However, for many women, taking on new work roles has meant 
a double work load as they still have the primary 
responsibility for child care and household duties. As well, 
many of the options for wage labour in the area did not pay 
that well. Women found that they were in a double bind if 
they were working for minimum or low wages and had to pay 
child care costs. Also, some resisted commuting long 
distances to work because this kept them away from their 
children, a problem especially when the children were young. 
For these reasons, and because of increasing cash 
requirements, some women became more interested in fishing 
with their husbands. Although a few women started fishing in 
the late 1970s, the ineligibility for unemployment insurance 
created a barrier for many. As discussed in the thesis, 
women's efforts to change this legislation made the option of 
fishing with their husbands more viable. 
These moves into new areas of work challenged many 
stereotypes about women's role in the fishery, both in the 
household and in the community. The process of being more 
directly and consciously involved in survival strategies gave 
women more possibility for negotiating an equal say in 
ongoing strategies. 
The new initiatives of women have helped househ""')lds 
survive, but they have also subjected them to new 
vulnerabilities. Fishing households where women are fishing 
are almost exclusively reliant on fishing income and 
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unemployment insurance. Thus, they will be especially 
affected by any changes in this state policy. Fishing income 
is concentrated in fewer fishing households, hence 
potentially isolating fishing households from others in the 
community. As financial pressures increase, there is more 
pressu~e on women who are not presently fishing to engage in 
this work. This could crea":;e more stress in the fishing 
households. 
Because the total income of the household is dependent on 
fish, there is more pressure on stocks, not just lobster but 
also for other species. Many of these species are migratory 
and access to them depend on regional stocks, some of which 
are in trouble. The division of regional quotas among the 
provinces in the southern Gulf is increasiHgly more 
conflictive as each province demands more fish. 
6.2. Future Survival and New State Initiatives 
The latest crisis in the Atlantic fishery has been 
accompanied by a variety of new state initiatives. Changes 
in unemployment insurance and proposals for increases in the 
minimum carapace size in both canner and market lobsters are 
two examples. These and other changes, su~h as frbe trade 
rulings and declining prices, will have a significant impact 
on survival. I will briefly deal with the changes in 
unemployment insurance, declining prices and the carapace 
size issue. 
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6.2.1. Unemployment Insurance 
All of the survival strategies discussed in this thesis are 
affected by the state poli~y of unemployment insurance. 
Fishers' unemployment insurance is an important supplement to 
fishing income during the winter season. UI is also a key 
factor in mobilizing the wage labour of women in fishing 
households. 
The recent changess in UI regulations, which now require a 
minimum of fourteen weeks for eligibility, has created 
difficulties in a fishery that depends primarily on an eight-
week lobster season to give helpers and plant workers the 
majority of their work-weeks to qualify for benefits. The 
need for more weeks will definitely increase the pressure to 
fish other species. The decision to fish other species will 
not be based on whether it is economically advantageous, but 
rather on the need to get fourteen weeks of insurable 
earnings. Consequently, as more people compete for scarce 
resources and markets, the economic advantages that result 
from fewer fishers participating will diminish. 
These changes in UI will have repercussions at every level. 
Whether women are fishing with their husbands or working in 
local fish plants, the requirement to have fourteen insurable 
weeks will probably result in lower weekly earnings, which in 
turn will result in lower UI benefits and less household 
income. Women who are fishing hire local people for child 
care during the lobster season, and give them unemployment 
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insurance stamps. These child care workers will have a 
difficult time to get extra weeks of work after the lobster 
season is finished. 
In recent years unemployment insurance for fishers has 
suffered from particularly negative attitudes. These 
attitudes have been expressed in terms like 'abuse of the 
system, fraud, cheating'. The context of the critique gives 
the impression that fishers don't have a right to 
unemployment insurance. This attack on fishers' access to UI 
is accompanied by the another familiar theme, 'there are too 
many fishers for too few fish in Atlantic Canada•. 
The goal of the licensing policy was to reduce 
participation in the fishery. However, this did not succeed 
to the extent expected, partly because the state, in its 
implementation of the licensing policy did not take into 
consideration that fishers were embedded in households. 
Unemployment insurance and other household incomes 
supplemented fishing income, allowing fishers to stay in the 
fishery even when their fishing income was declining. Thus 
the recent attacks on unemployment insurance may be a new 
attempt to reduce membership in the fishery. 
The issue of unemployment insurance is a complex one 
because it not only assists in the survival of the fishery at 
the harvesting level, but also plays an important role in 
subsidizing the processing sector. If fishers were not 
receiving unemployment insurance, there would be much more 
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pressure to increase the wharf price to fishers. As we 11, 
the state through unemployment insurance subsidizes the 
labour costs of processors who do not have to pay any of the 
subsistence costs of workers when they are not working. 
6.2.2. Declining prices and Changes in American Legislation 
The lobster fishery in 1989 and 1990 has been particularly 
hard hit by severe cuts in prices to fishers. In the middle 
of the spring lobster season in 1989, prices dropped 
overnight from $2.60 to $2.00 a pound for canners, and from 
$3.25 to $2.50 a pound for market lobsters. In 1990 the 
situation was even worse with prices starting at $1.25 for 
canners and $1.75 for markets. These were similar to prices 
in the late 1970s. 
Processors are blaming the low prices on soft markets and 
high inventory costs. A historical dependence on the U.S. 
market has meant that processors have not been very 
aggressive about finding new markets or developing new 
products. The dependence on this market has made the lobster 
industry very vulnerable to factors like a high Canadian 
dollar or changes in the American lobster industry. In 1989, 
the United states increased the tuinimum carapace size of 
lobster. Fishers voted against having a similar increase in 
the minimum size of market-si?.ed lobster in canada. 
Consequently, any market-sized lobster smaller than the 
American minimum size could not be sold in the u.s. market. 
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However, as a result of pressure from the processors in the 
Maritim, . region, and from some fishers, the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans implemented legislation jn August of 
1990, putting the new size into effect for the Fall lobster 
season. This was strongly opposed by fishers in P.E.I. as 
they feel they can't sustain reductions in catches in a year 
when they are already suffering from huge cutbacks in 
prices. 
6.2.3. Carapace Size Increase for canner Lobsters 
Another issue that will have more consequences for fishers 
in PEI and especially in the area of Naufrage is the proposal 
to increase the minimum carapace size for the smaller, canner 
lobster. The Department of Fisheries and Oceans has been 
promoting an increase in the legal minimum size of the canner 
lobster in the southern Gulf from 2~ inches to 2 3/4 or 3 
inches since the late 1970s. Fishers in PEI, particularly 
those in district 7B, have opposed this measure more 
strongly than their counterparts in Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick. They maintain that over 80 per cent of their 
catch is canner lobsters, and an increase in minimum size 
would result in significant decreases in their landings. 
In 1989 and 1990, the crisis in the lobster fishery 
resulting from low prices and soft ma~kets has caused renewed 
interest in increasing the size of the canner lobster. Those 
fishers and processors promoting the increase are arguing 
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that if they take small lobsters, which have questionable 
economic value, off the market, it should reduce the overall 
supply of lobsters on the market and cause upwari pressure on 
the price. 
The Maritime Fishermen's Union conducted a study of this 
issue in PEI and eastern New Brunswick in 1988 and 1989 to 
examine both the supports for and constraints against 
increasing the size of the canner lobster in different parts 
of the southern Gulf. The preliminary results of the survey 
indicate that the question is still a divisive issu~. The 
majority of fishers in PEI are still opposed to a size 
increase (Maritime Fishermen's Union 1990:29-31). 
In the research on the issue of increasing the minimum size 
of the canner lobster, there has been very little discussion 
as to how this change would affect other members of the 
fishing household. Changing the carapace size could affect 
the processing industry, which would have implications for 
sources of wage labour and 1 in turn 1 household survival 
strategies. I must emphasize that decisions favoring the 
processing industry are not necessarily the most efficacious 
for fishing households. The industry does provide jobs in 
fishing communities, but these jobs are often non-unionized 
and low-paying. If a larger lobster would mean higher prices 
to fishers, it would result in the transfer of surplus from 
the processing sector to the primary sector. However, there 
is no guarantee that the fishers will get a higher price. 
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The important point is that any adequate analysis of this 
issue must take into account the effects of the legislation 
on the lobster fishing household. 
6.3. Areas for Future Research 
This thesis has discussed the interaction between state 
policy and survival strategies of fishing households focusing 
particularly at the harvesting level. We also need to 
investigate the interaction of household strategies for 
survival, individual strategies regarding work and strategies 
of capital in the PEI lobster fishery. 1 Since lobster 
fishing households are dependent on wage labour for their 
survival and these jobs are often provided by processing 
plants, which in turn are buying the lobster from fishers, it 
is important to see the connections between processors, 
fishers and workers in processing plants. 
Research also needs to be done on the relationship between 
large and small capital in the processing sector. The nature 
of the lobster fishery facilitates the entrance of small 
buyers purchasing product directly from the fisher at the 
wharf. This has created competition at the wharf level and 
has caused some upward pressure on the price to fishers. 
However, in the last few years, there seems to be more 
agreement among the buyers on wharf prices . 
• This is an idea that was suggested by MacDonald and 
Connelly (1989:69). 
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The present crisis of slow markets and low prices to 
fishers highlights the neces::dty for research into the whole 
area of marketing of lobster. There is a need to investigate 
the destination of products, the kinds of processed product, 
changing consumer tastes and competition on the international 
market from other shellfish producing areas. This research 
is useful for fishers' organizations to assist them in 
~ounting campaigns for fair prices for their product. All of 
these issues point out the need to explore inter-household 
strategies of survivul. 
6.3.1 Unionization 
In this thesis I have dealt only with household strategies. 
However these strategies will only be effective if linked 
with other survival strategies at a provincial and regional 
level. The new crises around falling prices and new 
regulations involving minimum size and unemployment insurance 
regulations unde~line the need for fishing households to be 
involved in organizations that will enable them to develop a 
collective response to the threats to their survival. 
It was obvious from the interviews that therf" is very 
little involvement with formal fishers' organizations on the 
part of either men or women in Naufrage harbour. There is 
some degree of organization at the port level, which 
occasionally extends to joining forces with fishers from 
other ports to fight for certain issues. But most lobbying 
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is directed from the port level to individual federal or 
provincial politicians. This sets up a situation that 
aggravates differences between harbours and promotes a system 
of divide and conquer among fishers. 
In Naufrage harbour I sensed that fishers had a distrust of 
fishers' organizations, both unions and associations, and a 
lack of confidence in their ability to change anything. This 
distrust seems to come from different directions: from a 
perception that organizations cannot do anything to change 
government's lack of responsiveness to the needs of inshore 
fishers, from previous negative experiences with fishers' 
organizations, an1 from a belief that the individualism of 
fishers prevents them from working together. There have been 
some examples of fishers in this area coming together to 
present their demands in a collective way. The challenge is 
to find ways to build on these experiences and encourage 
further collective action. 
There are two fishermen's organizations in PEI, the PEI 
Fishermen's Association and The Maritime Fishermen's Union 
(MFU) . The MFU is the most progressive organization of 
fishers in the region. Formed in 1977 as a union of inshore 
fishers in the Maritime Provinces, it was initially involved 
in fighting for collective bargaining rights. More recently, 
it has played a key role in influencing government policy to 
protect and support the inshore fishery. It has a regional 
rather than a provincial focus, which is important in 
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developing a collective response to managing the resources of 
a Gulf fishery, as opposed to fragmented, provincial 
strategies with fishers fighting each other. It has been 
closely linked to the labour movement of the region and has 
demonstrated a more defined class perspective than other 
organizations in its fight for a viable inshore fishery in 
the political economy of the region. 
However the members are all boat-owners and ideologically, 
the MFU has analyzed survival in the inshore fishery from a 
male, boat-owner :Jerspective. Women have been minimally 
involved in the union. If women's contributions are 
necessary for the survival of the inshore fishery, then any 
changes in policy will affect them as well as the male 
fisher. They should be involved in the process of developing 
pol..:.cy that will take into account the needs of the whole 
fishing household. Therefore organizations such as the 
Maritime Fishermen's Union need to consider developing 
structures that allow women of fishing households to become 
full members. 
6.4. Conclusion 
The lobster fishery has changed significantly in the past 
twenty years. This fishery as a form of petty commodity 
production is very vulnerable to the constraints of external 
economic and political structures. However, within those 
constraints fishing households have found space to exert 
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their influence. Individual fishing families in Naufrage 
have shown creativity and ingenuity in developing household 
survival strategies. This thesis has demonstrated that 
survival is a complex issue. It is influenced by a number of 
factors such as: gender and generational differences; the 
skills, interests and needs of the household members; the 
negotiating space between men and women; availability of wage 
employment. The negotiation of survival strategies depends 
on both the economic and non-economic concerns of fishing 
households as, within the constraints of external structures, 
they work out a way of living that best meets their values 
and goals as fishing families. 
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APPENDIX A 
METHODOLOGICAL NOTES 
Two main methodological approaches were used in this 
research. one was researching available information on the 
lobster fishery. The second method of gathering information 
was through interviews with members of fishing households . 
The inter,riew schedule is included in Appendix B. 
The purpose of using semi-structured questions was to 
allow fishers more freedom in expressing ideas on how the 
fishery had changed over the span of their fishing lives. 
The main advantage of this method is that it gave more scope 
for fishers to express their views on a wide variety of 
issues. 
The disadvantage of such a wide range of topics is that, 
in a two-hour intervi4i:lw, it was difficult to get detailed 
information on any one topic. For example, for the sections 
on expenses, capital investment and income, the informatior. 
was quite uneven and not very useful. It was only possible 
to get information on general trends. I was trying to 
compare figures for three specific years, 1978, 1983, 1988, 
but found that fishers did not have specific information on 
their income and expenses. Many fishers have only started 
organizing their financial records in some systema~ic way in 
the last few years . I also observed that the fishers are not 
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used to interviews, and with some it was difficult to sustain 
interest to the end of the interview. 
For the interviews 1 I developed two separate interview 
schedules, one for women and one for men. They contain some 
common questions and some separate sections. The sections on 
the men's interview guide that were not on the women's 
required more detailed information regarding the activity of 
fishing, such as fishing practices, relations with buyers, 
relation with helper, capital investment and expenses. I 
found that the women did not have much information on these 
issues. My goal was to get some historical perspective on 
these topics. I want:""-:i to find out holil fishers had 
experienced changes in various areas, such as landings and 
prices of various species; kinds of gear; capital investment 
and relationships with buyers. Even though some women are 
now engaged in fishing, it is a relatively new experience. 
As well, most women are only involved in fishing lobster and 
I was soliciting information on other species as well. It 
also indicates that men are still primarily involved in many 
of the activities and decisions around fishing. 
In the women's questionnaires I did use spec4fic questions 
about child care and housekeeping tasks since these are 
factors that often determine women's options in working 
outside the home. I also observed from the interviews that 
the responsibility for most of these "!:asks still falls to 
women. It was a weakness not to have asked these questions 
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to the men also. After the first few interviews, I tri~j to 
rectify this by including some questions on child care and 
housekeeping responsibilities in the men's interviews. 
However, these were long and it was Lficult to deal with 
additional issues in any comprehensive way. 
The selection of respondents was made according to the 
number of years fishing as boat-owner. My reason for doing 
this was to compare fishing experiences across different 
generations and to see if there were different problems 
between younger fishers and older ones. The differences 
between generations were not as distinct as I had expected. 
This may have had something to do with the narticular 
respondents selected. I had only three cases in the older 
group, for example. Interestingly enough there were not many 
older fishers in this community. As the criterion was years 
as boat-owner rather than age, there were wide differences in 
age and position in the life-cycle of the family between the 
respondents in the two older groups. Thus it was difficult 
to determine common characteristics of each group that made 
them clearly distinct from the others. I had hypothesized 
that older fishers would have fewer debts and more financial 
security than younger fishers. Thus their way of coping with 
the current problems of low price and high costs might be 
quite different. I discovered that the criteria of years 
fishing was not necessarily a useful indicator in determining 
financial security. While in general younger fishers tend to 
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have bigger debts, there are other factors that determine 
debt level, such as inheritance of license versus buying it 
on the market. While I could observe some general 
differences between the groups, there were not enough common 
characteristics in each group to enable clear comparisons 
between them. 
Since most studies on the survival of small boat fisheries 
focus on the activities of male fishers, it was important to 
do research on the contribution of women to survival of 
fishing households. Even though not all the same questions 
were asked of both men and women, interviewing each one 
separately gave me an idea of how each perceived the 
challenges and problems of the fishery. The exercise of 
talking to both men and women in the fishing household gave 
me helpful insights into developing the model of survival I 
am using in this thesis. The process of doing the research in 
this way has sharpened my own awareness of the importance of 
looking at survival strategies as a household response, 
rather than just that of the fisher. 
Another criteria that was used in selecting households was 
to choose half where women were fishing and half where they 
were not. The percentage of the sample with women fishing is 
much higher than the population. This may create a 
perception in the research that the phenomena of women 
fishing is much more pervasive than it actually is. However 
choosing a larger number of women who are fishing gave me a 
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chance to examine in more detail how changes in work 
allocation are affected by and in turn affect gender 
relations. 
Having two groups of fishing households allowed for a 
comparison of attitudes to the survival of the fishing 
enterprise. It was also useful in determining if a greater 
dependence on the income generated from fishing was a 
constraint or an opportunity for survival. 
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APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR MEN IN LOBSTER FISHING HOUSEHOLDS 
NAME 
ADDRESS PHONE NO 
~~~~~~~==------- -------------HOW MANY YEARS FISHING? 
HOW MANY YEARS AS BOAT ~O~W~N~ER~?---
-----
A.WORK-HISTORY SINCE HIGHSCHOOL 
l.What was the last grade you finished in school? 
2.What other certificates, educational qualifications do you 
have? 
J.What has been your work history since you left school? 
B.FISHING PRACTICES. 
4.0escribe your early fishing experience. 
i'lhen did you start? Did you fish with your father? 
How many years did you fish as a helper? 
How did you learn the skills you have? 
S.What kind of gear did you have when you started - boat, 
gear, electronic gear on your boat? 
G.What were the fishing practices when you started? How have 
they changed? 
?.What kind of species did you fish then? Changes in volume 
and price. 
C.FISHING GROUNDS. 
8. Before government regulations were introduced regarding 
lobster districts, what were the informal rules about 
who could fish in the harbour and where? 
9.Have these practices changed over the years? Why or why 
not? 
lO.Has the number of 
decreased over the 
been the factors 
decrease? 
boats in the harbour 
last number of years? 
that has caused the 
D.RELATIONSHIP WITH BUYER: 
increased 
What have 
increase/ 
or 
ll. Oeser ibe the buying and selling practices when you 
started? 
12.Are there different buyers now? Did new buyers coming in 
affect the price of lobster? 
lJ.Where did you q~t the following inputs for your fishing 
enterprise? Bait, Fuel, Credit 
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14. Has the relationship with the buyers changed over the 
years? Are fishers more/less independent from the 
buyers? 
E.RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OWNER/OPERATOR AND HELPER. 
15.Do fishers look to family or kin first to find a helper? 
16.How do boat owners pay their helper? Wages? Shares? 
Is the reason for choosing based on custom? Preference 
of owner/operator? Is there a boat share? 
17.Is fishing experience a factor in choosing a helper? 
F.SOURCES OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
18.What are the sources of your household income? 
INCOME FROM FISHING 
Lobste~­
Groundtish 
Mackerel 
Herring 
Tuna 
Other 
INCOME FROM WORK BESIDES FISHING 
What kind of work? 
INCOME FROM U.I. 
INCOME FROM OTHER MEMBERS 
How many other members in the family? 
How many members earn income? 
Sources of income 
NON-CASH INCOME 
Cut your own wood 
Help from family in house repair 
car repair 
Build your own traps, rig nets 
Garden 
G.EXPENSES 
19.Compare the costs of the following items for 1978, 
1983.1988. 
Gear, Helper, Boat, Bait, Fuel 
H.GOVERNMBNT REGULATION/POLICY: 
20.How do you think Government regulation has affected the 
fishery? 
21.What are the advantages of regulations? disadvantages? 
22.How does unemployment insurance affect the fishery? 
23.How has Government policy in general affected the inshore 
fishery? 
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!.CAPITAL INVESTMENT. 
24.What was a lobster license worth when you started fishing? 
What licenses did you have to buy on the market? Price? 
25.How many boats have you bought? Newjsecond-hand? Price? 
26.Which of the following equipment do you have on your boat? 
two-way radio 
VHF 
Loran c 
Sounder: coloured paper __ _ 
Plotter 
27.What was your fishing outfit worth when you started 
fishing? 
What is worth today? 
28.If you make any extra money in any one season, what do you 
do with it? (Priorize) 
Pay Bills 
Invest in fish1ng operation ____ _ 
Invest in the household 
Invest in other enterprises 
RRSP/Savings -----
J.DEBT LEVELS. 
29.How do you purchase supplies to get ready for fishing? 
One Buyer Cash Credit 
Various Buyers Cash Credit 
Retail Outlet Cash --- Charge to Buyer 
JO.What kind of bill would you have with the buyer at the 
beginning of the season when you started fishing? 
3l.How does increased debt in your fishing operation affect 
your fishing? 
32.From whom do you borrow money when you started fishing? 
buyers banks/Credit Union PLA private __ _ 
33.From whom do they borrow today~ 
buyers banksjc.u. PLA ____ private ____ __ 
K.ROLE OF SPOUSE IN FISHING ENTERPRISE? 
34.How is your spouse involved in the fishing enterprise? 
fishing renewal of license 
building/repair of ge~r 
communication with buyer_s __ __ 
books --
communication with partner at sea 
correspondence 
banking/paying bills other 
35.If she is not involved in-fishing in the boat, why not? 
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L.FISHING DECISIONS. 
36.Do you discuss with your partner decisions about fishing 
matters? Why or why not? 
37.Does the fact that she is fishing/not fishing affect her 
involvement in decisions around fishing? 
M.ATTITUDE TOWA~D WOMEN FISHING. 
38. Has your attitude changed in regard to women fishing? 
39. What do other fishers in the harbour think of women 
fishing? 
40. What does your family,(parents, brother, sisters) think 
of women fishing? 
41. What do men who are also looking for jobs as helpers 
think about women doing this kind of work? 
42. Do you see your daughter going fishing? 
N.ROLE OF CHILDREN. 
43.Do your children participate in the tasks of preparing for 
fishing? Has that changed over the years? Do they get 
paid for doing these tasks? 
44.Do they go out fishing with you? Do you pass on fishing 
skills to your children? 
45.Is there a difference in labour contributed or skills 
learned between girls and boys? 
46.Do you see your daughter/son going fishing? 
Do you see fishing as a good profession? 
What are the obstacles to their going fishing? 
Would you help them get started? 
O.ORGANIZATION 
47.What is your perception of how fishers are organized? at 
level of harbour? at level of province? at level of 
region? 
48.What are the problems in organizing fishers? Benefits? 
49.Have you ever been involved in fishermen's organiza-ions? 
at port level? at provincial level? at regional level? 
SO.How do you solve problems that pertain only to this 
partjcular harbour? (ice facilities, repair of wharf,) 
Sl.What would you do for a problem that cannot be solved at 
the individual harbour level? (i.e. quota problems, price, 
52.0o you feel that fishers' organizations can have any 
effect on problems in the fishery? 
53.Are there any particular obstacles to lobster fishers 
organizing? 
54.0o you think men and women should be organized separately? 
55.Is the Maritime Fishermen's Union active in this harbour? 
the Fishermen's Association? 
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56.What is your perception of the difference between the two 
organizations? 
P.RELATION WITH COMMUNITY. 
57.What is the attitude of the community to fishers? Do they 
play an important role in the community? 
58.Are you involved in community organizations? Do you hold 
executive positions? 
59.Is it important for you to continue living in this 
community? 
60.How important is the lobster fishery to the survival of 
this community? 
61.How do people survive in a bad year? 
62.Would you like to see your children hnve a chOice of 
living in this community? 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR WOMEN IN LOBSTER FISHING HOUSEHOLDS 
NOTE: I used the same basic interview schedule for women who 
were fishing and for those who were not. There would be a 
change of emphasis from one group to the other. For women who 
were fishing, section B was much more extensive. For women 
not fishing I would spend more time on section H. extensive. 
NAME ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
ADORES S •••••••••••••••••••••• , ••••••• PHONE • •••••••••.••••• 
YEARS FISHING •••••••••••• 
A. EDUCATION AND WORK HISTORY: 
l.What grade level did you finish in school? 
2.What other certificates or qualifications do you have? 
3. Give me some details about your work history after 
finishing school. 
B.FISHING EXPERIENCE: 
4.Do you fish with your partner? Yes no 
5.If no, why not? 
Have you ever wanted to go fishing? 
Is your family a fishing family? 
6.If yes, tell me something of how you made the decision to 
go fishing. 
Was it your idea or your husband's:? Were you 
influenced by the fact that other women were fishing? 
Did you dis~uss it with other women to see what lt was 
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like? What were the prime reasons for going fishing? 
Are your reasons for continuing different than for 
starting? 
?.How often do you go fishing? 
a)Every day b)5/6 4/6 3/6 1/6 (CIR~LE ONE) 
c) occasionally 
a.oo you fish other species besides lobster? 
9.Describe the tasks you do on the boat? 
Are there tasks that you feel you cannot do? How did 
you learn these tasks? Do you feel that you are always 
learning new things? Are there other t; .3ks that you 
would like to do that you don't do no\,! Do you ever 
drive the boat or operate any of the instruments such 
as Loran c, radar, etc.? Would you like to learn how to 
operate these instruments? 
10.Are you the only helper on the boat? 
If there is another person how do you and the other helper 
share the tasks? 
ll.Are you paid by shares ____ wages __ __ 
What is your wage? How do you actually receive your 
wage? 
C.FISHING TASKS OUTSIDE FISHING 
12.Do you help with any other tasks related to fishing 
besides working in the boat? 
fishing 
renewal of license 
building/repair of gear 
communication with buyers 
books 
communication with partner at sea 
correspondenc: 
banking/paying bills 
other 
13.If not, why not? 
D.DECISION MAKING 
14.Does your partner discuss decisions about fishing matters 
with you? Do you consider that your opinion is 
im~o:tant? Does your partner consider that your 
op1n1ons are important? 
15. (IF NOT WORKING IN THE BOAT) Do you find that not working 
in the boat has any effect on your participation in 
fishing decisions? 
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E.CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENTS: 
16.How many children do you have? 
What are their ages? ____ 
17.What kind of child care do you have? 
Is finding adequate child care a problem for you? 
How do you find somebody? 
Do you take responsibility for finding someone? Does 
your partner help with this task? 
Is it kin? neighbours? 
What is the regular wage paid for child-care in this 
area? 
Do you give stamps to your child-care worker? 
F.HOUSEWORK AND CHILD CARE TASKS: 
18.Describe to me an ordinary day during the fishing season. 
19.In your household, who usually does the following tasks? 
child care 
preparation of meals 
washing of clothes 
cleaning of clothes 
dishes 
gardening 
grocery shopping 
other shopping 
chauffeur for children 
Wife Husband shared 
20.Does your partner help you with the household chores more 
Juring the fishing season than at other times? 
21.Are you satisfied l'ti·':.h the division of labour in the 
house? 
Would you like your partner to help more with 
household tasks? Do children help with household 
tasks? 
22.Do you feel that the work you do in the household is a 
contribution to the fishing enterprise? 
G.ATTITUDE TO WOMEN FISHING 
23.Has your (or other women's) fishing in the boat changed 
your attitude to women doing this work? 
24.What does your partner think of you or other women 
fishing? 
25.What do other fishers in the harbour think of women 
fishing? 
26.What does your family (parents,brothers and sisters) think 
of women fishing? 
27.If you did not go fishing with your partner, would he hire 
someone else in the community as a helper? 
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28.How do men in the community feel about women are doing 
this kind of work? 
29.Does the fact that you don't work in the boat affect your 
knowledge of fishery issues? If so:oneone called the 
house asking about information on fisheries issues, do 
you feel you could talk about it? If someone comes to 
the house and talks about fisheries issues, do you feel 
comfortable about joining in the discussion? Do you 
feel that you could make decisions about the kind of 
equipment to buy? 
30.Do you see your son/daughter going fishing? 
Do you see it as a good profession? Do you see any 
particular problems in their going fishing? What do 
you see as the advantages? would you be willing to 
help them get started? Are they learning fishing 
skills? Is th~re a difference between boys and girls in 
the possibili~y of learning fishing skills? 
H.WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME. 
31.Do you have another job outside the home besides fishing? 
32.IF YES, what type of job? What is your main reason for 
working outside the home? Is the income from this job 
necessary to maintain the fishing household? How doe~ 
work outside the home affect your life at home? 
33.IF NO, do you want to work fulltime outside the home? 
34.What are the employment possibilities in the area? 
O.ORGANIZATION 
35.What is your perception of how fishers are organized? at 
level of tsarbour? at level of province? at level of 
region? 
36.What are the problems in organizing fishers? Benefits? 
37.Have you ever been involved in fishermen's organizations? 
at port level? at provincial level? at regional level? 
38.How do you solve problems that pertain only to this 
particular harbour? (ice facilities, repair of wharf,) 
39.What would you do for a problem that cannot be solved at 
the individual harbour level? (i.e. quota problems, 
price,) 
40.Do you feel that fishers' orqani~ations can have any 
effect on problems in the f.:..::ihery'? 
41.Are there any particular obst .. clf!S to lobster fishers 
organizing? 
42.Do you think man and women should be organized separately? 
43.Is the Maritime Fishermen's Union active in this barbour? 
the Fishermen's Association? 
44.What is your perception of the difference between the two 
organizations? 
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P.RELATION WITH COMMUNITY. 
45.What is the attitude of the community to fishers? Do they 
play an important role in the community? 
46.Are you involved in community organizations? Do you hold 
executive positions? 
47.Is it important for you to continue living in this 
community? 
48.How important is the lobster fishery to the survival of 
this community? 
49.How do people survive in a bad year? 
SO.Would you li~e to see your children have a choice of 
living in this community? 
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